


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


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*Princeton Theological Review*

# The Princeton Theological Review.



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## VOLUME I.

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# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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## I.

### EDWARD IRVING.

THE career of Edward Irving, of London, in the earlier part of last century, is perhaps well-nigh forgotten. Mention of the gift of tongues, and of his followers, the "Irvingites," who afterward developed into what is now known as the Catholic Apostolic Church, may serve to recall this once world-wide celebrity. His sad career has its features of instruction and warning not unsuited to the present day.

Irving was born in the small rural town of Annan, in Scotland, in the year 1792. He was of respectable and pious origin. His father was a tanner. On his mother's side he bore connection with a family of note in the locality. As a boy he was precocious mentally, and well endowed. At thirteen years of age he entered the University of Edinburgh and graduated in his eighteenth year. He at once set himself to the work of teaching, and became a tutor in Haddington. This was a temporary calling, as he proposed later to enter the ministry. Among his pupils at Haddington was the young girl, Jane Welsh, afterward the wife of Thomas Carlyle. This relation as tutor and young pupil grew into a lifelong friendship. With Carlyle himself, too, he maintained a cordial intimacy from that time. Companionship and association were afterward interrupted, but they remained friends on a familiar footing until death divided them, and one of Carlyle's sketches in his *Essays* is a pathetic tribute to his early Scotch friend, while in his *Reminiscences* he speaks of him at yet greater length.

At this time Irving was a robust young man, of kindly spirit,

of erect and vigorous frame, and like young David, the son of Jesse, "ruddy and withal of a beautiful countenance and goodly to look to"; and like King Saul, too, in his towering stature. He was accounted very handsome in all physical features with the one defect of an unfortunate squint, being violently cross-eyed.\*

As an instance of his strong physical life, coupled with his intellectual avidity, we are told that after dismissal of his school one evening he walked from Haddington to Edinburgh, a distance of eighteen miles, to hear Dr. Chalmers preach, and back again the same night, appearing fresh and alert for his school work in the morning.

Even in this early period, while yet in normal mental tone, he was fond of subtle speculations and of broaching fanciful opinions, which subjected him to officious hintings that as a prospective divinity student he might find more profitable subjects. With this bent of mind he early began to exhibit a pugnacious tenacity of view, an impatience of opposition and a love of controversy.

After two years of tutoring work at Haddington, Irving enrolled as a theological student, but at the same time, while prosecuting his studies, took the head-mastership of an academy in the town of Kirkcaldy. He was now about twenty years old, noble and commanding in appearance, a veritable "son of Anak" in his towering height of three or four inches above six feet. His physical proportions and his handsome features attracted attention wherever he passed. He was often taken for a cavalry officer, or a Highland chief. His mental impress and general personality were also marked. The pupils in his school were dubbed "the little Irvingites," ominously prefigurative of his London following in the latter days of his sad career.

He received license as a probationer for the Gospel ministry in 1815, while conducting his school at Kirkcaldy. As a licentiate he availed himself of all opportunities to preach, being desirous of a speedy settlement. But disappointments everywhere attended him. Both in his subject-matter and his manner of speech he was a prophet without honor among his own people. When we think of the distinction and exceeding popularity he attained as soon as he began his ministry in London, the apparent failure or at least the unresponsive attitude of the congregations in his native land seems difficult of explanation. He had great stateliness of manner, a prophet-like mien, an antiquated diction, elongated sentences,† and an idealistic and sublimated plane of

\* Whitfield had the same affliction, and used to be ridiculed by the godless wits of London as the "Rev. Dr. Squintum."

† In a certain communication he addressed to the Presbytery of London, I find one sentence of 351 words. That was doubtless exceptional.

thought which did not lay hold on the Scottish people. "He had muckle granner" (*grandeur*), they would say. The congregation at the parish church would "thin out" if it was known he was to supply the pulpit in the pastor's absence. Justly conscious of his talents, too proud or too well convinced in his own mind to alter his methods, and characterized by no small degree of self-importance and fired with ambition, his spirit chafed under all this. He became restive but not chastened, and while humiliated he was not at all humbled. It was the people who were in the wrong, he reasoned to himself—the people and the conventional humdrum preaching of the day! He conceived a contempt and cynical disdain for the prevailing pulpit style, and grew censorious and bitter over what he thought its dead platitudes; and while upright and correct in personal life, he exhibited marked infirmities of temper and was often vehement and severe in his speech.

During seven years of teaching work in Kirkcaldy, for five of which he had been an unsuccessful probationer for the Gospel ministry, he gave up his school and went to Edinburgh, where he occupied himself in further study,\* and in the preparation of sermons after a new method—a method of his own conceived in the dreamy years when, along with mortification and the sense of wounded pride, he had become impatient and very critical with the style of preaching he everywhere heard. He would speak incautiously over the accepted theology and the "certified soundness of dull men," and likened it to going back and forth on the same route like a ferryboat. In a self-confident but vague style he would boast that he wanted to "go deep into the ocean of truth."

He was enthusiastic and eager for the work of the ministry, and, like an armed knight, only waited a summons to enter the lists, but also, like those standing in the market-place, his wail was "no man hath hired me." He began to think there was no place for him in his own land and in his own Church, and contemplated for a while the career of a foreign missionary on some apostolic model of his own.

At length, after many disappointments and mortifications, he was invited to be Dr. Chalmers' assistant in St. John's Church, Glasgow. This was in 1819, when he was twenty-seven years old. He was not over-confident as he assumed the work, saying to the Doctor, "I will preach if you think fit, but if they bear with my preaching they will be the first people to bear with it." He was

\* Among other things he took up the study of ancient languages, saying pathetically, "Rejected by the living I was conversing with the dead."

happy, however, in having work at last, and felicitated himself in being thus associated with Thomas Chalmers, then in the greatness of his fame. His acceptability somewhat improved, but still his preaching did not much impress the people, though appreciated by a small circle.\*

He was very laborious in parish work. He went among the poor and won their esteem. In everything having a mode of his own, he assumed an apostolic manner in his intercourse, and whenever he entered one of their humble dwellings, would first utter his salutation, "Peace be to this house!" He would lay his hands on the heads of the children with the benediction, "The Lord bless thee and keep thee!" In all he did there was an air of picturesqueness and eccentricity. He was full of kindness and gave freely of his own means to the needy he found.

Thus he spent three years—still sore, and chafing with a sense of restraint and inferiority as building only on another's foundation, and in eight years of trial not advanced beyond the degree of probationer for the Gospel ministry.

Now the scene in London opens. In a crowded, obscure part of that great city was the Caledonian Chapel. This was a work maintained by the Scotch Established Church for the benefit of the Scotch Presbyterians living in London. It was at this time greatly reduced, with but fifty members, and in almost hopeless straits. Irving visited them and preached on trial. His change of fortune, his blaze of reputation and fame came almost with the suddenness of a flash. He was received most flatteringly. He writes of it, "My head was almost turned with the approbation I received."

Thus at length the time came for his ordination to the ministry; and as a settled pastor in a charge of his own, in the highest degree of hope and enthusiasm, he threw himself into the work, as he unwisely and boastingly said at the time, with the purpose of "making a demonstration for a higher style of Christianity, something more magnanimous, more heroic, than this age affects." It was in 1822 that his London career opened.

His amazing success as a preacher now began, and in the very metropolis of the English world. The contrast between his obscurity and apparent failure in Scotland and his sudden popularity and acclaim in London is puzzling. His greater freedom, however, and sense of position and wider scope, seemed suddenly to quicken and enlarge his powers. His name in less than a year was ringing through the great city. It was a startling and

\* Sometimes on the Sabbath when it was found he was in the pulpit as the preacher for the occasion, the people would be seen coming away from the church doors saying, "It's no himself the day"—"himself" being Dr. Chalmers.



unexampled leap into public favor. The humble Caledonian Chapel became known far beyond its little circle of plain Presbyterian parishioners, and people of the titled ranks and of high official station, and of the literary and intellectual classes, thronged to hear him. Sir James McIntosh, one of the foremost men of letters of that period, by some casual circumstance had been led to Irving's chapel one Sunday. He mentioned him as a great preacher to Canning, the celebrated statesman, and together they sat among his hearers the next Sunday. Shortly afterward, in a discussion in the House of Commons, the revenues of the Church of England were referred to, and the relation between high talent and good pay. Canning, in his speech, told the House of having recently heard a Scotch minister, in the Caledonian Chapel, which had no endowment whatever, preach the most eloquent sermon he had ever listened to. This excited curiosity and started the fashionable classes running after Irving. Applications for sittings rose to 1500 when the little building could only seat 600. The regular members could not find places. Tickets of entrance were issued. Crowds filled the aisles and the pulpit steps up to the very feet of the preacher. Literary men, philosophers, statesmen, Cabinet ministers, members of the nobility and people of fashion were found there. Coroneted coaches, twenty and thirty at a time, stood waiting about the doors—as Irving himself with a show of vanity, but at the same time in a guileless simplicity and *naïveté* of spirit, writes on the dedication page of a volume of his sermons, “The Princes and the Nobles and the Counsellors of this Great Empire whom God brought to hear me.” Thus within a year he sprang from obscurity and despondency to the giddiest heights of popular applause and idolatry. “For the first three or four years it was an unprecedented ministry,” said Dr. James Hamilton, one of Irving's successors in that church. And thus writes Thomas Carlyle of this period: “At sight of Canning, Brougham, Lady Jersey & Co. crowding round him and listening, week after week, as if to the message of salvation, the noblest and joyfullest thought (I know this on perfect authority) had taken possession of his noble, too sanguine, and too trustful mind: that the Christian religion was to be a truth again, not a paltry form, and to rule the world, he unworthy, even he, the chosen instrument.”

His appearance and manner in the pulpit were striking. He was very tall, robust and erect, with the finest physical proportions, and a wonderful voice. He had profuse black hair which hung in heavy ringlets on his shoulders.\* His face

\* As a descriptive writer at the time said, “A dark, apostolic head of hair waving toward his shoulders.”

was strikingly handsome with but his one defect — that of the cross-eye. This was all that marred his fine appearance, unless it was a certain fastidious and dainty air which hung about him. His oratory seemed not so much of the free and spontaneous sort as of a studied style, and he had the mannerisms of the stage—"an unconscious playactorism," Carlyle said.\* A New England writer—Goodrich, better known as Peter Parley—in his *Recollections of a Lifetime*, written many years ago, describes once hearing Irving when visiting London. The house was overflowing. He counted twenty carriages of the titled nobility in waiting. His comments are worth quoting. He notes in the preacher "a strange mixture of saintliness and dandyism." The prayer he thought affected, yet solemn and striking. His speaking was strongly suggestive of the manner of the stage. Phraseology was rich, flowing and redundant. Notwithstanding the "solemn dandyism," the preaching was grand. "It seemed at times," he said, "as if the whole audience was heaving and swelling with intense emotion—the whole heart and imagination were carried along upon the rushing tide of thought. As a display of oratory it was equal to anything I have ever heard from the pulpit; yet it did not appear calculated to have any effect in enforcing Christian truth upon the conscience."

His second year had only opened when he brought out his first book, dedicated to Dr. Chalmers, its title-page reading, *For the Oracles of God, Four Orations. For Judgment to Come, An Argument*. These had in substance been given as sermons. The unwisdom of the man is seen in the first words of the Preface, reflecting so pointedly on all his brethren in the ministry—"It hath appeared to the Author of this book, from more than ten years' meditation on the subject, that the chief obstacle to the progress of divine truth over the minds of men, is the want of its being properly presented to them." That their ignorance in religion has been due "to the want of a sedulous and skillful ministry, on the part of those to whom it is entrusted." The book had immediate popularity. It went through five editions (three in the first year), and was known on this side of the Atlantic also.† Dr. James Alexander, in his *Forty Years' Familiar Letters*, speaks very appreciatingly of it, and says its defense of eternal punishment "is one of the most commanding arguments I ever read." A copy of the book lies before me as I write.

\* But Carlyle also said, "Voice fine, of melodious depth, strength and clearness. None that better filled the ear, though not pathetic"—"not a power quite on the heart as Chalmers's was."

† Irving's name about this time was considered in the matter of successionship to the pulpit of Dr. John M. Mason in New York.

There is an impressive diction, a strain of elevated thought, an old-time eloquence and a stately rhythmical flow in its long sentences which still have charm. But as a volume it is now only a relic, perhaps seldom to be found even in the dusty shelves of old second-hand book shops.

It became necessary to build a new and larger house of worship. From Caledonian Chapel they became Regent Square Presbyterian Church, which still flourishes to-day, perhaps the strongest church of that order in London. Irving's great popularity, however, and his starlike brilliancy was of short duration. But he still continued to be a marked figure. He had fame and notoriety, and was much in demand. His career lasted about five years longer, and its end was a sad, woeful, heart-sickening failure, and, alas! it might be said of him as Hosea speaks, "Oh, Israel, thou hast destroyed *thyself*!" His failure lay at his own door.

To say that Irving had glaring faults and defects is no more than must be said of many another conspicuous man. But to say that one neither can nor will see them himself, nor allow correction of them, is what cannot be charged against the average man. This, however, was true of him. He never would mend his ways, however palpably disastrous they proved. He refused to profit by his blunders. To-morrow would be as to-day and yet more abundant in its folly. It was partly from conceit and an overweening sense of his own sufficiency which made him impervious to criticism and proof against every friendly suggestion, and partly from the ineradicable conviction that the whole Church had but an obscure sense of the truth, and that his brethren of the ministry failed in their apprehensions of their work and in their methods of preaching, and that he was born to "set things right." This we are painfully constrained to regard as largely accounting for his sad and pitiable course. It was not so much the arrogance and presumption and self-complacency which naturally excite our repugnance. There was in it all a *naïveté* and guilelessness which modified the popular judgment. He would exhibit follies, but in the midst of them would be seen a simplicity and noble spirit and an amiable sort of hallucination. He was a combination of talent and oddity. He was a brilliant genius, but an idealist and impracticable visionary, living in a mystic atmosphere, and his admirers had a heavy load to bear in his extravagances. He was a good man, but marked by grievous infirmities. In public ministration he seemed utterly without prudence and practical wisdom.\* His pulpit services he would

\* John Brown, of Haddington, used to say to his students, "If ye lack grace ye may get it by praying for it; if ye lack learning ye may get it by working for it; but if ye lack common sense I dinna ken where ye are to get it!"

often protract beyond the bounds of all judgment and beyond the bounds of reasonable endurance—continuing them for three hours or more. He had been known to give two hours and a half to a sermon alone. When kindly and most respectfully requested by the Session to shorten a little, he not only refused to do so, but rebuked them for presuming to interfere with his own sense of duty. He says in a letter to his wife: “I told them they must talk no more to me concerning the ministry of the Word, for I would submit to no authority in that matter but the authority of the Church, from which also I would take liberty to appeal if it gainsaid my conscience.” And again, subsequent to this, he writes to her, “Our service extended to three hours in the morning, and two hours and a half in the evening, and I find I cannot relax.” When attempting to regain his hold on the fashionable and worldly auditors, as they began dropping away from his services, he refused to shorten even by half an hour. Dr. Chalmers tells of his going to London to preach for him on a special occasion. Irving took part of the services which preceded the sermon. His prayer was forty minutes long, and his reading of the Scripture, and expounding thereof as he read, about as much more, so that the audience was well wearied before the invited guest of the occasion had a chance to begin. And Chalmers humorously adds, “When my turn came, of what use could I be in an exhausted receiver?” It might seem ungracious to reproduce the following incident, were it not illustrative of Irving’s utter lack of tact combined with his simplicity and straightforwardness. A certain gentleman invited a party of Christian friends to his house. In the course of the evening, before separating, a late supper was to be served. Some of the guests had three miles to walk after the meal. But before sitting down to eat Irving was requested by the host to read the Bible and expound a little. He began, and continued to discourse on and on. At last the clock struck twelve, and then the host very gently suggested it might be desirable to draw to a close. “Who art thou,” replied Irving, “who dares to interrupt the man of God in the midst of his administration?” He pursued his talk for some time longer, then closed the book, and waving his long arm over the head of his host, uttered a prayer that the brother’s offense might be forgiven!\*

At another time, when in his tide of popularity, he was invited to deliver an address before the London Missionary Society. The house was crowded long in advance of the hour. Irving’s pro-

\* Related by a Rev. Mr. Craig, of Edinburgh, and given in Hanna’s *Memoirs of Chalmers*, Vol. III, p. 276.



livity was so great that he had to stop twice in the course of the address to let the people rest themselves by singing. But this was not the whole of his tactless course that night. The Society, like all our Missionary Boards now, with its stations and men and its great network of operations, had to be maintained by the money offerings at home, and depended much on the large popular anniversary meetings to stir the interest and enthusiasm of the people. But what should the speaker of the occasion do but ignore all this, and make his whole address a disparagement of systematic or organized methods of missionary work, and a protest against the "machinery of evangelism," and urge as the ideal plan that missionaries go forth as free lances, without staff or scrip, without banker or provision, and responsible to no Society or Board with its Ways and Means Committee and its balance sheets! The address fell like a pall on the friends of the Society. The directors were greatly chagrined and metaphorically gnashed their teeth and, departing from usual custom, refused to print it. Thereupon Irving published it himself and dedicated it to whom? To the poet Coleridge, thus acknowledging: "You have been more profitable to my faith in orthodox doctrine, to my spiritual understanding of the Word of God, and to my right conception of the Christian Church, than any or all the men with whom I have entertained friendship or conversation."

In *Leigh Hunt's Correspondence*, Vol. II, Charles Lamb thus writes (1825): "I have got acquainted with Mr. Irving, the Scotch preacher, whose fame must have reached you. He is a humble disciple at the feet of Gamaliel S. T. C. Judge how Irving's sectarists must start when I tell you he has dedicated a book to S. T. C., acknowledging to have learned more from him than from all the men he ever conversed with. He is a most amiable, sincere, modest man in a room, this Boanerges in the temple. Mrs. Montague told him the dedication would do him no good. 'That shall be a reason for doing it,' was his answer. . . . Judge now whether this man be a quack."

In the dedication of a volume of sermons to another of his philosopher friends, Basil Montague, he takes occasion to repeat this acknowledgment, confessing himself "more beholden to our sage friend, Mr. Coleridge, than to all men besides for the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus."

As another surprising expression of indebtedness for theological conception (related in Carlyle's *Reminiscences*), Irving, speaking once of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, said: "In this German poet there are some pages about Christ and the Christian religion which, as I study and restudy, have more sense about that matter than I have found in all the theologians I have read."

While still a notability in London some began to speak of him as "a disappointed notability." His audiences continued large, though the new building, much more spacious than the old, was seldom overcrowded. The character of his hearers, however, outside the original, steadfast membership of the church, had greatly changed. "Fashion went its idle way," said Carlyle, and the coroneted carriages were no longer seen at the doors. The titled classes, the great ones in the world of letters and in public affairs had had their fill. Those now taking their places were another kind of people—they were of a class that loved the unbeaten paths and whose ears itched for startling novelties. "Yielding partly to his own excursive instincts," wrote Dr. James Hamilton, "and partly to the temptation to tell some new thing to an excited throng expecting a sensation every Sunday, soberer themes were exchanged for exuberant discourses on prophecy and for subtle speculations on the mystical and the mysterious. These were followed by his enthusiastic advocacy of the miraculous gifts and by weird prayer meetings held in the morning dawn, and conferences and strange expoundings through the day, and the 'tongues' came and 'the idealist became the simple visionary.'"<sup>\*</sup>

Irving's mind was not of the logical or judicial order, and in theological speculations he was obscure, sentimental and fanciful. He had imagination and was rich in poetic and spiritual conceptions. But, as Principal Tulloch said of him, he was never at any time a thinker, and was destitute of the critical intellect. He was attracted by whatever in theology or philosophy had a tinge of mysticism. Dr. Chalmers tells of Irving once taking him to an interview with Coleridge. He himself, he says, found the poet-philosopher's monologue "mainly far out of all sight and all sympathy," while Irving sat as at the feet of an oracle and drank in every syllable. Going away, Chalmers remarked on the obscurity of what they had been hearing, and in his downright Scotch way said he "liked to see all sides of an idea before taking up with it." Irving responded, very characteristically, "For my part, I love to see an idea looming through the mist!" That remark throws light on his mental vagaries. And yet with all this predilection for the shadowy and fanciful, no one could be more insistently dogmatic than he.

I have found no instance where he ever confessed himself mistaken, or relinquished a cherished view if it were opposed. The

<sup>\*</sup> Carlyle's judgment in this connection is most probably overdrawn: "The intoxicating poison had been swallowed. . . . There was now the impossibility to live neglected, to walk in quiet paths. Singularity must henceforth succeed singularity."

contrary judgment and opinions of friends had no effect on his mind. In the matter of his intercourse with fellow-ministers, there was always a sense of "aloofness." Cordial and sympathetic relations with his brethren seemed limited to scattered ones here and there, who for the most part were marked by peculiarities of personal history or of views. He formed associations and congenial intimacies in ranks outside his own calling, to an extent perhaps very unusual among busy pastors. This was in part due to his cultivated tastes and aptitudes, but very largely due to that cynical judgment of the ministers of his time, which marked him from the very first, as to their conception of the work and their qualifications. When he resided for a time in Edinburgh, while a licentiate, Carlyle says he "used to give breakfasts to the intellectualities he fell in with." In the years of his London popularity he mingled with poets and painters, with literary men and philosophers, and "with many of the world's great," as Mrs. Oliphant remarks, "whose society was not specially open to ministers of the Gospel." As we have seen, he sat as a disciple of Coleridge. He was on confidential terms with Basil Montague and his wife, and an intimate in the inner circle of their home, where he met many of the world's notabilities. Goodwin, the radical Socialistic philosopher, and advocate, for a time, of pernicious theories concerning marriage, was another with whom he had association.

He took to advancing strange views as to the nature of Christ.\* That in becoming incarnate the Lord had taken human nature in its fallen estate, with its sinful tendencies, a nature which was in all respects as ours; that His body was of sinful substance against which He had to strive. That His holiness in the life of the flesh was not due to any native quality making it to differ from humanity in general, but to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and that the Lord was without sin only because, in the constant struggle and conflict, He came off victorious. It is easy to see that these may have been only unguarded deductions from the evident truth that, as possessed of a human nature, Christ could be subject to temptation. But he would brook no questioning and, when controverted on the subject, proceeded to develop his thought into an essential conception of Christ's human nature, which was construed to mean the sinfulness of that nature. The Presbytery of London felt obliged to condemn the views which, by speech and pen, he was zealously propagating. And here Irving's fatuous perversity exhibited itself. Instead of modifying or explaining in accord-

\* The book "*Christ's Holiness in the Flesh*," a series of his pulpit discourses, 1831.

ance with the thought of the Church in respect of the Lord's humanity, he would insist on the same misleading expressions; and not only so, but in a persistent and unyielding dogmatism would pertinaciously charge his opponents with robbing the Lord of His true glory, and that they denied Christ had truly come in the flesh, and were Anti-christ and enemies of the truth.

About this time he had become enamored of predictive prophecy relative to the outward and political state of the world, the signs of the times, the restoration of the Jews, and the second coming of Christ. This quite absorbed him and he spent much time attending prophetic conferences, and mingling with new and divers characters whom those themes attracted. With his imaginative temperament, the extremer phases and the more mystical and allegorical methods of interpretation took hold of him at once. His sermons and addresses now were largely on those lines. The question of Catholic emancipation was then before the country, and this gave new zest to the subject of political conditions in relation to the kingdom of God on the earth. He went up to Scotland in the spring of 1828, preaching his messages on prophecy as he had opportunity, and especially in Edinburgh. The General Assembly was in session there at that time. Not to divert from the Assembly's hours of work, he took six o'clock in the morning as his hour. It was but six years since he had left Scotland, a preacher slightly esteemed. Now he was "the great Mr. Irving," and Assembly commissioners and the people of the town thronged the church and gave tribute, at least to the spell of his eloquence. Dr. Chalmers writes: "He (Irving) has given twelve lectures on Prophecy to the people of Edinburgh, and certainly there must have been a marvelous power of attraction that could turn a whole population out of their beds so early as five o'clock in the morning. The largest church was overcrowded. I heard him once; but I must just be honest enough and humble enough to acknowledge that I scarcely understood a single word, nor do I comprehend the ground on which he goes in his violent allegorizations, chiefly of the Old Testament."\* This line of thought so took possession of him that gradually he became imbued with the conviction that the first age of the Church should be reproduced in the nineteenth century, and that the phenomena of miraculous gifts—healings, speaking with unknown

\* *Hanna's Memoirs of Chalmers*, Vol. III, p. 226. Again Chalmers speaks of it: "He is drawing prodigious crowds. . . . I have no hesitation in saying that it is quite woeful. There is power and richness and gleams of exquisite beauty, but withal a mysticism and an extreme allegorization which I am sure must be pernicious to the general cause. This is the impression of every clergyman I have met, and some think of making a friendly remonstrance with him."



tongues, and direct revelations by the Spirit—were again to be the dowry of the Church. At times, too, he gave intimations of our modern Christian Science view that bodily disease was sin, and no man with faith ought to be overcome by it.

Just then there developed in Scotland one of those remarkable religio-psychological occurrences of which we occasionally hear. A Miss Campbell, as we are told, after a long invalidism, was restored to health in response to prayer, and this was accompanied by her instantly speaking “at great length and with superhuman strength” in an unknown tongue. This was shortly afterward followed by a similar instance in the case of another young woman of the same neighborhood. These reports made a great stir, and to Irving’s mind were as sparks to the tinder. “They carry to me,” he wrote to Dr. Chalmers, “a spiritual conviction and a spiritual reproof which I cannot express.” Thus began the agitating and woeful chapter which irretrievably wrecked and despoiled him.

In the meantime his congregation had greatly changed in character. The literati and the fashionable and the titled classes were no more seen, and the carriages with coronets and emblazonry drew up no more at the doors. His faithful Scotch Presbyterians held on, but were becoming painfully apprehensive. A new clientele had developed entirely unlike the original stock—those whom the preacher’s eloquence had touched, and those drawn by his prophetic studies, and all those who delighted in the speculative and mystical and shadowy more than in the things of sober preaching.\* And now began in this staid old Scotch church the strange phenomenon of the so-called “Tongues.” This was a sudden breaking out into speech, as the impulse might seize, without regard to order or decorum in the assembly. This “utterance” was regarded as a direct message of the Holy Spirit, the speaker being but the passive medium. The message was preceded by a burst of doleful and unintelligible sounds, startling in their fullness and strength, which was the “unknown tongue,” serving as a heralding signal and sign of inspiration to prepare the ears for the vernacular utterance about to follow. This “utterance” or message was generally of an exclamatory and hortatory character, insipid and commonplace, and exciting attention only by reason of its *outré* accompaniments. At first Irving thought to restrict these demonstrations to more private and less formal gatherings. And it is said that at morning meetings in the early

\* Dr. James Hamilton’s description is “a coterie of charlatans and moonshiny mystics, visionary men and hysterical women, who domineered and flattered by turns.”

daybreak hour as many as a thousand would sometimes be present, and these weird and astonishing utterances would be heard. But that fantastical element of his people were persistent and aggressive and would not be restrained, and the warnings and reproofs of the "prophets" mastered him, and he announced in the pulpit that his conscience would no longer permit him to stifle the voice of the Holy Ghost in the church! A notable scene soon followed. Two of the sisterhood, during the morning service, "gave vent to utterance," producing the utmost confusion. Irving was in the midst of his sermon, one of those discourses of genius, it is said, which "still ranked among the wonders of the times." But neither to his own mind nor to the interrupting "prophetesses" did the sense of impropriety or disorder suggest itself. When the half-incoherent message was finished, he did not resume his sermon, but told the people this was the hand of God, and the divine directory by which he must henceforth be guided; and turning to the fourteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, he discoursed on his favorite theme of tongues and revelations and prophesyings. At night, the church being filled to its utmost, there was a like scene, only of still greater confusion.

In view of that day's unparalleled scenes, Irving was led for the moment to regret the experiment, and to declare that he would not again expose the Sabbath services to such outbreaks. But before the week was over, he rose above mere prudential considerations; and when the Sabbath came recanted his error, and begged the people to listen with devout attention should it please the Lord to speak by the mouth of His messengers there present. They had not long to wait. A young woman, a Miss Cardale, rose to "prophesy," beginning in the unknown tongue and then passing into the known in the following ejaculatory testimony: "He shall reveal it! He shall reveal it! Yea, heed it! Yea, heed it! Ye are yet in the wilderness. Despise not His Word! Despise not His Word! Not a jot or tittle shall pass away!" And Irving reverently called on the church to bless the Lord for His voice, which they had just heard in the midst of the congregation!

Amazing as it seems, here was Irving's conviction and his conscience. He made no claim to the "gift of tongues" for himself. But, as he believed, the "gifted persons" were among his people, and to silence them was to silence the voice of God! One of his judicious elders, his own brother-in-law, William Hamilton, thus wrote at this time: "Mr. Irving is fully persuaded and hesitates not to declare that it is the Holy Ghost speaking in the members of Christ, as on the day of Pentecost . . . and he is so

thoroughly convinced in his own mind, that it is impossible to make an impression upon him, or to induce that caution which the circumstances seem so imperatively to demand."

The delusion gained ground. A number of masterful men connected themselves with it and seemed to control Irving. This element outnumbered the sober Scotch remnant, who soon realized that they were unable to stay the current. The Session would have compromised had he been willing to suppress the manifestations in public, allowing him liberty in the more private meetings. But he would not agree to shut out what he took for the voice of God from any meeting of the church, and he only became more headstrong and extreme. A bridgeless chasm began to open between himself and his earlier brethren.

In the meantime the church was suffering. It had become a target and laughing-stock to the irreverent public. The press took up the matter. The London *Times* spoke of the "blasphemous absurdities enacted in the Caledonian Church," "the screaming of hysterical women and the ravings of fanatic men," the "fooleries" and the "hideous interludes of the unknown tongues." And such was the scandal and reproach that the church authorities were at last constrained to interfere. The organization was in connection with the Established Church of Scotland, and the property vested there. It was held by the trustees for the purposes of religious service according to the doctrine, form of worship and mode of discipline of that Church; and the trust-deed provided that in all cases of complaint against the minister, brought by the trustees, the Presbytery of London should adjudicate, their decision being final. Such was the novelty of the situation which had been precipitated that this seemed the only practicable method of interference. Accordingly, after friendly remonstrance and long patience, and even kindly proposals of compromise, as respected the time and place of the "prophesying," had proved without avail, the trustees prepared their case for Presbytery, alleging that the pastor permitted and encouraged the interruption of the public sanctuary service by those not ministers nor licentiates of the Church of Scotland, and by persons neither members nor seat-holders. When it was first bruited that the trustees contemplated this appeal, Irving very characteristically addressed them in written communications in which, resolutely refusing to deviate in the slightest degree from the course he had adopted, he solemnly warned them "in the name of the Most High God not to gainsay or impede the work of speaking with tongues and prophesying"; that the manifestation of which they complained was "verily the mighty work of God,

which to act against is to act against the Holy Ghost"; and as if they were the offenders under charge, he adjures them "retrace your steps. Come forward and confess your sin in having thought or spoken evil against it." Conditions and circumstances which in the case of any other man would at least have caused hesitation at this moment of crisis, had not the slightest deterrent influence on Irving's mind. The tried friends of years, both in the Church and without, were lamenting his course; while his new following were but partisan friends, having but little in common with him, adherents only of yesterday and only as he represented their vagaries and submitted to their methods. His elders, with but one exception, withstood him. His wife's father, Dr. Martin, the long-time pastor in Kirkcaldy, affectionately sought to dissuade him. Thomas Carlyle and his wife, in vexation and in great plainness of speech, remonstrated with him against his "Bedlam" and "chaos." His friend Coleridge grieved that he was "throwing himself away." His own chosen assistant in the congregation, Rev. Mr. Scott, who had been fully committed to the doctrine of the tongues and the divine gifts, renounced it all as a gross mistake. And even the man Baxter—who had been one of the most active and conspicuous in the band of "prophets," a stimulator and director of Irving to a large degree, and who had brought many into the new band—on the very morning of the day Irving was to meet the Presbytery and make his defense, this man suddenly appeared at his house to announce his own recantation, and to tell him his conviction "that we have all been speaking by a lying spirit and not by the Spirit of the Lord." We wonder how poor Irving could stand up against all this strong tide. But none of these things moved him. His self-complacent air was, "'Tis they who are blind, 'tis I who see!" He set himself in fatal steadfastness against all discouragements, and with head erect and confidence unshaken he appeared before the Presbytery.

He made a protracted and impassioned presentation of his case. He claimed for himself, as "the angel of the Church," an authority above every Church court, in the exercise of which none could control him save the exalted Lord Himself. He affirmed the absolute reality of the alleged miraculous gifts, and that they were to continue a perpetual endowment in the Church. The utterances which had been given forth among his people had the signs of the Holy Ghost upon them, and were "in words worthy of God," and "Can there be any statute forbidding the Holy Ghost to speak in his own temple?" Neither did he rest on the defensive, but boldly carried the war into the territory of



his judges, charging that they would not heed the Scriptures and hence were not a court of Christ, but were enemies of the cross and Anti-christ, and the Lord was angry with them. That they had "been betrayed into the snare of Satan and had brought complaint against the Holy Ghost, from which awful responsibility I pray God your souls may be delivered." That the Protestant Churches were as truly in the state of Babylon as was the Roman Church. And he warned them how onerous a day it would be for London and for the whole kingdom if "with a stout heart and a high hand you shut up that house in which alone the voice of the Holy Ghost is heard," and "with a trust-deed beat the minister of Jesus from his place, and the Lord Jesus from His place also." "It is not I that am decided against, but it is you, the pastors and elders, that are decided against."\*

He was not sparing in vituperation and invective either. He solemnly denounced the presbyters before him as "in arms against the King," and he would lead forth his squadron to do battle, "no longer by your side, but against you, until you change your ensign and fight under the banner of the Word of God." The Psalmist's words of indignation against his foes he made his own, refusing "to make distinctions between my personal friends and God." But all this was not "in malice, but contrariwise in love." He could wash their feet with his tears, "if only I might thereby prevail to turn them back from their pernicious ways." And he assured them there was mercy with God whom they had offended, "if they will repent of their sins and lie low in the dust before Him."

The Presbytery, after fully considering the question, and deploring the necessity laid upon them, took action to the effect that, by his breaches of doctrine and discipline, he had rendered himself unfit to remain the minister of that Scotch Church in London. The trustees therefore locked the doors upon him.

Such were the anomalies in Irving that it is said his preaching all this while, apart from his vagaries about the tongues, was with his customary power, and that on the very Sabbath day of his exclusion, appointed as a Communion Sabbath, two hundred were ready to be admitted as new members. He and his large flock assembled for their matins "in the early May sunshine, before the world was half-awake," and found the gates closed upon them. His following numbered more than half the church,

\* It is all very pitiable, yet we cannot but recall the incident of the old Greek philosopher whom the court once banished from the city. Hearing the decree read to him, and turning at once to depart from its coasts, he threw back his Parthian dart, "And I banish the city!"

and they went out, ejected, as they claimed, for the truth's sake, and with the air of martyrs. Irving had no organic faculty, nor perhaps desire for much of organization. He so dwelt in a mystic atmosphere and saw all things under a poetic glamor that it is likely, had he been left to himself, his movement would never have assumed much externality. But it was not long before it came under the control of men much shrewder than he, and possessed of great administrative and directing capacity. For a while the people were known simply as Irvingites. But in the course of time, under the executive lead of Mr. Henry Drummond and others, the movement developed into what is now known as the Catholic Apostolic Church.

With his temperamental peculiarities, Irving could perceive no moral impropriety in a loose alliance to the faith or the government of the Church which had ordained him. He anticipated those in the ranks of the ministry since his day who have sought to relieve their consciences in the matter of Confessional relations. He would speak of a Church creed as a "snare to tender consciences and a trial to honest men," that it pertained to the past and is "what the Church thought at that time." He claimed for himself a full liberty of attitude, and would make the specious plea that "the person is above the book, and not the book above the person." He favored Macleod Campbell, who, by an almost unanimous vote, had been condemned by the Scotch Assembly for doctrinal errors; also Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen, whose writings had been questioned, and he boldly charged that the Church courts had rendered more "wicked judgments and had more grieved God and Christ than did the Council of Trent," and had "sealed themselves Babylon, and had set up the abomination which maketh desolate in the holy place"; that they were a "degenerate race of rulers who had sold themselves to do iniquity with greediness, and to draw sin as with a cart-rope." And when criticised for remaining in a Church with which he was so at variance, and whose usages and authority in the ordinances of worship he felt free to disregard, he justified himself therein, claiming that to withdraw would be "selfish and treacherous to his Master."

The rupture with his old Church and the initiation of his new movement marked the beginning of the end for poor Irving. It was a sad change and he felt it sorely. The heart is touched as one reads of it. Broken now were all his old ties of ancestral Church and his early fellowships. He had one kind of repose, however, to which he had long been a stranger—his days of contention and strife with former friends were now over, and he had

unchallenged freedom in regard to the "manifestations." But he was a sad and brooding man, without buoyancy or ambition. He found relief to his spirit by excessive preaching—preaching in his church, preaching on the commons, on the street corners, sometimes every day of the week for weeks at a time.\* And when thus preaching there would stand near by some obscure man or woman to be seized by "the power" and break in with the "tongue" and the prophecy, and for whom the great preacher would reverently pause, as for the voice of God! Oh, it was pitiful!†

Interest in the "tongues" phenomena of that period has long since ceased. But it may be interesting, for curiosity's sake, to look at a few specimens. They are given in Mrs. Oliphant's *Life of Irving*. In the course of one sermon Irving was thus interrupted seven times.‡ Speaking of the Church as barren, an ecstatic voice cries out, "Oh, but she shall be fruitful! Oh! Oh! she shall replenish the earth and subdue it—and subdue it!"

When he is declaring there is salvation in Christ for every one, a voice is heard: "Ah! Shut Him not out—shut not out your Saviour! Ah! you are proud of your dignity! Ah! truly your power is fearful! Ah! you are not straitened in your Father; you are straitened in yourselves! Oh, receive Him now! Delay not! Ah! wherefore stand ye back?"

Irving resumes, when he is immediately interrupted again: "Oh, I have set before thee—Oh, I have set before thee an open door! Oh, let no man shut it—Oh, let no man shut it!"

Then again an utterance from the mouth of one of the sisters: "Ah! will ye despise—Ah! will ye despise the blood of Jesus? Will ye pass by the cross, the cross of Jesus? Oh! He was slain, He was slain, and He hath redeemed you! He hath redeemed you! Oh, the blood, the blood, the blood that speaketh better things than the blood of Abel!"

And again a voice sounds forth: "Ah! be ye warned! Ye have been warned. The Lord hath prepared for you a table, but

\* He once expressed the opinion that "no man is furnished for the ministry till he can unclasp his pocket Bible and, wherever it opens, discourse from it largely and spiritually to the people."

† "How are the mighty fallen!" exclaims his good friend Carlyle. "My own high Irving come to this, by paltry popularities and Cockney admirations puddling such a head!"

‡ Only, "they are not interruptions," said he in his speech before the Presbytery of London, "for we are told, 'If anything be revealed to another sitting by, let the first hold his peace.' And if by the Spirit anything be revealed to any one sitting by, though I be engaged in praying—though I be engaged in preaching—I am required to hold my peace!"

it is a table in the presence of your enemies. Ah, look you well to it! The city shall be builded—ah! every jot, every piece of the edifice. See that ye build with one hand, and with a weapon in the other. Ah! Sanballat, Sanballat, Sanballat! the Horonite, the Moabite, the Amorite! Ah! confederate, confederate, confederate with the Horonite! Ah! look ye to it, look ye to it!”

Dr. Addison Alexander, of Princeton Theological Seminary, describes a service he himself attended in Irving's church in 1833.\* He read Exod. xxxix, with an allegorical exposition. The ouches of the breastplate he explained to mean the rulers of the Church. While he was dealing out one of the elders broke forth, first in the signaling unknown tongue which, though he could not exactly reproduce it, he says sounded like “Taranti—hoiti—faragmi—santi.” This was immediately followed by the vernacular message, “O ye people—ye people of ye Lord, ye have not the ouches—ye have not the ouches—ha-a-a; ye must have them—ye must have them—ha-a-a; ye cannot hear—ye cannot hear!” As soon as the voice began Irving had suspended his exposition and covered his face with his hands.†

Irving's Presbytery in Scotland had already proceeded against him, and he appeared before its bar to answer to the charge of “disseminating heresies, particularly the doctrine of the fallen state and sinfulness of our Lord's human nature.” Under great tension of feeling and a strain of excitement throughout the public, and accompanied with certain dramatic ebullitions by Irving himself, the sentence of deposition was pronounced—and he was no longer a minister or a member of the Church of Scotland.

As before the Presbytery of London, so now, too, Irving became the aggressor, and would judge and rebuke those who had gathered to administer against him. When they proposed to have first a private conference with him, he refused—declaring he would not take their hand of fellowship nor eat bread with them, but would be at enmity with them while they were in rebellion against Christ in persecuting his faithful members. They were

\* He gives this personal picture: “He has a noble figure and his features are not ugly, with the exception of an awful squint. His hair is parted right and left and hangs down on his shoulders in affected disorder. His dress is laboriously old fashioned—a black Quaker coat and short clothes. His voice is harsh, but like a trumpet; it takes hold of one and cannot be forgotten.”—*Life of J. A. Alexander, D.D.*, Vol. I, p. 290.

† Carlyle, in his “*Reminiscences*,” describes a social call he and his wife once paid at Irving's house. “Devotees were in the adjoining room. There burst forth a shrieking, hysterical ‘Lah, lall, lall!’ (little or nothing else but *l's* and *a's* for several minutes), to which Irving with singular calmness said only, ‘There, hear you, these are the Tongues!’ We soon came away. ‘Why was there not a bucket of water to fling on that lah, lalling hysterical mad woman,’ each said to the other.”



disowning, not him, but the Lord, and he reproved them all, both ministers and elders, for their sins. They were "in gross darkness" and their "people were benighted." With an overwhelming sense of indignation, he returned to his London flock.

That which Irving lacked of organizing power, the masterful men of the new movement were abundantly supplied with, and it soon became manifest that he, the original shepherd, instead of longer leading, was now himself carried on a tide which other hands were directing. As apostles and elders and prophets, they exercised authority not only in the affairs of the congregation but over Irving himself. Whether they considered he had never been properly set apart to the office of "angel" of the Church, or whether he had disobeyed some of their regulations in his voluntary preachings, or whether they so far deferred to the act of his deposition from the ministry by the Scotch Presbytery—whatever the reason may have been, no sooner was he back among his people than he was notified that an interdict had been issued "in the power," forbidding him to assume any function outside the province of a deacon. This was the greatest humiliation and indignity to the greatly tried man who had already endured so much for those vagaries which were now embodied in the new Church. But he received it with bowed head (for how could he appeal from an inspired direction?), and he sat among the penitent and the silent ones until the apostles and prophets, catching a new "utterance," restored him to his place. Repeatedly was he reminded that he was a subject, and no longer his own master or their leader. He was censured and rebuked at times and would humbly "confess his errors" and submit to the judgment. Was not this what he valiantly contended for—the supernatural utterances of prophets for instruction and guidance in the Church? He was consistent and submitted himself and obeyed. Along with such humiliations inflicted upon him, the leaders began introducing morsels of ceremonial and paraphernalia which must have been exceedingly distasteful to Irving.\* And at the same time his informal open-air work was looked upon with disfavor. His intercourse with the world by pen and by public functions ceased and he became a recluse within the walls of his church.

Irving was now a broken man. By the end of the first year his health was weakening, his energies flagged, and his spirit failed him. The fire of his eloquence ceased, and there was a plaintive pathos in his tone. "Reproach hath broken my heart," he mournfully exclaimed at one time amid his over-

\* "The movement became wayward enough," says Dr. Wm. Arnot, writing about 1870, "and now it marches and bends and burns candles with as much childish earnestness as any of its neighbor ritualists, whether Anglican or Romish."

whelming perplexities. It was pitiful, and those who had known him in earlier years, and who still admired him even in his aberrations, could only grieve but could not help. It was the delusion of *Dou Quixote*—the same high-minded chivalry, the same simplicity which often disarmed criticism or turned it into pity, the same fertility of explanation when failures and disappointments befell his cherished schemes. But unlike the poor Spanish knight, there was no sign at the last that the spell was broken and his vision cleared. He continued to the end in what, to give it the best name, we will call his firmness.

During the latter half of the year 1834, he set forth on a horse-back journey for health's sake, traveling slowly through western England and wending his way to Scotland. Sometime in October he arrived in his greatly loved native land. But he had returned only to die. He lay at Glasgow. His strong form was wasting away. He was frequently in delirium, but what they could catch of his words was of spiritual things and the breathings of prayer. Sometimes he imagined himself back in London amid his congregation, and would speak words of counsel and exhortation. Once the watchers heard him murmuring strange syllables of an unknown tongue. The venerable Dr. Martin, his wife's father, giving ear, found it was the Hebrew of the 23d Psalm the dying man was uttering. On a Sabbath midnight in December he passed away. The last thing like an articulate sentence which they caught from his lips was, "If I die, I die in the Lord. Amen."

He was buried in the crypt of Glasgow Cathedral. If not in life, yet in death he was back again, restored, as it were, in the old companionships. For mingling in the throng which followed the body to its last resting-place were many of his friends of other days, and most of the clergy of the city who, disapproving his erratic course, yet gave him tender respect and honor in his death. And throughout the city he was still in repute as "the great Edward Irving," and among all classes there was the mingled sentiment of admiration and pity.

The strong Regent Square Presbyterian Church of London is in a sense Irving's memorial. He had built it, and within its walls had been known many of his preaching triumphs, and alas! too the exploiting of his vagaries.

The well-known Dr. James Hamilton was afterward a pastor there, and he was followed by the still living Dr. Dykes. During Dr. Dykes' pastorate, and at his suggestion, a memorial tablet to Irving was placed in the church. And there it is to be seen to-day—the unhappy man's erratic course forgotten and his name linked again with its one-time associations.

## II.

### DASHING THE LITTLE ONES AGAINST THE ROCK.

THE historical setting of the 137th Psalm is its complete vindication from the mistaken interpretation of believers in the Bible and from the severe charges brought against the Psalm by unsympathetic writers. Many a tender-hearted believer reading, "Happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock" (cliff), is at a loss for an interpretation that shall speak without malice, revenge and delight in the sufferings of others. The refined tenderness of the first verses, the love of Jehovah and His worship, the appeal to Him to whom alone vengeance belongs (Deut. xxxii. 39, 41; Ps. xciv. 1) cannot be harmonized with the often supposed brutal revenge of the last verses. Did the sufferings of the captives, who knew that they suffered for the sins of their own nation, bring forth no better fruit in them than prayer to Jehovah for and gloating over expected cruelties to little children who had never injured them? Did they bless God and curse men in the same breath of prayer? If they thus cursed men their sorrow for Jerusalem was divorced from all love and reverence for God. Ezekiel tells us that the captive Jews looked upon Jerusalem as "their stronghold, the joy of their glory, the desire of their eyes, on which they set their heart" (xxiv. 25); but this was only human patriotism, love of their homeland, for these same captives were idolaters in heart and deed in Judah and in Babylonia, and mocked at God's word. Is Ps. cxxxvii only a patriotic song without a spark of true love and reverence for Jehovah, the song of these idolaters, rebels against God and Babylon? If so, it is the only song of idolaters among the Psalms. Unless we consider the Psalms as a mere helter-skelter collection of songs without regard to their meaning, which is disproved by all the other Psalms and by their careful arrangement, it is impossible to account for the preservation, by the prophets Ezra, Haggai, Zechariah, and men of like minds, of this song of the idolatrous captives in Babylonia. It is equally impossible to account for this song of the idolaters being placed between

the preëminent song of the grace of God that endures for ever (Ps. cxxxvi) and the song of thanksgiving for Jehovah's presence with his servant and for the coming day when all shall glorify Him (Ps. cxxxviii).

But on the other side, Ps. cxxxvii is as mere literature far from the songs of idolaters through ignorance, as any one may see by comparing it with the Babylonian songs. And it is still farther from the songs of apostate Jewish idolaters, whose hearts were hardened against Jehovah and all spiritual truth. For this Psalm is of melting tenderness and of the finest literary quality. Even translated into English its exquisite flavor is not wholly lost. Its unknown author had cherished in Babylonia, afar from the land of the Hebrew, his loved tongue in its best models, and has poured through its simple words a flood of grief that still moves to sincere sympathy those who read it. The whole picture of their lot, their surroundings, the heart-agony, the intense longing, the self-respect of the captives in the midst of mocking Babylonians, lies there embedded in its simple phrases. Whatever may be the correct interpretation of his words, there can be no doubt that the author was a poet in the first rank of those who can make the simplest words palpitate with the deepest grief of the heart as well as roll out the thunders of the storm against sin. Coming out from the shadows of the captivity by an unknown singer it has strong affinities with the greatest of all Christian hymns, the *Dies Iræ*, that arose in exquisite truth and sublime power and melody during the captivity of the truth in the Middle Ages. The same tenderness of heart toward God, the same absolute reliance on His promises of grace, the same conviction of the certain terrors of His judgment against the wicked mark both of them. They are of the first flow of pure oil from God's olive trees hidden in His house.

In the righteous judgment of the Judge of the whole earth there come times when the poison, the corruption of sin reaches such a height that He must sweep off from the earth those who defy Him. Such a time was the era of the Flood. Another time was from 700-500 B.C., when He swept off Assyria, Judah, Babylon, Edom; another was at the overthrow of Jerusalem by the Romans, and another was the crushing out of the Roman Empire by the hordes from Asia. With the exception of the Flood, God has used one wicked nation to punish another wicked nation. The nations pursue their own plans without any regard to, in defiance of God, and yet they work out God's will. So did Assyria and Babylon in their pride and lust of conquest over Israel and Judah.' The day of their own punishment for their



corruption and defiance of God, was surely coming from the hand of the righteous Judge of all nations, over whose judgments of salvation and of destruction both heaven and earth sing (Jer. li. 48; Rev. xix. 1-7).

God was to punish the ten tribes of Israel for their three hundred years of turning from all His calls of grace, from all His bounties, to the worship of idols and to the iniquities beyond name and number they delighted in before their dead gods. And Jehovah let loose upon them the tiger lord of Assyria, whom they had loved better than Jehovah, but whose one desire was the conquest of Israel's land. When Assyria had finished the dread work in which it delighted, then came its own time of destruction from the presence of Jehovah (Isa. x. 12), and the Medes and Babylonians, long oppressed by the cruel Assyrians, rose up and made a desert where Assyria's cities and palaces had stood thick on the earth.

There was no nation where all that God hates and must destroy rose to greater heights and sank to lower depths than Judah. A hundred years previously the ten tribes had been carried into captivity and their land given to others, but even this did not stay Judah's plunge into deeper crimes. The Philistines had ever been the enemies of God and Israel, but the Philistines had never sunk as low as Judah (Ezek. xvi. 27). Sodom had been burned out of the earth by fire and brimstone from Jehovah in heaven because her sins cried to God for vengeance, and her name is left as a mark of the fire of God's wrath. And yet Sodom never trod in the depths Judah sought and loved (Ezek. xvi. 48 f.).

In Judah God had set His earthly throne. In His temple He poured forth the evidences of His love and grace, that He might walk among and dwell with His chosen people (Ex. xxix. 45, 46; Lev. xxvi. 11, 12). The spiritual among His people saw in the symbols of His house "His honor and majesty, His strength and beauty," and loved to go there and meditate on His word. For over Jerusalem, the earthly type, hung the abounding promises of that better city where Jehovah eternally dwells (Ps. xlviii. 8), to which every pilgrim here through the valley of weeping, the valley of the shadow of death, whose strength is in God, shall at last come and appear before his Redeemer in joy unspeakable and full of glory (Ps. lxxxiv. 7). There no want is known (Ps. lxxv. 4), there all tears are wiped away by the tender hand that led His host (Isa. xxv. 8), there the river of God's pleasure flows bankfull (Ps. xxxvi. 8, xlv. 4), there no enemy is ever seen (Isa. lii. 1, liv. 14, 15), and peace and joy and light and gladness find their everlasting abode (Ps. xvi. 11, xxxvi. 9), and thanksgiving with praise is

the breath of all its inhabitants (Ps. l. 14, 23). But Judah's kings and false prophets and people set themselves to make this earth their heaven, to do the desires of their wicked hearts, to cast out all thought of God and to fill Jerusalem with idols and all that idol worship means. So even while the beautiful temple of Solomon was still standing, and the appointed worship was regularly performed, and priests in white walked its courts and served the altar, Jerusalem was a closer approach to hell on earth than the world had ever seen (Jer. xxiii. 14; Ezek. xvi. 48). God compresses into the words of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, describing Jerusalem from B. C. 740 to 580, all the anguish and wrath of love and holiness and justice. Few were left who cared for Jehovah. The multitude of wicked priests and false prophets sneered and laughed at God and followed their sins. "The priest and the prophet reel with strong drink, they stagger with strong drink, they err in vision, they stumble in judgment." "A wonderful and a horrible thing is come to pass in the land; the prophets prophesy a lie and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so." "Ye trust in lying words that cannot profit. Will ye steal, murder and commit adultery, and swear to a lie, and burn incense to Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye have not known, and come and stand before me in this house that is called by my name, and say, We have been saved that we may do all these abominations?" "In the prophets of Jerusalem I have seen a horrible thing; they commit adultery and walk in lies . . . they are all of them become to me as Sodom." The temple itself had become the abode of vile priests who called themselves the priests of Jehovah, but sought the recesses of the temple to commit their unspeakable iniquities and turned their backs to the temple while they worshiped the sun. In the temple porticos degraded, licentious women sang the foul songs of Tammuz (Ezek. viii. 1-18). It was "the bloody city full of abominations," "infamous and full of tumult." Father, mother and children, they were all filled with hatred to God and mad upon their idols. They wrung from God the intense, piteous appeal, "Oh, do not this abominable thing that I hate. Wherefore commit ye this great evil against your own souls, to cut off from you man and woman, infant and suckling, out of the midst of Judah, to leave you none remaining?" (Jer. xlv. 4, 7.) And at last, when He could no longer bear it (Jer. xlv. 22), God let loose upon them the Babylonians. "Slay utterly the old man, the young man and maiden, and little children and women" (Ezek. ix. 6). "Pour out wrath upon the children in the street, and upon the assembly of young men together, for even the husband with

the wife shall be taken, the aged with him that is full of days" (Jer. vi. 11). "I will dash them one against another, even the fathers and the sons together, saith Jehovah. I will not pity nor spare nor have compassion, that I should not destroy them." These terrible prophecies did not change the people. They only blasphemed God the more, and at last the century-long prophecies were fulfilled in the streets of Jerusalem. "Her young children are gone into captivity before the adversary." "The young children and the sucklings swoon in the streets of the city." "My virgins and my young men are fallen by the sword; thou hast slain them in the day of thine anger; thou hast slaughtered and not pitied" (Lam. i. 5, ii. 11, 21).

So Jehovah slew in Judah and Jerusalem parents and children, as Jesus says He will slay the unfaithful parents and children of His Churches (Rev. ii. 23).

Esau, the firstborn of Isaac, sold to Jacob his birthright for a single meal because he valued all the promises of God at less than that price. This bad bargain rankled in the minds of his descendants, the Edomites, and for a thousand years they were the bitter enemies of Israel, determined, with no more regard than Esau to Jehovah and His promises, to take Israel's land and destroy them from the face of the earth. They were ever in collusion with all the enemies of Israel, with the Philistines, with Tyre. When the Babylonians came to raze Jerusalem down to its foundations, then in glee and hope Edom rushed to help them in the slaughter. They beset the roads to cut off every fugitive. They carried away the spoils, and in assurance of speedy possession they cast lots for the ground and gloated over Zion's calamity (Obad. 11-14; Ezek. xxxv. 1-15, xxxvi. 1-5).

Jehovah's reply to Edom's defiance begins at the Exodus (Num. xxiv. 18), and continues increasing until it rolls in thunder tones for three hundred years before her ruin. In the great day of Jehovah's wrath upon all nations His sword shall come down upon Edom and be filled with blood (Isa. xxxiv. 5, 6). When He who "speaks in righteousness, mighty to save," treads the winepress of the fierceness of the wrath of God the Almighty and stains all His raiment with blood, it is in Edom that God sets the winepress (Isa. lxiii. 1-6; Rev. xiv. 20, xix. 13-16). The violence done to Jehovah, His land, His people, shall be exactly returned to Edom, for it shall be desolate, destroyed forever by Jehovah, thrust down to Sheol with the slain of Jehovah (Obad. 8-10; Joel iii. 19; Amos i. 11, 12; Jer. xxv. 17-21, xxvii. 3. xlix. 13-22; Ezek. xxv. 12-14, xxxii. 29; Mal. i. 4). After that destruction of the "perpetual enmity" Jehovah will restore His land and people and give them peace.

These were the battles of Edom against Jehovah. These were the prophecies of Jehovah concerning Edom and concerning the fair prospect when Edom, the enemy of God and His people, should be blotted out by the hand of Jehovah.

The day of Babylon was coming. Both in the Old and New Testaments Babylon is the synonym of every sin that exalts itself against God—of boundless wealth, of limitless pride, of hatred to God written in the blood of prophets and saints, of every blasphemous thought, of all the foulnesses of the crimes of the flesh. For two hundred years before her overthrow God had foretold it with all plainness. The terrible picture of that ruin by the hand of Jehovah includes the work of the heartless Medes, whose “bows shall dash the young men in pieces; and they shall have no pity on the fruit of the womb, their eye shall not spare children.” “Prepare ye slaughter for his (evil-doer’s) children for the iniquity of their fathers, that they rise not up and possess the earth and fill the face of the world with cities. And I will rise up against them, saith Jehovah of hosts, and cut off from Babylon name and remnant, and son and son’s son, saith Jehovah. . . . I will sweep it with the sweep of destruction, saith Jehovah of hosts” (Isa. xiii. 1–xiv. 23. Comp. xxi. 1–10, xliii. 14, 15, xlv. 1, 2, xlvii. 1–15).

A hundred years pass away and the world-quaking roll of Isaiah’s thunder peals out again in Jeremiah with the vivid lightning strokes of the final catastrophe. Again it is the Medes, gathering many nations under their banner, who are to deluge her with the waves of her own blood. The words of Jehovah, the supreme though unrecognized commander of the mighty host of the Medes, are paralleled by God’s commands at the final destruction of the world’s Babylon in the Book of Revelation. “Do according to all that I have commanded.” “Destroy her utterly, let nothing of her be left.” “Recompense her according to her work, according to all that she hath done do unto her, for she hath been proud against Jehovah, against the holy one of Israel.” “Surely they shall drag them away, even the little ones of the flock. Surely he shall make their habitation desolate.”

There was something far more than Israel’s deliverance concerned in Babylon’s fall. From its first building (Gen xi. 1–9), when for daring defiance of God He scattered her builders over the face of the earth, until its fall it ever remained the sorceress of the world, of kings and all peoples. And now He, who had borne with her for thousands of years, to whom alone vengeance belongs, arose to smite His implacable, unyielding foe. “It is the vengeance of Jehovah, take vengeance upon her, as she hath



done do unto her"; "the vengeance of Jehovah our God, the vengeance of his temple." "It is the time of Jehovah's vengeance, he will render unto her a recompense." "For Jehovah hath both devised and done that which he spoke concerning the inhabitants of Babylon." "I will render unto Babylon, and to all the inhabitants of Chaldea, all their evil that they have done in Zion in your sight, saith Jehovah." "Behold, I am against thee, O corrupting mountain, saith Jehovah, that corruptest all the earth, and I will stretch out my hand upon thee and roll thee down from the cliffs and make thee a mountain burned up" (comp. Rev. viii. 8, xviii. 21).

In that day Jehovah will put into the mouth of Zion and Jerusalem these words, "The violence done to me and to my flesh be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitant of Zion say; and my blood be upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Jerusalem say. Therefore thus saith Jehovah, Behold, I will plead thy cause, and take vengeance for thee" (Jer. li. 35, 36). And out of the roar, the tumult, the crash of the assault on Babylon He calls His people to flee from her and save themselves from the fierce anger of Jehovah, and, fleeing fast from her, "remember Jehovah from afar and let Jerusalem come into your mind," over which hung the promises of redemption, of favor, of the power of God to purify His people and make them dwell with Him in plenty and peace.

All these prophecies were written out in Jerusalem by Jeremiah in the early years of the exile, and about 594 B.C. a special copy of them was made and given to Seraiah, one of the high court officers, the brother of Baruch, the faithful scribe and follower of Jeremiah. Seraiah was going in the train of Zedekiah, the vassal king who went to pay vassal's duty to the proud monarch of Babylon. "And Jeremiah said to Seraiah, When thou comest to Babylon, then see that thou read all these words and say, O Jehovah, thou hast spoken concerning this place to cut it off, that none shall dwell therein, neither man nor beast, but that it shall be desolate forever. And it shall be, when thou hast made an end of reading this book, that thou shalt bind a stone to it and cast it into the midst of the Euphrates: and thou shalt say, Thus shall Babylon sink, and shall not rise again because of the evil that I will bring upon her."

These things were known in Jerusalem by the believers, who knew Jeremiah to be God's prophet, seven years before the destruction of Solomon's temple and more than forty years before the fall of Babylon. They were known and treasured by the small number of the true servants of God in Babylonia, by Ezekiel the prophet, the younger contemporary of Jeremiah, who



was well acquainted with all Jeremiah's prophecies. They were known by Daniel, who studied Jeremiah's words and foretold to Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar the destruction of the kingdom, and knew by Jeremiah's words the length of the captivity. They were known by Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego, the faithful companions of Daniel; and also by all those who, like them, wept over their own sin and the sin of their people, and the ruins of Jerusalem, and sought Jehovah their God and inquired "concerning Zion with their faces thitherward, saying, Come ye, and join yourselves to Jehovah in an everlasting covenant that shall not be forgotten."

All this is the background of the picture in the Psalm. Of the multitudes who were carried into captivity the majority changed their sky but not their mind. They had loved idolatry in the temple of Jerusalem, and they were at home and contented and growing rich in Babylonia. It was difficult, when the way was open to return, to find even four of the twenty-four courses of priests willing to go back. These Babylonian Israelites tripped lightly up to Ezekiel the prophet in the captivity, laughing and saying to each other, "Come and hear what is the word that cometh forth from Jehovah." "And they come unto thee as the people cometh, and they sit before thee as my people, and they hear thy words, but do them not. For with their mouth they show much love, but their heart goeth after their gain. And lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument; for they hear thy words, but they do them not" (Ezek. xxxiii. 30-32).

But there was a small number sent from Jehovah into captivity whom God loved and who loved God. Over them God promised to watch and to bless and to bring back some of Israel to His land (Jer. xxiv. 5-7). Among these faithful few were Ezekiel and Daniel and their companions. Neither captivity nor high office during captivity turned their hearts from the deep conviction of their own sin and the sin of their people, which brought on and continued the captivity. Righteousness belonged to Jehovah, but to them confusion of face. Yet Jehovah was the God of grace and pardon. And they prayed, "O Lord, according to all thy righteousness, let thine anger and thy wrath be turned away from thy city Jerusalem, because for our sins and for the iniquities of our fathers, Jerusalem and thy people are become a reproach to all that are round about us. Now, therefore, O our God, hearken unto the prayer of thy servant and to his supplications, and cause thy face to shine upon thy sanctuary that is desolate, for the Lord's sake. O my God, incline thine ear and hear; open thine

eyes and behold our desolations, and the city that is called by thy name : for we do not present our supplications before thee for our righteousnesses, but for thy great mercies. O Lord, hear ; O Lord, forgive ; O Lord, hearken and do ; defer not for thine own sake, O my God, because thy city and thy people are called by thy name " (Dan. ix. 16-19). The hearts of these few faithful were set for God, His pardon, His promises bound up with the city and people called by His name. This is the part of the Israelites in Babylonia from whom alone the Psalm could have come. The others were far from the thoughts and the feelings that find intense expression there. These were the only ones, from Daniel beside the throne to the day laborer in the fields, who saw through the glamor of the captivity, its opportunities of wealth, of comfort, of respect, of high office and power. They remembered what brought about their captivity and continued it, and what was to be its end. Like Nehemiah in later days, all the splendor of luxury and high office were naught to them and not worth a moment's possession when Jerusalem lay in ruins and God was reproached for the captivity of His city and people. To them, as to prophets and psalmists before them, as well as to all who after them have known and loved God, a reproach cast upon God, His word, His grace, was a more bitter trial, a more intolerable burden, than reproach of themselves.

Henry Martin, the saint and missionary, near the ground where the 137th Psalm arose, could bear any reproach against himself, but when God was blasphemed by one of his hearers he burst into tears and left them. To reproach the spiritual-minded exiles was to reproach men who knew and confessed to God more of their own sins than any others knew of them. To reproach God was to stab their dearest friend, to crucify and blaspheme Him who was all their salvation and all their desire. It is this reproach of God that lies heavy upon the hearts of the singers of the 44th, 69th, 74th, 79th, 83d, 89th, 102d, 119th Psalms. It is this reproach that weighed down Ezekiel among the captives, that was the swelling burden of Daniel's prayer, that in the midst of prosperity and peace in Babylon made them hang their harps upon the willows and weep, for when God was reproached all joy was dead.

With gay light-mindedness, ignorant of the deep sorrow that dwelt in the bosom of these captives, men around them asked them to make merry with a song of their city Zion, as the Babylonians made merry with their songs of Babylon. The desolation of Zion was the gaping, festering wound of the sin of Israel, the reproach of His recreant people. Till that wound was healed there could be no joy over Zion for those who knew God. Their

captivity was the sign that "his anger was not turned away, but his hand was stretched out still." The day of redemption surely promised had not yet dawned, when "they shall come and sing on the height of Zion, and they shall flow together to the goodness of Jehovah, to the grain and to the new wine and to the oil, and to the young of the flock and of the herd. And their souls shall be as a watered garden, and they shall not sorrow any more at all. Then shall the virgin rejoice in the dance, and the young men and old together, for I will turn their mourning into joy and will comfort them and make them rejoice from their sorrow" (Jer. xxxi. 12, 13). Knowing all this, it would have been a sin against Jehovah and hypocrisy to sing Jehovah's song of gladness and delight in His worship in Zion while Zion was in ruins, the temple burned up and no worship could be celebrated there, and they were captives in a foreign land because of the sin of Israel. But though Zion, Jerusalem, was in ruins, yet with her were inseparably interwoven the glowing promises of redemption, return and peace. "Thou shalt arise and have mercy upon Zion." "Thy servants take pleasure in her stones and have pity upon her dust." For the time shall come when Zion shall hear the voice of her God, saying, "Awake, awake, put on thy strength, O Zion; put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city; for henceforth there shall no more come into thee the uncircumcised and the unclean. Shake thyself from the dust; arise, sit enthroned, O Jerusalem; loose thyself from the bonds of thy neck, O captive daughter of Zion." The day of the enthronement of Zion is also the day when Babylon, "the mistress of kingdoms," shall be stripped for the meanest slavery. "Come down and sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babylon; sit on the ground without a throne, O daughter of the Chaldeans. . . . I will take vengeance, I will spare no man." For these captives to forget that Zion should yet be enthroned above all nations, and the house of God be the fountain of life for Israel and for all nations, would be to forget God Himself and the living water that was their life in captivity. That were living death, when the hand loses the chords of God's harp and the tongue withers from all thanks and praise. They had known the time when God sent out His light and truth, and these led His glad worshipers to His holy hill and to His tabernacles, and they went to the altar of God, to God their exceeding joy (Ps. xliii. 3, 4). To that exceeding joy, that chief joy, found only in Zion, they hoped again to come. But it was impossible to hope for that promise without also hoping for the promise, always joined by God with it, of the overthrow of their bitterest enemies. And so, true to God's words,

they recall His own prophecies that He would remember Edom, and return to her as she had done to Jerusalem and put away forever "the perpetual enmity." Not the Jews or the Medes or any human hands were to direct the requital of Edom, but Jehovah, the righteous Judge, who shall "come to judge earth; he shall judge the world with righteousness and the peoples with equity."

What no human foresight could imagine under the reigning world-power, this singer grasps with absolute faith, that the long-heralded prophecies of God would be fulfilled by the coming fall of Babylon. Jehovah, his God, would bring Babylon to the ground. It was Jehovah's promise. It would be Jehovah's work. And as sure as Jehovah lived He would fulfill His word. The psalmist uses the very words of God, "Daughter of Babylon" (Isa. xlvii. 1; Jer. l. 42, li. 33); "that art to be destroyed" (Jer. li. 48, 53, 55, 56, Am. Rev.). The Hebrew is stronger than the translation. As Jeremiah long before it came to pass saw the destruction of Babylon as though it were passing before his eyes, and speaks of it in the present and past tenses, so this singer sees God's word bound to her. She is now marked by God as "The destroyed." Her destruction is as sure as though it were already accomplished.

"Happy" is the rendering of a Hebrew word that occurs twenty-six times in the Psalms and in nineteen instances is translated "blessed" and seven times it is translated "happy." There is no good reason for the change, because the word in all the Old Testament is used only of men who trust God, whose strength, delight, hope are in God, whom God instructs by chastening, who do His will, and are supremely blessed by God. Blessed shall he be who is called by God to bring Babylon to the dust, fulfilling Jehovah's promise and command to do to her as she in despite of God has done to Zion.

"Blessed (by God) shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock." This is the verse that is said to be so contrary to the teachings of the New Testament that it could not occur there. But the learned men who have made this charge have made it without examining the clearest proof to the contrary. Jesus quotes this very verse, the very words "dash thy little ones," in His lament over Jerusalem. Only in Luke xix. 44 does the Greek verb found in Ps. cxxxvii. 9 (Septuagint) occur in the New Testament. The New Testament Greek and English "children" is a better translation of the Hebrew than the Old Testament English "little ones." The Saviour says "thine enemies . . . shall dash thee to the ground, and thy children within thee." He found no more difficulty in quoting this Psalm than



in quoting the other most imprecatory Psalms (lxxix and cix), of which the Holy Spirit was the author (Acts i. 16, 20). They were not foreign to Christ's spirit. But Christ goes further. He bestows upon him who shall overcome by keeping and doing His will "authority over the nations," "to rule them with a rod of iron as the vessels of the potter are dashed to pieces," quoting Ps. ii (Rev. ii. 26, 27); as the Saviour Himself is to dash in pieces with a rod of iron His enemies (Rev. xii. 5, xix. 15). Does any intelligent reader interpret literally these sayings by the Saviour and of the Saviour? Is he to take men and dash them in pieces with a rod of iron and find delight in that work? Are not His words expressive of the terrible results of men's own sin, precisely as Jeremiah's breaking the earthen jar before men was a visible type of the ruin sin would bring? If no intelligent reader interprets literally the words quoted by the Saviour, why should these same words be interpreted literally in the passages of the Old Testament from which they are quoted? But more than this. God has through the ages been "dashing in pieces" His enemies and the enemies of His people. He began at the Red Sea (Ex. xv. 6), and "dashed in pieces" Pharaoh and his host when He destroyed them by the waters. Within the bounds of His chosen people He dashed in pieces Ephraim, the ten tribes of Israel, "the mother was dashed in pieces with her children," because of their unbridled hatred of God and preference of idols (Hos. x. 14, xiii. 16). He placed in Zion itself the firm rock of His word, that those who stumble at it may be broken to pieces (Isa. viii. 9, 15). He alone summons the Medes against Babylon, whose bows shall dash the young men in pieces. They shall have no pity upon the fruit of the womb. Their eye shall not spare children (Isa. xiii. 16, 18). For Babylon is to be God's threshing-floor, wholly trampled to the ground (Isa. xxi. 9, 10; Jer. li. 33). And Judah and Jerusalem, the last of His chosen people, for sins that rent the heavens with cries of defiance and agony, He will break as a potter's vessel, breaking it in pieces without sparing (Isa. xxx. 14).

God also uses the same expression respecting the course of His redeemed and purified people who do His will. They are to "thresh," "beat in pieces" many peoples; they are to "thresh and beat small" the mountains, all opposing difficulties (Mic. iv. 13; Isa. xli. 15, 16). They are to be Jehovah's "battle axe and weapons of war," and with them Jehovah would "break in pieces" kingdoms, "man and woman," "the old man and the youth, the young man and the maid" (Jer. li. 20-23), though redeemed Israel never had a hand in the destruction of Babylon



and never is to have a hand in the destruction of others except by testifying the word of God, "the sword of the Spirit."

There is one instance mentioned in the history of Judah when the idolatrous Amaziah conquered Edom, a country of high mountains, and threw down from the top of a high cliff ten thousand of the people and they were broken to pieces (2 Chron. xxv. 12). Since that time war in all lands, even to the last century, has signalized its victory by similar atrocities. To "dash down by the cliff" is a metaphor that has not imagination but a terrible fact for its basis. But that it is used metaphorically by the author of our Psalm, long resident by Babylon's myriad willow-bordered canals, is proved by the fact that Babylonia is a perfectly flat alluvial country where no hill, nor stone, nor rock, nor cliff is to be found. If the children of Babylon were literally to be thrown down from the cliff, they must have been carried hundreds of miles out of their own country to Elam or Media or down into Arabia to reach the place of execution. Babylon, the city, was built on the low alluvial plain on both sides of the muddy Euphrates. Yet God says, "I will stretch out my hand upon thee and roll thee down from the cliffs" (Jer. li. 25). No intelligent dweller in Babylonia, heathen or servant of Jehovah, could fail to understand the metaphor of Babylon's being hurled from her exaltation in pride and power, for the literal interpretation is ridiculous, no cliffs or rocks or mountains being anywhere near.

And close by Ps. cxxxvii, in Ps. cxli. 6, is another plain proof of the metaphorical use of the same phrase. "Their judges are thrown down beside the cliff, and they shall hear my words for they are sweet." If the judges were to be literally dashed to pieces from the cliff, it is folly to add that they are then to hear sweet words. But if these leaders who led the people astray were to be brought down by God from their high office and taught their sin and their dependence on God alone for the sweet tidings of pardon and right judgment (Ps. ii. 10-12), then we can see that the psalmist speaks in accord with many a word of God elsewhere (Job ix. 24, xii. 17; Isa. i. 26, xl. 23; Dan. ix. 12).

The choice of interpretations of Ps. cxli. 6, as in Ps. cxxxvii. 9, lies between the impossible literal and the clear metaphorical, just as it does in hundreds of places in the Old and New Testament.

The Hebrew word used in this verse means child, children; it may mean a very young child or one grown up. It does not specify the age, as any one familiar with Hebrew knows.\* The children to be dashed to pieces in Babylon, as the children, the

\* *Ollel* in Hebrew, like *nēpios* and *teknon* in Greek, does not specify the age but the relation.

Saviour says, were to be dashed to pieces in Jerusalem, are the progeny of the viper, those who choose their fathers' sins and are worse than their fathers. "Children" and "seed" are often used in the Old and New Testaments for those similar in mind and deed. For instance, the 37th Psalm tells us, "I have not seen the righteous forsaken nor his seed begging bread." And Littlethought replies, I have, for I know many sons of good men who are beggars. And again, in Ps. xxxvii. 28, we are told "The seed of the wicked shall be cut off," and again Littlethought says, All experience is against this, for the Psalms themselves assure us that it is the wicked who inherit this world and leave their abundance to their children. But the Psalm has no reference to "the children of the flesh" at all. The seed of the righteous are all who have the same spirit.\* The seed of the wicked are all who are wicked. For the law that impressed itself deeply on all who sought God, and is over and over insisted upon by the very prophets of the captivity, is that "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin" (Deut. xxiv. 16; 1 Kings. xiv. 6; 2 Chron. xxv. 4; Jer. xxxi. 29, 30; Ezek. xviii. 1-32). When the Old or New Testament speaks of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, we must always remember that no child was ever punished by God simply for his father's sin, but because he chose his father's sins rather than the grace of God and increased in the depravity of his father. This is the reiterated testimony of Old and New Testaments. When the Saviour says "that the blood of all the prophets shed from the foundation of the world" would be required of that generation, it was because they consented to the works of their fathers, and would not turn to God.

In the destruction of Babylon related in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, all who sought God are warned to flee from her before she was dashed in pieces. All who chose Babylon, its pride and power, rather than God, were dashed to pieces with her. Just as Jerusalem's children, turning from Christ, were dashed to pieces with her, while those who turned to Christ escaped from her coming ruin.

What, then, does "Blessed shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy children by the cliff" mean? Since it was God who was to dash Babylon and her progeny to pieces, and this verse is part of a prayer to God, it means blessed shall every one be whom God shall use to destroy to the uttermost Babylon and her children

\* Comp. Ps. xxii. 30, lxix. 36, cii. 28, cv. 6, cxii. 2; Isa. vi. 13, xlv. 3-5; Rom. ix. 8; Gal. iii. 29, etc.

that chose and followed in her sins. She was the mountain-high corrupting power of the world, defiant of God and the oppressor of all who loved God and righteousness and holiness. In her was found the blood of the saints and the prophets, Rev. xvii. 6, xviii. 24.

While the author of Ps. cxxxvii is unknown, we know well the circle of lofty, faithful souls to which he belonged. Were Ezekiel or Daniel a poet, this Psalm might well have come from the pen of either, for they were in full accord with its words and spirit. But this is sure, that out of those few in captivity whose faith in and love for Jehovah and His words were victorious over every trial, this pure song of God's own words arose, and found its echo in the tenderest heart and holiest mind this world has ever known, as he wept over Jerusalem and pronounced her doom.

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK.

HOWARD OSGOOD.

### III.

#### PROF. SWING ON RITSCHL AND HIS CRITICS.

ATTENTION was called in the April number of THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW (1902) to the volume of Prof. Swing, of Oberlin, on *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, in an able and temperate notice by Dr. C. W. Hodge, Jr. It is not the purpose of this article to retrace the ground gone over in that critique. The present writer, however, may be excused for taking a special interest in the volume in question, as in its pages he finds himself singled out as a chief offender in "misleading" the public in regard to the real nature of Ritschl's teaching. The burden of responsibility laid upon him is truly heavy. "Prof. Orr," says the author, "has done more than any other critic to discredit Ritschl in the estimation of the English public. He has gone through the subject with such thoroughness and evident sincerity (it is gratifying to have even thus much acknowledged) that his fundamental misunderstanding of Ritschl's views has been accepted as historical truth."\* Again, "The fact is that Prof. Orr's persistent attempts to explain away everything objectively real from the theology of Ritschl vitiate his whole work, and render him, in spite of his scholarly accomplishments, a misleading guide to the understanding of the Ritschlian theology."† In the Index, under Prof. Orr's name, we have "A misleading guide." In a review in an influential American paper of the writer's last book on *The Progress of Dogma* the same charge recurs. "Prof. Orr," it is said, "is chiefly responsible for the misunderstanding of Ritschl in England and America, and in this book he continues his inability to appreciate the Ritschlian point of view."‡ The curious fact is that, while certain positions of Prof. Harnack are adversely criticised, there is scarcely an allusion to Ritschl in this last-named work except in way of approval. These are serious charges, and if they are unfounded deserve to be refuted. Still, the personal aspect of the matter does not greatly concern the writer; and

\* P. 4.

† P. 128. Profs. Denney and Wenley are included in the same condemnation.

‡ *The Independent*, 21st August.

were it not that Prof. Swing's assertions raise the larger question of what really ought to be thought of the theology of Ritschl, the readers of this REVIEW would certainly not be troubled with any fresh comment on the subject.

To obviate misunderstanding, let it be said at once that no disrespect is intended to Prof. Swing's treatment of the Ritschlian theology in his book. On the contrary, it is a pleasure to acknowledge that he has produced an interesting little monograph on his subject, which, though, as we venture to think, extravagantly rose-colored in its estimate of Ritschl, will have its value for every student of that author, whether he agrees with its conclusions or not. Special thanks are due to Alice Mead Swing for the excellent translation of Ritschl's *Unterricht* incorporated in the volume. Such a translation was distinctly needed, and on the whole this is as good as could be desired. The volume is worth possessing for it alone. Neither is complaint made of the criticism in itself. Prof. Swing is perfectly within his rights in making what criticisms he thinks justified; and if the present writer was convinced that he had in any material respect misrepresented Ritschl, he hopes he would have the grace frankly to acknowledge his error. As the case stands, however, he cannot feel that he is called upon for any such retraction. His judgments on Ritschlianism were not formed without long and painstaking study, and renewed examination has only had the effect of causing him to adhere to them more firmly. This by no means implies that he has no perception of the distinctive merits of the Ritschlian movement, or appreciation of the healthy impulses that have proceeded from it. Of these ample and cordial acknowledgment have repeatedly been made. The sole question relates to the adequacy of the basis of the Ritschlian theology, and the justice of its interpretations of the evangelical doctrines. And on these points the writer's judgment is unaltered. For the purposes of the Evangelical Church he does not hesitate to say that Ritschl's theology is *impossible*. This is even more the case with Ritschl's own teaching (to which Prof. Swing confines himself) than with that of some of his followers, who have in many ways modified his positions, or perhaps never accepted them.

Only one other preliminary observation is necessary. Prof. Swing's attitude to Ritschl's theology is, it must be confessed, peculiar. He constitutes himself an expounder, not a critic, of the system; but the exposition is accompanied with almost unvarying approval. He remarks, "We need not defend all that Ritschl said";\* but by no chance at any point does a sign of

\* P. 6.



dissent escape him. In this entire homologation of Ritschl's peculiar teaching, Prof. Swing stands nearly alone. Every one familiar with the literature is aware that even the most sympathetic critics have conceded large hiatuses, obscurities, inconsistencies, indefensibilities, in Ritschl's thinking.\* None of them would give Ritschl the same unqualified certificate which Prof. Swing here issues. This applies to many of the exceptions taken to Ritschl by the critics whose remarks alone Prof. Swing notices. In his pages all critics are presumed to be, from one side or another, *hostile* to Ritschl. It should in fairness have been indicated that in many cases the same criticisms proceed also from those who can only be ranked as Ritschl's friends. Prof. Swing's method of dealing with the objectors—"simply placing their statements," as he says, "about Ritschl side by side with Ritschl's own words, in a sort of literary pillory"†—is a delightfully simple, but, as pointed out by the reviewer in April, in Ritschl's case an eminently unsatisfactory one. Ritschl is of all writers the last to whom it is adapted. His statements are often tantalizingly obscure; are far from being always coherent; often are evangelical in sound when deeper consideration shows that, in the context of his system, they import something very different. Illustrations will immediately be given of the caution needed in this "pillory" process.

It may be well to begin by looking at the specific charges of misunderstanding advanced by Prof. Swing, and testing his accuracy in regard to these. The following are the instances in which the present writer is put in the "literary pillory":

1. As respects the "fundamental misunderstanding," this is said to be specially seen "in his (Prof. Orr's) continually representing Ritschl as subjective in his theory of knowledge and judgments of worth, and in his asserting that Ritschl does not hold to the objective reality of sin, and therefore of redemption, and that with Ritschl the very resurrection of Christ is discredited."‡

So far as this relates to the theory of knowledge and judgments of worth, it is considered farther on. Other points fall under the remaining heads.

2. On the resurrection of Christ (cf. the closing sentence in above): "And yet Prof. Orr, in *The Christian View of God and the World*" (p. 454), "says that he cannot but regard the Ritschl-

\* Ritschl's followers, as Prof. Swing himself says, have "had less to say publicly in direct praise of his theology, than they have in the way of modifying his individual statements" (p. 1).

† P. 5.

‡ P. 4.

lian position ' as the virtual surrender of faith in Christ's resurrection !' '\*

The note is one of astonishment that such a thing as doubt of Christ's resurrection should even be hinted at in Ritschlianism. The question is discussed below. Meanwhile it should be noticed that the quotation given has reference more immediately to the views of leading Ritschlian writers, whose words, as cited, amply justify the statement made.

3. On sin : " And yet Prof. Orr says that with Ritschl ' sin is only a subjective judgment which the sinner passes on himself, to which nothing actual corresponds.' " In opposition, Ritschl is declared to have emphasized " in a thoroughly fundamental way the fact of sin, of guilt, and of participation in a kingdom of sin." " And this," he says, " I wish to make very clear, for the reason that several critics, and Prof. Orr in particular, have shown here an incredulity that would itself be incredible if we did not have so many illustrations of it." †

Prof. Orr never made any such statement as that attributed to him. He did not say (as quoted) that in Ritschl's view " sin " is " a subjective judgment " of the sinner, but that " guilt " is—a very different thing (see next paragraph). To this judgment, for reasons to be given, he adheres.

4. " Yet, notwithstanding all these clear and positive statements, Prof. Orr actually declares (*The Christian View of God*, etc., p. 17c[9], and not by any means set right in his later book. *The Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 146, 269f.) that the effect of Ritschl's theology, along with others, is ' to weaken, if not actually to destroy, the idea of guilt ' ; that Ritschl regards all sin ' as arising so much from ignorance as to be without real guilt in the eyes of God ' ; and that ' redemption is not removal of guilt, but of consciousness of guilt ' ; and ' instead of guilt being regarded as something objectively real, which God as well as man is bound to take account of, it comes to be viewed as something clinging to the subjective consciousness—a subjective judgment which the sinner passes on himself, to which nothing actual corresponds.' " ‡

These are the typical examples of misunderstanding which it is proposed to subject to some examination, less, as already said, for the purpose of self-vindication than as a means of bringing out what the theology of Ritschl really is.

1. It will be convenient to begin with the alleged misrepresentation as to Ritschlian views on the resurrection of Christ. It is gratifying to find an initial point of agreement with Prof. Swing

\* P. 111.

† Pp. 120-1.

‡ P. 127.

in the importance he evidently attaches to this great Gospel affirmation. This constitutes it a good test of the real trend of Ritschlian teaching. And *our* surprise is that Prof. Swing should question the accuracy of the statement made as to the general attitude of Ritschlian theologians to this cardinal article of faith. There is, indeed, a positive wing of the school, represented, *e.g.*, by Kaftan and Loofs, and, at a greater remove from Ritschl, by Häring, which does give unequivocal expression to its faith in the resurrection. But the greater number who can be classed as Ritschlians either (1) reject the bodily resurrection (the physical miracle), while holding as "a thought of faith" that Christ still lives and rules; or (2) admit supernatural "appearances" of Christ to the disciples, though not a bodily rising; while (3) practically all hold that the historical question is one indifferent to faith. It is difficult to see how they could do otherwise. The resurrection, as a fact, must rest, if it is to be believed at all, on historical evidence; and that the Ritschlians will not admit as a ground of faith. On pp. 203-5 of the writer's *Ritschlian Theology* will be found a careful conspectus of the views of most leading Ritschlians on this subject. It is for Prof. Swing, if he challenges the statement quoted in his note, to disprove the accuracy of that summary.

The views of Ritschl's followers are not hastily to be set aside in forming a judgment as to the trend of his theology; but the more precise question is as to the belief of Ritschl himself on the Lord's resurrection. On this point Prof. Swing speaks with a confidence far beyond the evidence. It is one on which every impartial mind must admit that great ambiguity rests. The present writer has never gone further than to say that "it is difficult to catch precisely Ritschl's own attitude to miracle, and specially to the Lord's resurrection," and that "his whole position is extremely vague."\* This, he believes, exactly represents the fact, and any stronger statement is "misleading." The passages quoted by Prof. Swing from Ritschl's second volume as to the apostolic belief in the resurrection† are aside from the point (as strong, *e.g.*, will be found in Baur). More importance attaches to certain passages quoted by Ecke in his *Die theol. Schule A. Ritschls* (pp. 193-9) from unpublished lectures of Ritschl (date not given), which do show that at a certain stage Ritschl's beliefs were more positive than he ever allowed publicly to appear.‡ There remains the passage in Sec. 23 of the *Unterricht* affirming

\* *Ritschlian Theol.*, p. 93.

† P. 111.

‡ Cf. *Ritschlian Theol.*, p. 93.

Christ's "resurrection through the power of God"; \* with which may be compared another, not usually noticed, of similar import, in his *Theol. und Met.*, p. 31. But it deserves careful notice that the word used in these two passages—the most explicit, if not the only explicit ones on the subject in Ritschl's published writings—is not the usual word "Auferstehung," but another of more general meaning, "Auferweckung" (reawakening), and stands in a context which seems to deny the reality of physical miracle. Over against these slender references have to be placed the facts (1) of the entire silence of Ritschl on the Lord's resurrection in his (third) dogmatic volume, where, if anywhere, we should have expected to find stress laid upon it; and (2) of the express statement in the *Unterricht* (Sec. 17) that miracles are to be construed religiously, and not as occurrences contrary to the laws of nature or the orderly coherence of natural events, by which Ritschl evidently means events breaking through the ordinary causal connection of nature. Is it conceivable that, if the resurrection held, as Prof. Swing affirms, "an absolutely vital place in Ritschl's thought,"† he should write a work of many hundred pages on the essential doctrines of salvation, and never once make an unambiguous declaration of his belief in it.‡ In face of such a fact it will take more than marks of exclamation to show that Prof. Orr has misled his readers on this vital point. The truth is, as every one might see who penetrates to the interior of Ritschl's thought, that it lies wholly apart from his developed theory to base religion in any degree on a fact which depends on outward historical testimony.

2. The next main subject on which misrepresentation is alleged is Ritschl's doctrine of sin and guilt. Here, again, it is believed it will be easy to show (1) that Prof. Swing mistakes the view he criticises, and (2) misapprehends the real view of Ritschl. No one, least of all Prof. Orr, dreams of denying that Ritschl meant to affirm the reality of sin as contrariety to the ideal of good in the kingdom of God, and therefore to the will of God. But it can and must be held that Ritschl *weakens* the idea of sin in its Scriptural aspect by bringing it so largely under the category of "ignorance,"§ by regarding it as an "apparently inevitable

\* Mr. Garvie quotes this sentence as one "about which he, at least, can discover no ambiguity" (2d Edit. of his *Ritschl. Theol.*, p. 410). But see below. And is a belief supported by *one* passage not ambiguous?

† P. 111.

‡ We can hardly except the allusion to Christ's "Auferweckung" on p. 341 (E. T., p. 360).

§ Even the word "relative" before "ignorance" is struck out in later editions. Properly: for sin being measured, not by the moral law, but by the idea of the kingdom of God, it can hardly be imputed where that idea is absent.



product of the human will under the given conditions of its development,"\* and by denying hereditary sin. The effect is seen in his doctrine of guilt, which is expounded in so involved and difficult a manner that misconception is pardonable, but the essential point in which Prof. Swing seems quite to miss. He finds Ritschl speaking much of guilt, and, on the strength of certain statements affirming the reality of guilt, characterizes it as a fundamental misunderstanding to say that Ritschl's theory logically does away with the idea of guilt as ordinarily understood—reduces it to a subjective illusion. The mistake lies in not perceiving that what Ritschl means by "guilt" in his developed doctrine is something very different from what is ordinarily understood by this term, and that it is in the current and accepted sense (believed also to be the Scriptural one), not in Ritschl's peculiar sense, that the objectors declare the idea of guilt to be invalidated in his system. In the first place, it should be recalled that Ritschl's own doctrine varied at different stages of his development. When he published his first volume on Justification (1870), he was almost wholly under the influence of Kant in his ideas of moral law, of guilt, of accountability, of punishment; and at this stage his doctrine of guilt, as involving obligation to punishment, is strongly and unexceptionably expressed.† At a later period these ideas underwent profound modification. The whole idea of retributive punishment, and the idea of justice connected therewith (cf. his former view in Vol. I, p. 434, E. T.) is parted with, and the existence of a punitive will in God denied. Mr. Garvie, who is favorable enough to Ritschl, will bear out this statement. "If there is no wrath of God against sin, there can be no punishment by God of sin. This conclusion Ritschl expressly draws."‡ This is a great change, and, as can easily be

\* *J. and R.*, III, p. 380 (E. T.); cf. *Unterricht*, Sect. 28. The "apparently" here is not to be regarded (as is done, *e.g.*, by Mr. Garvie) as throwing any doubt on the empirical unavoidableness of sin, which is deduced from the facts that the will is a "growing" quantity, and that the self-seeking desires have a start over the knowledge of the good in consciousness; but, with the subsequent clause, "conscious as we are of our freedom and independence, is nevertheless reckoned by us as guilt," is probably to be explained as a survival of Ritschl's acceptance of Kant's doctrine of transcendental freedom, in contrast with the empirical connection of phenomena by the law of cause and effect. See his Vol. I, pp. 389, 394 (E. T.).

† Cf. Vol. I, pp. 389-96, 411 (E. T.), etc., and see *Ritschlian Theol.*, pp. 36, 37. "The essence of punishment," he here says, "is requit. From the idea of our practical reason, which sets the moral law in the light of guilt, it follows also that transgression deserves punishment" (p. 396). Traces of this mode of thought survive in the *Unterricht*.

‡ Garvie's *Ritschlian Theology*, p. 310.



scen, one which vitally affects his whole doctrine. At the same time Ritschl gives the doctrine a turn which substitutes another conception for that which is rejected, and somewhat conceals the change that has been made.

What, then, is Ritschl's later doctrine of guilt, and how is it affirmed to differ from the ordinary doctrine? Distinction is to be made here between what he calls "real guilt" and the "consciousness of guilt," though the relation of the two is again declared to be so close as to be inseparable, and practically "guilt" is resolved into the "consciousness of guilt."\* (1) Guilt as "real" he identifies with the actual state of separation from God brought about by sin, and speaks of guilt as removed when this separation is brought to an end.† *Ipsso facto*, of course, sin does separate from God; but the *state* of separation and the *guilt* of separation are distinct ideas, which ought not to be confused. If Ritschl tries to combine the two by speaking of separation from God as the central "punishment" of sin, this is admittedly done only "provisionally and dialectically,"‡ as the idea of punishment has no real place in his system. (2) The real emphasis lies, therefore, on the "consciousness of guilt," which is held to include such elements as a judgment of unworth passed by the individual on himself (which judgment must be presumed to be also that of God), the consciousness of separation from God, a sense of moral disturbance and feeling of self-blame; while out of it springs distrust of God, which confirms the feeling of estrangement. With all this there is no fault to find, nor has the present writer failed to do justice to it. But, as ordinarily understood, guilt is assumed to carry with it, nay, to find its peculiar character in, something further, viz., the liability to punishment (*obligatio ad pœnam*); and the consciousness of guilt, in like manner, is held to involve the sense of evil desert, of punishableness, of righteous subjection to the judgment of a holy God. This also is the Scriptural view. The sinner there is represented as lying under the just judgment of God, as condemned, as exposed to the wrath of God for his sins. *This element in the idea of guilt Ritschl undeniably eliminates*, or reduces to subjective illusion; and it is *in this sense* that he is accused of weakening, and virtually annulling, the idea of guilt. That such an element enters into the consciousness of guilt is not, of course, denied. The transgressor condemns himself, believes himself condemned of God, reads the

\* *J. and R.*, III, pp. 51, 53, 54, 56, etc.

† The usual wavering is seen even here. "We ought therefore rather to transpose 'the removal of the separation of sinners from God' into *the removal of the consciousness of guilt*." *J. and R.*, III, p. 54 (E. T.).

‡ *J. and R.*, p. 59 (E. T.).

meaning of punishments into the evils that befall him. But this valuation (*Schätzung*) of evils as punishments, which springs from the guilt-consciousness, is only, it is held, a subjective mode of judgment;\* there is nothing corresponding to it in God's judgment. If Prof. Swing is satisfied with this representation of guilt, there is nothing more to be said. But he must not "pillory" others who show this to be Ritschl's view as "misleaders." Dorner does not put the matter too strongly when he says that "no clear, connected doctrine respecting punishment, God's punitive justice, moral freedom, and guilt is to be found in Ritschl".†

3. This leads back to the charge of "fundamental misunderstanding" in regard to the "subjectivity" of Ritschl's doctrine. Prof. Orr, it seems, is continually representing Ritschl as subjective in his theory of knowledge and judgments of worth.‡ It is important here, in the first place, that the question should be correctly stated. Prof. Orr certainly never said or supposed that Ritschl's theology was subjective in the sense that he meant to deny the objective reality of God or the spiritual world; of sin as a contradiction of the moral order and divine end of the world; of Christ, and such a work of redemption as Ritschl ascribes to Him. It is, therefore, quite beside the mark to prove that, in Ritschl's view, God, Christ, sin, redemption are real, for this is not disputed. But in another sense the charge of subjectivity brought against Ritschl's theology is fully warranted. It may be, and is, contended (1) that Ritschl bases the knowledge of God, and with it the whole religious view, on purely subjective grounds; (2) that his theology is bound up with a theory of knowledge and of judgments of value which makes an unwarranted divorce between theoretic and religious knowledge, and imperils the objective character of the latter; (3) that even objective religious realities are held to be apprehended only in subjective relations, or as "mirrored in the subject";§ and (4) that the modes of apprehension of these realities are not limited by the strictly objective state of the case, but are moulded, shaped,

\* Cf. *J. and R.*, III, pp. 354, 354-65, etc. (E. T.). Mr. Garvie objects to this being spoken of as a value-judgment and denies that Ritschl so regards it (2d Edit., p. 409), but he is clearly mistaken. It is the attribution of a penal value (*Strafwerth*) to evils that do not of themselves possess this character. These are value-judgments, but, as Ritschl tries to show, wrong ones.

† *System of Doctrine*, IV, p. 67.

‡ P. 4.

§ *J. and R.*, III, p. 34 (E. T.). Cf. *Leben*, II, p. 191. Ritschl justifies this by the reflection that even the sensuous object is not observed and explained as it is in itself, but only as we represent it. See below.

heightened, colored by religious feeling and imagination, in the way that best suits subjective (religious) needs.

It would involve too wide a discussion to go into all these points, but some examples may be selected for illustration.

And first, Prof. Swing thinks that a "misleading" account has been given of Ritschl's doctrine of knowledge. Ritschl, it is alleged, has been accused of denying the reality of "things," whereas he plainly declares that we *do* know "things," only (after Lotze) not apart from, but "in" their phenomena, or appearances to us.\* It is to be feared that in this criticism Prof. Swing shows that he has not himself penetrated far into the interior of either Lotze's or Ritschl's theory of knowledge. There is no single point on which the critics of Ritschl, friendly or unfriendly, have been more at one than in regard to the unsatisfactoriness of his idea of the "thing." Was Ritschl realist or idealist? The present writer has no more doubt than Prof. Swing has that Ritschl meant to uphold some kind of realism; but it is just as certain that his arguments would logically lead to a different conclusion. Not only so, but Prof. Swing should be aware that the idealistic interpretation of Ritschl has been adopted by some of his warmest admirers. Thus, *e.g.*, he is interpreted by Traub,† in what Reischle, in his recent booklet on *Werthurtheile*,‡ regards as the ablest exposition of Ritschl's theory of knowledge. What is perhaps more striking, Traub's view is apparently homologated by Ritschl's own son in the *Leben*.§ Even, therefore, if Prof. Orr had asserted this to be Ritschl's view (which he did not), he could not have been accused of "misleading." Nor can the judgment of these writers be wondered at. Ritschl holds, we shall presume, that there are actual "things," but he equally holds that the "things" are known only in the subjective impressions they produce in us, and that the idea of the "thing" itself is a purely mental construction. Even as regards Lotze—though it is impossible here to go into that—Prof. Swing is widely astray. "Lotze's theory of knowledge," he says, "cannot be twisted into subjectivism."|| Yet Lotze himself affirms "the unavoidable and thorough-going subjectivity of our cognition."¶ Space and time are to him subjective forms of our representation as much as they

\* Pp. 78-9, 82.

† In *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1894.

‡ P. 9.

§ II, p. 391. This also replies to a criticism of Mr. Garvie's (p. 51). All the above writers admit the vacillating and unsatisfactory character of Ritschl's theory.

|| P. 63.

¶ *Outlines of Met.*, p. 143 (E. T.).

are to Kant.\* He will not reject "subjective idealism" as a possible hypothesis† and the spiritual beings he postulates as the causes of our perceptions have no relation of resemblance to the "things" we know. Ritschl, as his biographer admits,‡ was really in error in supposing that his theory of knowledge was essentially different from Kant's.

Next, as to the subjectivity of our knowledge of God. There is no question, as already stated, as to Ritschl's tenacious belief in God and His Providence. But it is just as certain—Reischle's book above mentioned may be consulted in proof—that the idea of God is reached by Ritschl solely on the basis of a judgment of worth on our own personality, and as a postulate for the securing of our position as moral and spiritual persons in the world. The idea is formed from within, and receives its shape, not from objective data, but from the working of the religious imagination (phantasy).§ If it be replied, as it may justly be, that in the Christian religion the knowledge of God is held to be derived in a more immediate way from Revelation, this only raises a new problem, and throws us back on the origin and character of the knowledge possessed by Christ of God—a knowledge which, however perfect of its kind, still is "religious" in its nature, and cannot be supposed to transcend the necessary limitations of religious knowledge in humanity. The idea of revelation, generally, is one of the least carefully investigated of all the notions in Ritschl's system. It is not a notion peculiar to Christianity, but is a mark of all religions.¶ That it is affirmed of Christ in an absolutely unique sense admits of no doubt; but whether it logically expresses more than the clearness and perfection of the idea of God and of His world-end which grew up in the consciousness of this wonderfully constituted person must remain doubtful,¶ as also the question of its scientific worth. It is easy for Prof. Swing to bring forward passages about Christ and His revelation from Ritschl which, fairly construed, would mean much more. This his critics have never denied; but it only serves to bring out, what they are compelled to emphasize, the remarkable disparity between his foundation and his structure.

\* *Outlines of Met.*, pp. 89, 131; *Met.*, I, pp. 359, 354 (E. T.).

† *Ibid.*, p. 141.

‡ *Ut supra.*

§ Cf. Reischle, p. 4.

¶ *J. and R.*, III, pp. 201-2 (E. T.).

¶ "Christ's unique worth," we are told, "lies in the manner in which He mastered His spiritual powers through a self consciousness which transcended that of all other men, and by His will brought them all to bear upon His personal de-tination" (*J. and R.*, III, p. 332, E. T.).



Lastly, there is the vexed question of "value-judgments," about which so much is still being written. The subject is too large to enter upon at any length; but before Prof. Swing repeats his charges of "miscalculation" he had better read what some of the newest critics say upon that difficult part of Ritschl's theology. One thing only may be remarked, viz., that it is wholly inept to quote Bernard, Luther and Calvin, and represent Ritschl as meaning no more by his declaration that religious knowledge moves solely in "independent judgments of value" than that religious knowledge is always morally and spiritually conditioned. Ritschl needed to assume no prophet's mantle to teach us that. No one would ever deny it. Religion is surcharged with value-judgments in this sense. One can cordially adopt the language of Luther and Calvin; but Ritschl speaks with a different voice. The core of Ritschl's theory is seen in his account of the genesis of the idea of God. The whole religious view of the world hinges with Ritschl on the idea of God. But the idea of God, as already seen, is derived from man's need of securing his personality in relation to the world. It rests on a judgment of worth; but the worth is ultimately that of one's own personality. It is subjective in basis, and subjective in the manner in which the mind represents it to itself. The same is true of every idea which depends on it—i.e., of the whole religious view. It has no point of contact with theoretic knowledge, and derives no illustration or support from it. This, it is believed, is what Ritschl means when he affirms that religion moves wholly in judgments of value. It is not denied that there is a deep truth in value-judging, as expounded, e.g., by Lotze. But the worth-judgments relate to objects that are *given* by the ordinary faculties of knowledge (or to ideals); the reality of the object is not made dependent on the worth judgment.\*

\* How this theory affects even the doctrine of forgiveness, in giving it an aspect valid only from the standpoint of time, should be studied in such a section as that in *J. and R.*, III, pp. 322-3 (E. T.). One or two sentences may be quoted. "On the other hand, all our reflections about God's wrath and compassion, His long-suffering and patience, His severity and sympathy, are based upon a comparison of our individual position with God, under the form of time. However indispensable these judgments may be in the texture of our religious experience, still they stand in no relation whatever to the theological conception of the whole from the view-point of eternity. . . . From the point of view of theology, therefore, no validity can be assigned to the idea of the wrath of God and His curse upon sinners yet unreconciled. . . . If we assume that God foresees their final inclusion in His kingdom, as theologians we have no alternative but to trace their redemption back to His love in an unbroken line, even though these very redeemed ones may, as their ideas take a temporal form, have the impression of a change from divine wrath to divine mercy. We must come to the same conclusion, too, regarding the phenomena of those cases where men are conscious of guilt and



Something might have been said, had space permitted, on Prof. Swing's views of Ritschl's doctrines of the Person of Christ and of Redemption. Here there is hardly room for a charge of "misleading." The question is not so much as to what Ritschl taught as to the adequacy of his teaching. It is very well to speak of what Prof. Swing calls the "Godhood" of Christ; but is this predicate satisfied by saying that Christ, as the perfect revelation of God in humanity, and as exercising spiritual supremacy over the world, has to us the "religious value" of God? The question recurs, *Ought* any being to have the religious value of God to us who is not personally and essentially God? The whole doctrine of a real incarnation is here involved. And Ritschl's system, it must be reaffirmed, has no such doctrine. Similarly it is not "misleading" to say that Ritschl's theology has no vicarious atonement, or provision for the expiation of guilt of any kind. Prof. Swing himself affirms as much. The question is, Is such a theology satisfactory as an interpretation of the Gospel? There is nothing "misleading" in denying it, if possibly there is a danger of misleading in affirming it. Perhaps, however, enough has been advanced to show that Ritschl's theology is not all such smooth sailing as Prof. Swing seems to imagine, and to enable the reader to judge of such a resounding sentence as the following: "These world-transforming views which inspired the teaching of Albrecht Ritschl, and which have been obscured by the wood, hay, and stubble of so many of Ritschl's critics, we are now, I trust, in a better condition to estimate for ourselves at something of their true worth for constructive theology."\*

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regard evils as the effects of God's curse." [Mr. Garvie may observe that this last case is put on the same footing as the experience of divine forgiveness.]

\* P. 115.

#### IV.

#### AN EXEGESIS OF 2 CORINTHIANS V. 1-5.

THE consensus regarding 2 Cor. v. 1-5 is, that it teaches that believers in Jesus Christ, while they yet live on earth, know that life in heaven is in prospect for them; and as they have here a habitation, so they will have there. The present one will be broken up; of that they are aware, and are continually made sensible of it by afflictions. For that reason they desire to enter their heavenly habitation, and also for the additional reason that the latter, being prepared by God, is perfect, and especially it is eternal. When that occurs, *what is mortal about them will be swallowed up by life*. Regarding this last expression, the consensus is not some precise understanding of its meaning. It is rather a custom of transferring the expression in *bloc* to Christian discourse, in which it is familiarly used as expressing in the best way what is not easily definable.

Interpretations of the details of this passage exhibit the very opposite of consensus. With the consensus as a warp, expositors weave in coloring, and even patterns, that differ according to the genius of the expositor. In some instances, the resultant web shows a pattern so striking that the warp hardly appears at all. Such is the case when from this passage it is made to appear that Paul expected to survive Christ's second coming, and that he would in consequence escape death by experiencing the change that he speaks of in 1 Cor. xv. 51. Here, however, he puts the case of dying hypothetically, as what may after all happen to him, and must happen to many believers. Nevertheless, while representing the comfort for that case, he expresses, as something that he and all believers of that date might cherish, the wish that he might enter on the heavenly state through the process of change without dying. For he shrinks from death; he feels antipathy for death. Other patterns, produced by other expositors, give more effect to the warp, that is to the consensus stated above; and some less.

When something is rightly said, it is capable of right interpretation if rightly taken in hand, and the interpretation should satisfy every one concerned to know it. What is so said is like a

skein of worsted, which is easily wound off if taken rightly, but becomes tangled if not. In the case of our passage, the assumption ought to be that Paul has expressed the truth in the right way. The present effort to interpret what he says will be on that assumption.

The interpretation begins with understanding what is meant by "*Our earthly house of the tent.*" This is metaphor. It is so generally understood to mean the human body, that this meaning must even be called a consensus. Almost all expositors begin with that. Diverging interpretations come afterwards, but they appear immediately. That they must come appears to any one the moment he tries to carry the notion, *body*, through the catena of expressions that follow the mention of "*our earthly house of the tent.*" For in the same verse, those who have their earthly bodies say, under the same figure of *house*: "We have a body in heaven from God, not made with hands," in which saying the implications are that they have the heavenly body at the same time that they have the earthly; that the heavenly is from God, whereas the earthly is not; that the heavenly is not made with hands, whereas the earthly is. In ver. 2 they say: "In this tent we sigh, longing to be superinvested with our house from heaven." For *tent* is the only object that the context offers to be supplied after *in this*; and ver. 4 shows that such is the meaning. Here, then, is expressed the expectation that the earthly body will be covered over by the heavenly; and thus, occupying both bodies, as one in a coat is covered over all by a cloak, the believer enters on the heavenly state. In ver. 3 the same believers say, with apparently a change of metaphor: "If so be having put on clothing we shall not be found naked." To know what this expresses, one must ask, What was put on as clothing? The *tent* is hard to apply, but the notion *body* may be carried over to the new metaphor. If the body is meant as that which was put on, how can that with which we were born be conceived of as something that we at some time or other put on, or another put on us? And on what did we or they put it? And what is meant by being found naked? If it is a state divested of the human body, how can that be put as a hypothetical case, seeing that all men must put off that body? Or can there be a situation where that need not be? One thinks of "We shall all be changed" (1 Cor. xv. 51); and here it is supposed that Paul must be understood to refer to that. In ver. 4, the same believers say, while yet in this tent, *i.e.*, in *the body*, "We are not willing to be divested, but to be superinvested." If this is said of the same contrasted objects, the earthly house of the tent and the house in

heaven, as the context requires, then the meaning is, We desire to have both the earthly and the heavenly body; and then also the way in which it is pictured that this mortal is to be swallowed up by life is, that the mortal body is to be enveloped and assumed within the eternal body.

No one starting with *body* as the meaning of *earthly house of the tent*, interprets our passage consecutively and consistently with itself to the end in this way. The impossibility of doing so is felt at once because of conflict with what is elsewhere taught in the Scriptures. And it is obvious that the notions so obtained are contradicted immediately in vers. 6-10. For there the heavenly state of presence with the Lord Jesus is set forth as absence from the body and out of it; and being present in the body is absence from where the Lord is, that is absence from heaven.

But in various degrees expositors come near interpreting as above. An instance of considerable approach to it is that interpretation referred to above as a pattern that nearly conceals the warp. Many are led to accept it. Its plausibility is due to the tenacity with which it holds fast the meaning, *body*, from its first supposed expression in *earthly house of the tent*, through the expressions that follow. That interpretation does not, however, find it stated that the present bodies of believers are to be super-invested with their heavenly bodies. But this is evaded, either by ignoring the distinctive meanings of *invest* and *superinvest*, and maintaining that it is only expressed that in the body believers sigh to be invested with their heavenly house; or it is alleged that Paul introduces another figure, viz., clothing, and that, being changed while still in the body (1 Cor. xv. 51), so far as this denotes embodying anew with negation of precedent dying, is a super-investiture. But 1 Cor. xv. 51 calls the change spoken of there an *investing*, while the thing spoken of here is called *super-investing*. Moreover, in ver. 4 this interpretation transmutes "We are not willing to be divested," into "We feel an antipathy to dying, we shrink from dying"; and in respect to the present tense, *we have a building*, and to the implications of *not made with hands*, it is driven to shiftiness as much as others are.

At each expression of our passage succeeding the initial *earthly house of the tent*, taken to denote *the body*, expositors strain words and idioms in order to evade meanings inconsistent with what Scripture elsewhere teaches. To escape from the implication of *made without hands*, viz., that the present body is viewed as made with hands, emphasis is laid on *building* in the clause, *we have a building*, by which we get the meaning: Instead of a perishable tent we have ready for us in heaven a house that lasts eternally,



as Heb. xi. 9, 10, is usually understood. Instead of taking *We have a building* in its direct present sense, it is said to be the present for the future; or the present of that date when dissolution occurs; or to be used because Christ's second coming was viewed as impending; or to express the certainty of what is future, over-leaping the *interim*; or in the sense: We have ready for the time when we must leave the body. *Not made with hands*, as implying the contrary of the body, is got over by saying, that though it does not fit the body referred to, it does fit what figuratively denotes the body, viz., *the tent*; or by saying that the house builded by God may be characterized as not made with hands, in distinction from the present body that comes to one by human procreation.

In ver. 2, what seems to be the plain rendering, and the consequent plain meaning as stated above, is escaped by rejecting *tent* as the object to be supplied. Instead, the reference of *in this* is said to be the situation posited in ver. 1, viz., the expected destruction of the body and the prospect of a heavenly house. Or instead of *in this*, we find such translations as *because, in this respect, the case being so*.

As to ver. 3, to report the different things that have been answered to such questions as have been asked above under the same verse would require a chapter for each question.

In ver. 4, not to mention other instances, our versions of 1611 and 1881 escape the plainer rendering. "We are not willing to be divested, but to be superinvested," by combining the *not* with the conjunction that precedes, and translating, *Not for that*. This changes "We would not be" into "not that we would be," and gives as the meaning of *burdened*: We are burdened with longing to be superinvested with our house from heaven, not with desire to be divested of our earthly house. But how can the former be desired without desiring also the latter?

This tangle of interpretation extends in an equal degree to the particles of speech that connect or emphasize the catena of expressions in our passage. It would take too much time to represent this; nor is it important for the present purpose. Conjunctions and other particles cause debate only when the expressions they conjoin or qualify are differently understood. Unmistakable expressions can leave their proper conjunctions unexpressed, and often do so.

The tangle of a skein of thread is often due to a single mistake in unraveling it, and the mistake is often made just at the start. A misfit of one piece of a machine, assumed to be right when it is not, may occasion violent adjustment of all the other parts that



are right in order to make the machine go, and then it goes badly. Let the one mistake in the skein and the one misfit in the machine be corrected, and all goes smoothly. It is likely to be so with what is rightly said, but is variously understood. May it be that the tangled interpretation reviewed above is due to misunderstanding at a single point, where, if correction is made, the meaning of the whole passage will be clear? This article aims to show that such is the case, and it has already intimated that the initial mistake that causes the whole confusion is precisely at the point where there is a consensus of interpretation. It seems expedient to open a question that has been treated as closed, and inquire, *What is denoted by the metaphor: Our earthly house of the tent?*

An explanation of 1 Cor. iii (in THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW, July, 1896) directs attention to the way in which the ancient event, recorded Ex. xxxiv. 29-35, that glorified Moses as the minister of the Old Covenant, is made the means of commending the ministers of the New Covenant. From that record, especially the LXX version of it, Paul borrows the diction wherewith to express the glory of the Gospel, and the glory of those that preach it as he and his fellow-laborers did. He does it by direct transference of phrases, without any "as it were," or "so to speak," such as he sometimes uses. He says: "But as of sincerity, but as of God, in the sight of (*enanti* = *vis-à-vis* with) God, speak we in Christ" (ii. 18), by which he claims for ministers of the New Covenant the counterpart of what was true of Moses. Pursuing the same diction, he says: "We use great boldness of speech, and are not as Moses who put a veil on his face" (iii. 12, 13). He characterizes the unbelieving Jews as "having a veil on their hearts whensoever Moses is read" in their worship, and says that "when Israel shall turn to the Lord, the veil is taken away." The latter expression signifies converted Israel turning to God to receive the New Covenant, and pictures the action as done in the way that is recorded of Moses receiving the Old Covenant: "When Moses went in before the LORD to speak with Him he took off the veil." Calling the Corinthian believers his epistle, he says that they are "written with the Spirit of the living God in tables that are hearts of flesh" (iii. 3). Referring to the way in which the ministry of Moses was glorified by the shining of his face, and that, too, a ministry of condemnation, he exclaims: "How shall not rather the ministration of the Spirit (*i.e.*, the Gospel ministration) be with glory!" (iii. 8).

A large part of the Corinthian believers to whom this epistle was addressed were Jews. They had received the "liberty"

that the Holy Spirit gives, which by Israelites was felt most sensibly and keenly to consist in release from the ministry that Moses received and instituted as the way of drawing near to God. That was "a yoke which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear." They saw that the New Covenant required them to "believe that they should be saved through the grace of the Lord Jesus in like manner as the Gentiles" (Acts xv. 10, 11). Referring to this class of his readers, as well as to the Gentile believers, and including both as well as his fellow-ministers in *We all*, Paul declares the reign of this "liberty," and names the Holy Spirit as the administrator of it, and says: "But we all, with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord, are changed from glory to glory, even as from the Lord [the] Spirit" (iii. 18). This is metaphor that pictures all Christian believers as in a tent of meeting that is the New Covenant counterpart of that tent of meeting where Moses received the Old Covenant.

For clearer definition of the tent of meeting that suggests this diction, and for better understanding further use of it that Paul may make, it should be remembered that it was not the tent commonly called the Tabernacle. The latter was not yet set up when the circumstances occurred that are recorded Ex. xxxiv. 29-35, from which Paul borrows his diction. The tent referred to was an *ad interim* tent of meeting (with God), provisionally used until the Tabernacle was ready. There is sufficient reason for understanding that it was Moses' own dwelling (see LANGE on Ex. xxxiii. 7-11, xxxiv. 29-35, *Bib. Work*). The Greek word for the Tabernacle is invariably σκηνή; and this may account for Paul's using in our passage the different word σκήνος which occurs nowhere else in the New Testament. The use of Moses' own house for the tent of meeting was temporary. Moses knew that, because in that tent he had received another tent from God, that was to be made and set up by men's hands.

These details, though much lost sight of by Christians now, were as familiar to the large number of converted Jews that were among the original readers of this epistle, as the other circumstantial details that Paul turns to metaphorical use. The Jewish believers would explain them to their less intelligent Gentile brethren. We may suppose that Paul represented the truth in the fashion now remarked on for the special benefit of the Jewish believers, as helping them to see it under the forms of thinking of revealed religion and of expressing it that were familiar to them. They were assailed by Jewish-minded teachers, as this epistle shows; and the truth expressed to them in this fashion would fortify them against such. Paul's method here much

resembles what appears in a larger way in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

If now our passage, v. 1-5 (without the *For* that connects it with something said in chap. iv), followed immediately on iii. 18, that pictures the whole body of believers as in a tent of meeting beholding the glory of the Lord, and like Moses changed to glory, nearly every reader would see in *the tent* a metaphor of the same sort as others that Paul uses in chap. iii. Such at least would be the first interpretation, which would then await confirmation from its fitting every succeeding expression that refers to the object so named. The intervening chap. iv presents difficulty, especially by causing our passage to be so remote from iii. 18. As it is, some express intimation that the metaphors of chap. iii are resumed seems necessary in order to justify interpreting *the tent* by iii. 18. The scrutiny to see whether these difficulties make impossible the interpretation now suggested, may be deferred until it appears whether the otherwise successful application of the interpretation makes it desirable to find that they are surmountable, or may be ignored, or do not really exist.

Metaphor requires the reader to make for himself the amplifications that are expressed when, instead of metaphor, a writer uses extended similitude. Doing this with the present passage, its first verse says: We know that our earthly house of the tent of meeting with God must be taken down, as Moses knew that the tent which was his dwelling would cease to be "the tent of meeting." Moses knew that there was to be a better and proper tent set up for that, viz., the Tabernacle. He already had that house while using the provisional house, having there received the design and specifications of it from God its builder. In like manner we, while in our earthly house of the tent, have a building from God. The house that Moses had from God, and was setting up, was made with hands. Our house from God is not made with hands, but is prepared by God Himself. The Tabernacle that Moses made was still to be on earth and was temporary, for it was to be done away, as chap. iii represents. Our house is in heaven and is eternal.

Thus far everything fits, giving a clear and consistent meaning. And let it be noted that the antithesis, that every reader sees to be implied in the words of this verse, is found, not to be between tent on earth and house in heaven, but between the objects here denoted by metaphor and the ancient things from which the metaphor is derived. The immediate effect is that *we have* and *not made with hands* are found to be perfectly appropriate expressions. Can *the tent*, with the meaning now attached to it, be carried

through the succeeding verses with the same success? Perhaps it may, if reasonable allowance is made for slight strains that usually occur when carrying a metaphor through a catena of related expressions.

The second verse says: "In this [tent] we sigh, longing to be superinvested with our habitation from heaven." This pictures the habitation from heaven as enveloping the tent and those in it. But if *tent* denotes drawing near to God to speak with Him as He is revealed, and *habitation from heaven* the same in its perfect and eternal way, there is entire fitness in what is stated. The latter is not substituted for the former. The presence and the communion is the same in both. The perfect envelops the imperfect. And supposing that *invest* and *superinvest* introduce an additional metaphor, viz., of clothing, there would be no incompatibility in the notion of being in the tent and in the habitation from heaven at the same time, as one having on a coat receives over it a cloak. It is, however, more reasonable to disallow the notion that *invest*, *divest* and *superinvest* are used metaphorically. *Superinvest* does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament beside our vers. 2, 4. But Paul uses *invest* in a free way, as the same is used in English, so that the reference to clothing quite disappears. See Rom. xiii. 12, 14; 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54; Gal. iii. 27; Eph. iv. 24, vi. 11, 14; 1 Thess. v. 8 (comp. Luke xxiv. 40). *In this tent we sigh* is expressed in the fourth verse more amply, and therefore the adaptation of the metaphor in that respect may better be considered there.

In the third verse it is said: "If so be indeed we who were invested (aorist participle) shall not be found stripped." If *tent* be taken as the unexpressed object of *invest* and *stripped*, and the context offers no other, the meaning is still clear and consistent. The verse presents hypothetically the case of those who, having received the New Covenant counterpart of that which Moses experienced in the tent of meeting, shall be found deprived of it; and expresses by implication that they will not be superinvested with the habitation from heaven as they now desire to be. Nearness to God must begin on earth to be enjoyed in heaven. The latent significance of what is so expressed is, that influences were at work tending to strip the readers in the respect referred to. Jewish-minded believers, or professed believers, would prevent others from seeing that the ministry of Moses was done away. Let it be noted that with this interpretation the participle in the aorist that appears in this verse is obviously the very tense proper to the object and action referred to.

The fourth verse completes what was half expressed in the



second verse, and explains the sighing mentioned there. It says : " We who are in the tent sigh, being burdened for that we are not willing to be divested, but to be superinvested." The sentence itself gives *the tent* as the object of its first clause, and as the object to be supplied after the next following verb in the infinitive. The thought expressed is again perfectly clear, especially if it is remembered here that i. 8 expresses what Paul means by *being burdened*. He says there : " We were weighed down (burdened) exceedingly," viz., by the afflictions that befell him and his fellow-laborers in Asia. And subsequent expressions, especially in chap. iv (in a context, be it noted, very near our passage), make it plain that he means afflictions that came from opposition on the part of those to whom the Gospel was veiled, who would have believers like themselves, that is, would strip away the tent wherein with unveiled face believers behold the glory of the Lord. Hence, as already noted, the caveat of our ver. 3 ; in close connection with which the fourth verse says : For indeed we who are in the tent sigh, being burdened with afflictions, for the reason that we are not willing to be divested of the liberty that the Spirit gives, but to attain to the perfect enjoyment of the same that shall be when we are superinvested with the habitation from heaven. Let it be noted, that ἐφ' ᾧ, translated *for that*, precisely as at Rom. v. 12, is as satisfactory here as it is there ; and also, that the meaning thus found in this verse comes from the plainest grammatical rendering.

The fifth verse, without metaphor, comments on the circumstances that have just been expressed, particularly referring to what is stated in the first verse, including the precedent investing that the third verse shows is essential to the superinvesting. It says : " He that wrought us for this very thing is God, who gave unto us the earnest of the Spirit." Reading our passage as closely consecutive on iii. 18, that is as mentally so, gives a clear meaning to this concluding statement. The glorious " liberty " proclaimed and described in iii. 17, 18, is of God's arranging ; but the Holy Spirit is there declared to administer it, which He does by His presence : " Now the Lord is the Spirit ; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, [there is] liberty." This ver. 5 says : God gives the Spirit ; and that so given the Spirit is the earnest of this very thing for which God wrought those that believe. This means that the Holy Spirit, whose presence is liberty to draw near to God with unveiled face, is the pledge that the believer who enjoys this privilege on earth shall enjoy the same in heaven.

As now interpreted, v. 1-5 connects in a lucid and satisfactory way with the immediately following verses, 6-10. On the



ground of what has been considered, and speaking for himself and his fellow-laborers in the ministry, Paul says: "We are of good courage, and are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Wherefore also we are ambitious, whether present or absent, to be well pleasing to him." It is usual to suppose that, dropping metaphors, Paul here names what was denoted by them; and that what is said here must be taken as interpretation of the foregoing metaphors. There is no such necessity when the metaphors are otherwise lucid of themselves. And when they are found to denote things quite distinct from being *present in the body* and from being *present with the Lord*, no confusion arises from the employment of the latter to denote the two situations of *enjoying* nearness to God. Moreover, although *present in the body* seems to interpret *earthly house*, *present with the Lord* does not as exactly answer to *habitation from heaven*; and *superinvest*, that is said of that *habitation*, would be an incompatible predicate said of *presence with the Lord*.

An interpretation so exactly consistent with all the expressions of the passage itself, and with the context that follows, and that finds a meaning both precious and agreeable to what is elsewhere taught in Scripture, might challenge acceptance notwithstanding its remoteness from iii. 17, 18, and even though chap. iv by its contents precluded our construing chap. iii as mentally near. The latter, however, is not the case. Immediately following the last verse of chap. iii, that pictures believers engaged in what is the Christian counterpart of what Moses experienced in the tent of meeting, chap. iv begins: "Therefore having this ministry we faint not." This ministry that is contrasted with Moses' ministry. The characteristic of not fainting is, in the first place, expressed to be repudiation of "handling the word of God deceitfully" (ver. 2). Continuing, as in chap. iii, to use the diction derived from the circumstances recorded Ex. xxxiv. 29-35, it is affirmed that "if the Gospel is veiled, in those that are perishing it is veiled," meaning Jewish-minded opposers that shared the hardness that was fallen on Israel (Rom. xi. 25). Consequently "the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ does not shine to them" (vers. 3, 4). The ministers of that Gospel, however, are by God's shining in their hearts, made luminous with the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ (ver. 6). The characteristic of not fainting is further expressed as enduring successfully afflictions that are the consequence of preaching the truth; which afflictions make these ministers appear as reënacting in their own bodies the killing of Jesus in the body, which in turn only inflames anew the resurrection hope within

them (vers. 7-15). And then it is reiterated: "Wherefore we faint not." If the outward man perishes, the inward man is renewed. Momentary light afflictions work out an eternal weight of glory for those ministers that look at the things that are not seen, that are eternal (vers. 16-18). The glory is the same that is the theme of chap. iii. "*Work out for us glory*" here returns to the thought of "*changed from glory to glory*" there; and spoken of afflictions so endured, claims that they are coöperative in the glorious process. "*We looking at (σχοπούμεν ἡμῶν) the things not seen*" borrows *looking at* from the LXX version of Ex. xxxiii. 7-11, that tells how Moses removed his tent, that was called the tent of meeting, out of the camp and far off: "And whenever Moses entered into the tent without the camp, all the people stood *looking*, each one at the door of his tent." The things not seen that they looked not at, Moses, who entered the tent, looked at, when the glory appeared that caused his face to shine when he again came out of the tent to speak to the people. All these representations of chap. iv keep chap. iii present mentally. The last three verses of chap. iv, both in thoughts and in reminiscent words, renewedly recur to the picture of the tent of meeting in its New Testament counterpart. And then follows: "We know that if our earthly house of the tent were destroyed," What meaning for *the tent* can be nearer than the present earthly place of privilege where Paul and his fellow-ministers felt God shining in their hearts for illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ, and received the ministry of that same; and where all that hear them and are "reconciled to God" (v. 20), "with unveiled face behold (look at) the glory of the Lord, and are changed into the same image from glory to glory"?

PHILADELPHIA.

SAMUEL T. LOWRIE.

## V.

### THE AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS OF THE BOOK OF ESTHER.

THE Book of Esther presents itself to us as a true narrative of a momentous episode in the history of the children of Israel. The scene is laid in Shushan the palace during the reign of a king who is designated in the English version as Ahasuerus—"this is Ahasuerus which reigned, from India even unto Ethiopia, over an hundred and seven and twenty provinces." Which of the royal names found in the pages of the Greek and Latin authors Ahasuerus corresponded to was long a most perplexing question that received various answers from commentators. The decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions has furnished the true solution. We now know that in **אחשורוש** we have the Hebrew form of what in Old Persian was *Khshayarsha*.\* This is the word that appears as Xerxes in the other histories with which the scholars of Europe and America were familiar before the long-silent records of Eastern rocks and mounds began again to speak.† The king intended is evidently the son of Darius, who reigned from 485 to 465 B.C. : Xerxes II was assassinated after sitting on the throne not more than two months.‡

The Jews, to whom, according to St. Paul, were intrusted the oracles of God, considered Esther as part of the sacred Scriptures. Although it is not quoted in the New Testament—in which respect it is not unique—the evidence is conclusive that it formed

\* The prefixed **א** may be compared with that of **אחשדרפנים** "satrapies," derived from the Persian *khshatrapavan*.

† Another foreign representation of the name is **חשיארש**; this occurs in the Aramaic portion of the bilingual tombstone found at Sakkara in 1877. The hieroglyphical forms may be seen in Lepsius' *Königsbuch der alten Aegypter*, Taf. XLIX.

‡ *Artakhshatra*, the native form of the name of King Artaxerxes, cannot be represented in Hebrew by the letters in the text, but is almost exactly the **ארתחשטרה** of Ezra and Nehemiah. The mistakes that have been made in the attempts to identify Ahasuerus are instructive. The Septuagint and Josephus call him Artaxerxes, showing that as early as the time when the Greek translation of Esther was made the true equivalent of the Persian name was unknown to the Israelites in Palestine and Egypt. It is evident that what we have before us could not have originated where such ignorance was prevailing.

part of the common Hebrew canon endorsed by Christ and His apostles. It was among the books recognized by Josephus. The passage in the works of that author, in which he gives an account of the writings received as of divine authority by his fellow-countrymen, is well known :

“For we have not thousands of books discordant and conflicting, but only twenty-two, containing the record of all time, which have justly been believed to be divine.\* And of these, five are the books of Moses, which embrace the laws and the tradition of the creation of man, reaching to the death of Moses. This period is little short of three thousand years. And from the death of Moses down to the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, who succeeded Xerxes, the prophets who came after Moses related the things done in their times in thirteen books. The remaining four books contain hymns to God and practical directions for men. From the time of Artaxerxes to our own time, each event has been recorded, but the records have not been deemed worthy of the same credit as those of earlier date, because the exact succession of the prophets was not continued. But what faith we have placed in our own writings is seen from our conduct ; for though so long a time has now passed, no one has dared either to add anything to them or to take anything from them, or to alter anything. But it grows up with Jews from their very birth, to regard them as decrees of God, and to abide by them, and if need be gladly to die for them.”†

This distinctly states that none of the historical works composed after the time of Artaxerxes was accounted part of the Scripture. Josephus, a man of priestly descent and scholarly tastes who had given special attention to religious questions, must be accepted as a competent witness to testify to what was the current opinion in the best-informed circles of his day on the matter here spoken of. How could such a production as the one we are examining, if it were a mere romance, ever have attained to canonical authority ? It favors no priestly or other special class in the community whose members may be imagined as foisting a lie on the populace from motives of personal aggrandizement. When it was first numbered with the writings looked upon as emanating from prophets in their official capacity, *i.e.*, as spokesmen of Jehovah, the proof in favor of its right to the place must have appeared conclusive. “ God is not a man, that He should lie ” had long stood in the Mosaic law rolls. The presence of several books in the Septuagint that were never admitted into the Hebrew Bible demonstrates that the religious heads of the people were not too prone to stamp with the seal of canonicity all candidates for that high honor.

We have a lasting monument to the historical truthfulness of the Book of Esther in an annual celebration. We can say at the

\* These were the same as the books that now form the Old Testament of Jews and Protestants.

† *Contra Apion*, I. 8.



present time, as could Josephus of old, that all the Jews in the world now observe the days of Purim because of the orders issued by Mordecai.\* This is the only explanation of the origin of the festival that has ever been given by the people who keep it; they have spoken with a consistent voice in all parts of the earth and throughout the centuries.† The anniversary exists and a story purporting to account for it exists, but how came the two to be joined to each other so strongly that nothing has separated them during more than two millenniums? If the former were before the latter, how did the true explanation disappear without leaving the slightest trace and the present so completely take its place? If the tale were first current, how was the initiation of the observance brought about? The book itself states that the memorial was established immediately after the occurrence of the events which it is to keep fresh in mind. This would have been a stumbling-block in the way of adding the festival at any subsequent date, for at once the disagreement between the actual fact and the allegation of the previous observance would be apparent. Thus the denial of the authenticity of the Book of Esther would lead us into inextricable difficulties. Admit its historical character and all is easy—we have an adequate cause assigned for the visible effects. There was a good reason for the first rejoicing; the command of the Persian vizier and the thankfulness felt by those who had experienced the deliverance would support the custom until it became a fixed part of the life of the people.

The simplicity of our narrative speaks strongly in favor of its genuinely historical character. There is nothing fabulous or absurd in it. Without admitting in the slightest that the supernatural is an objectionable element in a writing for which inspiration is claimed, it may be noted that here we have no recourse to it. Providence is, indeed, plainly visible, but it is only such as many a child of God can see in his own life—we have before us perhaps the most exquisite and masterly delineation to be found of the ordinary way of the Lord's carrying out His plans in the world. As this was a popular story, numerous additions were made to it, but they contain incongruous elements from which the original text is entirely free. Mordecai, for instance, is recorded as having discovered a conspiracy against the monarch (ii. 21-23), but it is not said, as in one of the Targums, that he was able

\* *Antiq.*, XI. VI. 13. The anniversary is even called by that worthy's name, "Mordecai's day," in 2 Macc. xv. 36.

† The attempts made within the last forty years by a few German scholars to find in this feast a metamorphosed heathen festival are mutually destructive because of the discrepant results supposed to be reached and are without the slightest support in Hebrew tradition.



to do so because he possessed a knowledge of all the languages of the seventy nations into which the population of the earth was traditionally divided. How simple are the words in vi. 1: "On that night the king's sleep fled," compared with the expansions the story of that night subsequently received! Would any ancient romancer, untrammelled by the necessity of adhering to truth, be able to so restrain himself from taking advantage of the many opportunities offered for embellishing his tale?

It has been said that there are improbabilities and impossibilities in the narrative; but most of the particulars given in support of the assertion are puerile or evince a lack of familiarity with Eastern life. "Is it at all likely that the provinces would be left without government for so long a time?" one writer gravely asks in connection with i. 3, 4—utterly regardless of what should have at once suggested itself to his mind, that there was nothing to prevent the direct appointees of the crown, when called to the capital, leaving the affairs of their districts in the hands of trusted under-officials, who would be responsible to them as they were to the king. That Esther could have kept up communication with Mordecai after having been taken into the harem of the "jealous and amatory Xerxes" should not surprise us. Nowhere, not even in ii. 22, is it stated that the two came into direct contact with each other, and in iv. 5 *sqq.* a go-between is mentioned by name. Even if the restrictions placed on women at the time were as severe as they now are in Moslem countries, the proverb would prove true that "Where there is a will, there is a way"—at least Oriental literature with its tales of forbidden intercourse, seems to show that such would be the case. The statements in the first half of the ninth chapter will cause us no trouble, with the harrowing accounts of the doings in the Turkish empire a few years ago before our minds. The circumference of Susa was variously estimated by ancient authors as one hundred and twenty or two hundred stadia, *i.e.*, about fourteen or twenty-three miles. The figures given for the slain in this large city—five hundred on the first day and three hundred on the second—certainly look moderate. The number in ver. 16 affords no just ground for impugning the historicity of the passage. The Jews were attacked in spite of the second decree, and the governors and other officials helped them. There is no improbability here. Asiatic rulers, however willing to preserve peace, cannot always prevent bloody conflicts between the representatives of different races and religions. When the man next the king was a Hebrew who had shown himself active in the interest of his co-religionists, on which side would those enjoying crown appointments naturally be

expected to cast their influence? Has not royal favor always been a potent converter (viii. 17)? Some of those in authority probably were not averse to seeing a little disturbance in their districts, and did what they could with safety to themselves to produce a conflict. Such double-dealing would bring an opportunity to win profit and credit. Ah, one must go to the East to learn diplomacy! In secular history the wife of Xerxes is called Amestris. That person, if the account we have of her be correct, is not to be identified with either of the queens of the Book of Esther. There is room for all of them. Chap. ii shows that women were no great rarity in the Shushan palace—as, indeed, they never were in those of Oriental monarchs. At one time Vashti was the reigning favorite, the one preferred by the king above all the rest, and at another Esther occupied that position. May we not read between the lines of the narrative of the overthrow of the first and the selection of the second? The seven princes of Persia and Media (i. 14, 21) were ready to advise the putting away of Vashti, perhaps because she had usurped the place of the wife drawn from their own circle, but it will be noticed that it was “the king’s servants that ministered unto him” (ii. 2) that suggested the plan for securing another fair virgin. Esther has her place in Bible history because of her connection with the deliverance of the chosen people from a calamity that threatened their destruction. That, however, was not a matter of world-wide interest at the time. To the Greek historian, not looking on affairs with Jewish eyes and not so intimately acquainted with the secrets of the harem as was the writer of the book we are considering, Amestris was a more public character and of greater importance because of her relation to the Achæmenian dynasty. The most aristocratic blood of the land coursed through her veins; her father was one of those who helped to set the crown on the head of Darius and the leader of the (in the stricter sense) Persian contingent in the Grecian expedition; her son succeeded her husband on the throne.

The book of Esther affords strong internal evidence of the time and the place of its origin. We have not here a colorless piece of literary work that may with equal ease and probability be assigned to any one of several widely separated periods and regions. Its local and temporal coloring is perhaps more pronounced than that of any other portion of the Old Testament.

The fact that there is no mention of Jerusalem or the temple in this book is in harmony with the theory of its origin in Persia not long after the date of the principal occurrence spoken of. The decree of Cyrus granting the exiles permission to return to Pales-

tine was issued in 538 B.C., and many went thither with Zerubabel. They met with much opposition from their neighbors and matters did not prosper greatly, looked at from a worldly point of view. The revival of patriotism under the lead of Ezra and Nehemiah did not take place until the reign that followed the one in which the scene of our story is laid, that of Artaxerxes. The new generation had been born and brought up in the region whither their fathers had been carried captive, and knew no other home. They had about them a vast and wealthy population, among which they might exercise the money-making instincts of their race. The return would necessitate more or less financial sacrifice. Josephus says that many of the Jews "remained in Babylon, since they were disinclined to relinquish their property."\* Thus the absence of any evidence of a longing for the Holy Land is thoroughly in accord with the other indications of the state of feeling in regard to that matter among the Hebrew subjects of Xerxes.

The linguistic characteristics of the Hebrew text indicate that it was composed in Persia. A comparatively large number of words of Persian origin are found in it. The names of the principal actors come from that language—those of the king, as already stated; of both the queens, Vashti and Esther; of Mordecai and of Haman, the son of Hammedatha.† So also do most, if not all, of the twenty-seven in i. 10, 14, ii. 21, v. 10 and ix. 7–9. The form **הרן** "India" (i. 1, viii. 9), is nearer to the Persian form *Hidhu* than to the Syriac *Hendu* or the Sanscrit *Sindhu*. Also **אחשרפנים** (iii. 12, viii. 9, ix. 3), **אחשתרנים** (viii. 10, 14), **כרפס** (i. 6), **פרתמים** (i. 3, vi. 9) and **פתשגן** (iii. 14, iv. 8) are non-Semitic words that came to the author from Persian sources. The presence of these names of persons and things connected with the government shows the familiarity of the writer with the life of the court, and is best accounted for by the supposition of his actual participation in it.

The author was well acquainted with the place in which he makes the events of his story occur and with its customs and manners. Susa was a town of mud bricks until Darius, the father of Xerxes, erected marble structures in it. Mounds now cover the site of the once gay city. The remains of the royal palace were examined by Loftus in 1851–2 and an account of the explorations was published in 1857.‡ The great hall "consisted of several magnificent groups of columns,

\* *Antiq.*, XI. 1.

† For Jews bearing heathen names cf. Dan. i. 7.

‡ "Travels and Researches in Chaldæa and Susiana."

together having a frontage of three hundred and forty-three feet nine inches, and a depth of two hundred and forty-four feet.' Some of the columns bore inscriptions in three different languages recording the fact that it was built by Darius. "It stands on an elevation in the centre of the mound, the remainder of which we may well imagine to have been occupied, after the Persian fashion, with a garden and fountains. Thus the colonnade would represent the 'court of the garden of the king's palace' [of Esth. i. 5, 6], with its 'pillars of marble.'" The explorer was satisfied after careful examination "that the outer groups or porticos stood distinct from the central square of columns, or connected simply by means of curtains. It seems to be to this that reference is made in the 'hangings fastened with cords to silver rings and pillars of marble' at the feast of the royal Ahasuerus." "The habitable portion of the Susian palace, erected by Darius and his successors, undoubtedly stood on the south of and immediately behind the columnar hall. Traces of brick walls were there uncovered, but, the depth of earth being so shallow above them, it was useless to excavate further in that quarter."

An exhaustive treatment of the account of the festivities in the first chapter would suffice to prove that we have before us the production of a writer who would not suffer any untruth to flow from his pen. It may seem improbable to a person acquainted with the modern customs of most Asiatic countries that Xerxes would under any circumstances call upon his queen to appear in public (i. 11); but we have evidence in Herodotus (V. 18; IX. 110 *sqq.*) that it was not then unusual in Persia for the women to be present at the table on the occasion of great feasts. Wine flowed in abundance before the royal guests. At a later time, after the issue of the cruel decree of destruction against a whole people, "the king and Haman sat down to drink" (iii. 15), and it was at banquets of wine that the evil was undone. The ancient Persians were noted for their love of wine. Herodotus says of them that "they are very fond of wine, and drink it in large quantities.

. . . It is also their general practice to deliberate upon affairs of weight when they are drunk" (I. 133). The vessels of gold diverse one from another and the couches of gold and silver are not a mere product of Oriental imagination. After the defeat of the Persian hosts at Plataea in 479 B.C., there "were found many tents richly adorned with furniture of gold and silver, many couches covered with plates of the same, and many golden bowls, goblets and other drinking-vessels."\* The war-tent of Xerxes, which the king on his departure from Greece had left with his

\* Herod., IX. 80.



general, Mardonius, was also captured; in it were "hangings of divers colors," "couches of gold and silver" and "tables of gold and silver."\* Herodotus, who tells us of these riches, wrote of them not very long after the Greeks took them as booty, having been born about the year that Xerxes ascended the throne. These references are specially pertinent. We have in them independent non-Jewish evidence that Ahasuerus possessed in abundance just such small and large utensils and articles of furniture made of the precious metals as are mentioned in *Esth.* i within about three years after the date there assigned to the occasion on which the writer says they were used. Another "great feast," made by the same king "unto all his princes and his servants" shortly after the return from the disastrous Grecian expedition, is recorded in *ii.* 18, but there nothing is said of those expensive objects of luxury. There is thus in this matter a remarkable agreement between the two authors. The special significance of the date of the feast will be referred to in a later paragraph.

We have in the eighth chapter a graphic description of the issuing of a royal decree and the forwarding of copies to the provinces. We know from other sources that there was no single court language in which alone official communications were addressed to the people. The great inscription of Darius at Behistan and several other records of the Persian monarchs are trilingual. There was a well-organized system of posts in operation in the time of Xerxes. Herodotus thus speaks of it in connection with a message sent by that king to Susa :

"Nothing mortal travels so fast as these Persian messengers. The entire plan is a Persian invention; and this is the method of it. Along the whole line of road there are men (they say) stationed with horses, in number equal to the number of days which the journey takes, allowing a man and horse to each day; and these men will not be hindered from accomplishing at their best speed the distance which they have to go, either by snow, or rain, or heat, or by the darkness of night. The first rider delivers his despatch to the second, and the second passes it to the third; and so it is borne from hand to hand along the whole line, like the light in the torch-race which the Greeks celebrate to Vulcan" (*VIII.* 98).

Other illustrations of the exact agreement between the representation of Persian life given in the Book of Esther and the reality as we know it from other sources of information could be given. It may safely be said that nothing, either trivial or important, is attributed to the age of Xerxes that only arose at a subsequent date.

Our author has made no mistakes in regard to the history of his country, but shows himself entirely familiar with the political

\* Herod., *IX.* 82.



matters of the time of his narrative. The empire of Xerxes is throughout, with one exception, spoken of as that of Persia and Media, a collocation that agrees with the relative importance of the two divisions. Under the Achæmenian dynasty Media, though not furnishing the king, was second only to Persia and stood in a different relation to it than did the other divisions of the country. The one departure from this arrangement of the terms is not due to a slip of the pen, but is in reality a token of the carefulness of the writer. It occurs in x. 2 in a formal reference to "the book of the chronicles of the kings of Media and Persia." The preëminence of the Median branch preceded that of the Persian, and of course in the official record of the combined kingdom the history of the former stood before that of the latter. Here in the title of the royal chronicles the order actually employed was the more correct, while elsewhere the other was the more appropriate.\* As in the name, so also in the extent of the territory over which the rule of Xerxes was acknowledged as supreme, our author is correct. In the opening sentence it is described as spreading "from India even unto Ethiopia." Had the writer but dated his work in the earlier part of the preceding reign and assigned the kingdom such boundaries, he could at once be convicted of an anachronism.

The representation of the character of the man at the head of the government of this vast empire agrees with that which we derive from other sources. Nöldeke refers to the great contrast "between Darius and Xerxes, who begins the series of weak and unworthy kings." Rawlinson thus sums up the portraiture found in the pages of Herodotus: "Xerxes, the second and inferior form of the tyrant, weak and puerile as well as cruel and selfish, fickle, timid, licentious, luxurious, easily worked on by courtiers and women, superstitious, vainglorious, destitute of all real magnanimity, only upon occasion ostentatiously parading a generous act when nothing had occurred to ruffle his feelings." The picture is a familiar one of his commanding the Hellespont to be given three hundred lashes and to have a pair of fetters cast into it while proud words were addressed to it. More sad is that of his infatuation for the wife of his brother Masistes; being unable to gain his wicked purpose, he married his son to her daughter, then transferred his attentions to the latter, and finally surrendered the mother to feminine fury. Another anecdote represents a certain Pythius as entertaining Xerxes and his whole army at Celenæ when he was going against Greece. The host volunteered

\* These statements hold good whether the short tenth chapter is from the same pen as the rest of the book or not.

to give for the war all the money he had, "two thousand talents of silver and of gold four millions of Daric staters, wanting seven thousand"—a sum about double that promised by Haman for the destruction of the Jews (Esth. iii. 9). The king was pleased and replied, "Thou shalt be my sworn friend from this day; and the seven thousand staters which are wanting to make up thy four millions I will supply, so that the full tale may be no longer lacking, and that thou mayest owe the completion of the round sum to me. Continue to enjoy all that thou hast acquired hitherto, and be sure to remain ever such as thou now art." When a little later this same Pythius requested that one of his five sons might remain at home to be the support and stay of his old age, part of the answer of the royal friend was making the army march between the divided halves of the corpse of the eldest.

How was Xerxes engaged during the first part of his reign according to extra-Biblical history? When he came to the throne in the beginning of the year 485 B.C., Egypt was in revolt. He marched against that country and reduced it again to subjection in the early part of 484 B.C., *i.e.*, after his second year had begun.\* After his return to the capital, "Xerxes, being about to take in hand the expedition against Athens, called together an assembly of the noblest Persians, to learn their opinions and to lay before them his own designs."† Allowing time for traveling, this consultation must have taken place in the third year of the king's reign. When the war had been decided upon, "all the Persians who were come together departed to their several governments, where each displayed the greatest zeal, on the faith of the king's offers."‡ Then followed the gathering of an immense army from all parts of the empire. Herodotus, in the first part of his Book VII, has a long description of the contingents from the various nations. We find mentioned by name Indians, Ethiopians, Arabians, Islanders from the Erythræan sea, and many others. "Was there a nation in all Asia which Xerxes did not bring with him against Greece?" exclaims the historian. The king set out on the march in 481 B.C., and spent the winter in Sardis. In 480 B.C. there followed the battle of Thermopylæ and other memorable events. In the latter part of that year Xerxes fled to Asia. Æschylus, a contemporary, represents him as going direct to Susa, but Herodotus makes him spend the spring and summer in Sardis (IX. 107). The former is the more probable course of action. Herodotus himself (VIII. 97-103)

\* Cf. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, 3d ed.

† Herod., VII. 8.

‡ Herod., VII. 19.

states that the monarch was in a great state of alarm after the battle of Salamis, and was contemplating flight when the advisableness of his withdrawing was adroitly suggested to him. He thereupon appointed Mardonius to the supreme command of the part of the army left behind, committing the whole matter of the conquest of Greece to that general. He then started for home and journeyed with all possible speed. It is not likely that he would remain in Sardis any longer than was absolutely necessary, *i.e.*, beyond the time when the roads became fit for travel in the spring. Before beginning his retreat he sent "a messenger to carry intelligence of his misfortune to Persia," whose report produced sore dismay in Susa, which "did not cease till Xerxes himself, by his arrival, put an end to their fears."\* The state of public affairs would be favorable to usurpers and the absence of the man who had suffered so disastrous defeat dangerous to his continuance in power. The only prudent and statesmanly course open to the king was to appear in his capital with troops at the earliest moment he could reach there. This would bring him back to Persia in the summer of his seventh year.

Let us now see how the story in the Book of Esther agrees with the history just given. "When the king Ahasuerus sat on the throne of his kingdom, which was in Shushan the palace, in the third year of his reign, he made a feast unto all his princes and his servants; the power of Persia and Media, the nobles and princes of the provinces, being before him: when he shewed the riches of his glorious kingdom and the honour of his excellent majesty many days, even an hundred and fourscore days"; at its conclusion followed a feast for seven days to all the people in Shushan (i. 1-5). This may well have been the assembly of which Herodotus speaks, but the purpose of our author did not require him to mention its cause. The weather and conditions of traveling doubtless had much to do with determining its time and duration. On the last day of the festivities, which cannot have been long before the close of 483 B.C., and probably was in the following spring, Vashti gave dire offense. Upon consultation with "the wise men, which knew the times," her permanent exclusion from the presence of the king was decreed. The plan for choosing another in her place was suggested "after these things, when the wrath of king Ahasuerus was pacified," and his thoughts had begun to dwell again on his former favorite (ii. 1, 2). How long a period had elapsed we are not told; let us suppose that it was short and that the advice was given in the early part of the year 482 B.C. It was in the tenth month of the seventh

\* Herod., VIII. 97, 99.

year of the king's reign that Esther met with favor (ii. 16). The interval is apparently great, but the explanation is simple. It must have taken some time to make the conscription of virgins, but the twelve months of purification required in the case of every one (ii. 3, 12) alone carry us into 481 B.C., the very year in which Xerxes, according to secular history, left Susa for Sardis *en route* to Greece. He did not return to the capital until his seventh year and shortly after his arrival occurred the advancement of Esther.

The way in which the statements of the Book of Esther and those of reliable extra-Biblical history dovetail into each other is very remarkable. Our examination leaves us not simply with the negative result of not finding any contradictions between the two, but it affords us most striking confirmations of the claim that the author of the former was, in the strictest sense of the term, a writer of history. The perfection in the temporal and local setting of his work will be better appreciated if we compare it with the other piece of Jewish literature most similar to it in plot that has come down to us from pre-Christian times. In the Book of Judith the children of Israel are also represented as in sore distress when a woman brings deliverance. The story has the form of history, but it will fit into no epoch of the past. The events described are alleged to have occurred after the Jews had returned from the captivity (iv. 3, v. 18, 19), while Nebuchadnezzar was reigning as king of the Assyrians in Nineveh, the great city (i. 1, iv. 1)! This alone is sufficient to exclude the work from the class of truthful narratives. Many other illustrations of its unreliable character might be given, for it is replete with chronological and geographical errors. Here is a specimen of an ancient Jewish romance: who will place Esther by the side of Judith and say that it also came from the pen of a romancer?

The entire correctness of the statements, direct and indirect, of our author, where it is possible to compare them with other authorities—and such points we have found not few—compels us to receive as true his assertions that we cannot otherwise verify. Included in the latter is what he tells us of the secret history of the court and the harem of Xerxes. This is an integral part of the narrative and cannot be separated from the rest; but how did the recorder obtain such facts? I think that it may safely be said that the evidence at hand conclusively demonstrates that he was not only a contemporary of the scenes he describes, but also a principal actor in them. What was his name? In Esth. ix. 20 we read that "Mordecai wrote these things, and sent letters unto all the Jews that were in all the provinces of the king Ahasuerus,



both nigh and far, to enjoin them that they should keep" the days of Purim. There is here a reference to a preliminary account of the recent deliverance that was transmitted to the Israelites in the provinces when the adoption of the celebration was urged upon them. In consequence of what was written they bound themselves and their children to observe the anniversary forever. As the festival of Purim was to be remembered "throughout every generation" wherever a Jew might be found (ix. 28), it was imperative that an authoritative statement of the facts connected with its origin should be prepared. From what source could such a written memorial best and most naturally come? "Then Esther the queen, the daughter of Abihail, and Mordecai the Jew, wrote with all authority to confirm this second letter of Purim" (ix. 29). "This *second* letter of Purim" was our present Book of Esther from the beginning of the first chapter to the end of the ninth. It was the formal narrative intended for permanent preservation and general instruction. There is definite historical proof that before the beginning of the Christian era the whole Book of Esther was known as a "letter of Purim." It is afforded by the subscription found in the Septuagint at the end of its tenth chapter: "In the fourth year of the reign of Ptolemeus and Cleopatra, Dositheus, who said he was a priest and Levite, and Ptolemeus his son, brought [to Egypt] this epistle (ἐπιστολήν) of Purim, which they said was the same, and that Lysimachus the son of Ptolemeus, that was in Jerusalem, had interpreted it." When sent out, the record before us was accompanied by more personal letters addressed to Jews in different sections of the country and written to confirm it (ix. 29, 30). It went forth in the name and with the authority of the queen and the grand vizier, but of course the actual work of composition fell to the lot of the latter, Mordecai.

The tenth chapter is very short, consisting of only three sentences. It seems to come in abruptly after what was originally intended to be the close of i-ix. It has the appearance of being a later addition; the reign of Ahasuerus is apparently presupposed to be finished. It may be considered as analogous to the closing portion of Deuteronomy, added to the Pentateuch to record the death of Moses and to round out the preceding narrative. It was probably added soon after the death of Xerxes and perhaps by Mordecai himself.

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## VI.

### SUCCESS IN THE MINISTRY.

A COMPREHENSIVE definition of ministerial success is not easy to formulate. It can only at most be approximated. Exact and complete definition is made difficult by the variety of the tests by which this success is measured, and the diversity of the lines and forms in which it is attained. In the world's eye, the ministry is simply one of the learned professions; and success in this, just as in the others, is generally and mainly judged of by immediate and material results. Men call a physician successful when he develops acuteness in diagnosis or skill in therapeutics, gains popular confidence, and builds up a large and lucrative practice. A lawyer succeeds, in the common judgment, when he displays grasp of legal postulates and power of lucid statement, skill in applying principles and collating precedents and marshaling evidence, ability to convince a judge or persuade a jury. A teacher is said to succeed when he stimulates a pupil's mental powers, arouses his industry and ambition, broadens his views, increases at once his store of knowledge and his power of thought. And, in like manner, when a minister of the Gospel gains and holds the popular ear, draws an audience, fills the pews, unites and organizes the congregation, stirs it to activity and beneficence, and by pleasing address and social tact and high character and deftly wielded influence becomes a figure and a power in the community, the common verdict pronounces him a success. And the verdict may be, as far as it goes, a correct one. All this may more or less be part and parcel of genuine ministerial success. On the other hand, there may be true spiritual success where there is but little of this immediate and tangible claim to popular recognition and applause.

True success in the ministry is a far higher and finer thing. It must be tried by a truer test than that of popular opinion. The success of any device is to be sought and found in its production or attainment of its appropriate and intended end. The Gospel is God's device for restoring man to divine fellowship and a holy character. The Gospel ministry is the divinely appointed human instrumentality through which this is to be brought about. It is a part and a feature of God's plan for accomplishing human

redemption. So the success of the plan involves and proves, to some extent at least, the success of the agency. And when sinners who have been pressed and plied with Gospel forces turn Godward and rise heavenward, avoid the evil and cleave to the good, develop virtue and put on Christ, separate themselves from sinners and yet impress and attract them savingly, it may readily be inferred not only that God's evangel is a success, but that God's evangelists as well are successful. The one hundred thousand ministers, or more, in the United States, all necessary deduction being made for the unemployed, the untrained, the inefficient and the unworthy, constitute a class of men in regard to whom, in view of the beneficent influence they exert and the noble work they do, success in their sacred calling may in general be safely assumed and asserted—a success perhaps larger in proportion than that which attends any other class or calling. Merchants and lawyers and physicians and authors and politicians and soldiers probably fail in their several callings in larger proportion than do the ministers of the Gospel of Christ.

If a more specific and particular definition of ministerial success be attempted, a difficulty arises, as has been said, from the variety and diversity of the lines in which it is reached and realized. No minister achieves it in all its possible forms. Its kind varies with the man's ability and adaptation. It may be lacking in some cardinal directions, even when it is signally achieved in others. Like an army beaten on one wing, but victorious on the other, the minister may fail on one side when on another he gains his point. Israel would not hear Ezekiel, and would not believe Isaiah's report, and yet the people's perverseness and unbelief in both cases were divinely foreknown, and formed part of that divine plan which the ministry of these prophets subserved and carried out. Just so, nowadays, a minister may lack personal magnetism and winning address, and for this or other reasons may gain little or no popular hearing or following: and yet his preaching, while apparently without saving or sanctifying effects, may attain other God-appointed ends—may convince or silence gainsayers, may establish and illustrate truth, or at least may declare God's glory, as the heavens and the sun declare it—as these would still declare it if there were no sentient beings to admire the stars or bask in the sunshine. A minister who numbers few converts may yet aid notably in the confirmation and attestation of the divine word. Ineffective as an evangelist, he may be a powerful apologist or polemic. A dull preacher may be a masterly pastor—a bishop, when he cannot be a Boanerges. One man arouses sinners; another edifies the saints; another still organizes the people's activity,

and stimulates their gifts and graces; another may have tact and force in handling ecclesiastical business; while each may be lacking in the spheres in which the others excel. And yet in each and all of these cases may be recognized undoubted and genuine ministerial success. The man's calling in either or all of these instances has an evident *raison d'être*.

Then, again, success may be real and great when it is too indirect and remote to be at once discerned and reckoned. Jesus said to the twelve: "I sent you to reap that on which ye bestowed no labor; other men labored, and ye are entered into their labors." The prophets sowed for a harvest which they and their contemporaries never saw ripened and gathered. So true successors of the apostles, like great cathedral builders, may make plans and lay foundations insuring a superstructure of salvation whose uprearing and completion only later laborers shall compass and later generations behold. "A wise master-builder" in the Gospel, as Paul calls himself, may only lay the ground-tier, on which not he but another shall rear the edifice. Most crops mature in a single season, but an acorn takes a generation or a century to develop an oak; and the latter outcome, though really the greater, may seem to hasty view and impatient judgment a comparative failure. So the cobbler William Carey's pioneer experiment in foreign missions, and the scholar Henry Martyn's heroic self-devotement to the heathen appeared to their fellows a reckless and unreasoning Quixotism, like the flinging of a treasure into a deep, dark sea—a crusade more ill-judged and wasteful and hopeless than that which Peter the Hermit preached and incited. Long years had to pass before men learned, as they long since have learned, to discern in these and other like essays the initial steps, the confident preliminaries, of a grand spiritual achievement—the plan and preparation for the brilliant victories of a holy war. These men and their comrades of the forlorn hope in the Church's modern movement upon heathendom succeeded splendidly in seeming failure—just as Fulton succeeded with his steamboat and Morse with his telegraph, and a host of others in the inventions and enterprises whose final issues, though long delayed, in the end made their names immortal.

In view of the difficulty of constructing a comprehensive definition of ministerial success in itself, it is allowable, as it is comparatively easy, to look for and find it as the sure outcome where its necessary elements and conditions are present. If ministers are what they purport and ought to be, success, in some form and degree, must and will attend them as sure as the purpose and promise of God can make it. The chief of these conditions is

implied in the descriptive term itself. The work of the sacred office must be a *ministry*. Its Model and Pattern is that Son of Man who "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister." The minister must be, and the true minister will be and is, the genuine servant of God and Man. A true call to the ministry summons and engages a man to be the servant of the Lord Jesus, and the servant of men for Jesus' sake. Selfishness is excluded by the very nature of the call and the necessity of the case. Self-denial is of the very essence of the work. Self must be thrust into the background from the outset. Worldly ambition is an impertinence and an intrusion. Rest and satisfaction and fulfillment and achievement are to be sought, not in self-assertion, not even in mere independent well-doing, but in bearing Christ's yoke and burden, and doing as He did the will of God. The true minister of Christ, whatever may be the details of his work and the visible outcome of his activity, will thus inevitably achieve a genuine success—a success the sort and extent of which are for his Master alone both to shape and to assure.

So, again, Paul describes ministers as "laborers together with God"—"God's fellow-workers." The phrase means not merely that the minister does the work which God gives him to do, but, more and higher than this, that he discerns and falls in with God's plans, seeks God's aims, moves in God's lines, agrees, sympathizes and harmonizes with God. Dr. Ichabod Spencer said that the secret of his success in guiding inquirers was that he always aimed to "conspire with the Holy Ghost." He was wont to search and study the Good Spirit's dealings with the soul, and then aimed to lead it on in the same line. So the true minister works not only for God but with God, in subordination and yet in sympathy. The same idea is conveyed under a somewhat different figure when it is said that Enoch and Noah "walked with God." Beyond mere spiritual self-surrender and fellowship, these men of old found out God's way, and made it the way on which their feet should journey, and toward whose safe and sure end their faces should be set. The man who "works with God" and the man who "walks with God" are alike the man who thinks as God thinks, and moves as God moves, and surrenders himself to God's use and disposal with willing submission and cheerful compliance. This is the very ideal of the Christian minister. And just so far as he realizes this is he sure of some true success in service—as sure as a saint in glory or an angel by the throne. He will without fail be able in measure to say at last as the Divine servant said, "I have finished the work thou gavest me to do."



We are at liberty then to define ministerial success as being, with whatever diversity of form or measure, the sure outcome, the inseparable sequel, of a genuine ministry. The reality and certainty of success here reside in right conditions rather than in visible results. The ministry has this advantage over other callings, that to deserve success is really to achieve it. The world's judgment affords no just criterion. Even the minister's self-measurement may be largely at fault. He may lack utterance like Moses, or courage and ambition like Jeremiah, or faith like Thomas, or steadfastness like Peter. He may be almost overmastered by a keen sense of his own insufficiency. He may still be withstood by indifference like Gamaliel's, or misconstruction like that of Festus, or mockery like that of the men of Athens. He may often be tempted to cry out, "I have labored in vain!" Yet none the less is his message "the power of God unto salvation." It is a veritable and solid success, by whatever test it may be judged a failure. And none the less, too, is the weak man who utters it "mighty through God." The earthen vessel is decked with a heavenly splendor. His Master sees to it that he is made sufficient for the ministration of the new covenant. The herald of salvation has the hosts of God at his back. God takes his part—and if God be for him, who can be against him? Let a man be quickened and called by the Spirit, and trained and commissioned by the Church; let him be equipped with sacred knowledge and endowed with heavenly gifts; let him come to men in the fullness of the blessing of the Gospel of Christ; let him be established in truth and resolute in duty; let him thrill with human sympathies and glow with heavenly love; let him hold his Master with one hand and clasp sinners with the other; let him speak the word and minister at the altar; let him rule the church and mould the household; let him win the young, guide the mature, and support the aged; let him cheer the dying and console the mourner; let him contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints, and be in himself its best proof and its brightest illustration, and whether he be a genius or a plodder, brilliant or dull, far-famed or little known, a stammerer or a Chrysostom, the life he lives will be illustrious, fruitful, memorable—blessed of men, admired by angels, owned by Christ, written deep in human hearts, and graven for evermore in the book of God's remembrance as linked with a veritable, splendid and immortal success.

It is remarked, and truly, that the number of candidates for the ministry has been for some time and still is decreasing. This can hardly be due to doctrinal strife or variance—for all the seminaries

show and share the decrease in pretty even ratio. The reason in general must be that the young men of the Church are turning more and more to life-callings which they have been taught or led to consider more attractive, because more promising. If the Gospel ministry could be set before them as a life-work which, if genuine, not only cannot utterly fail, but is absolutely surer than any other, however worthy, to attain a real and enduring success, the tide which now seems to set away from the sacred calling could hardly fail to turn. And no agency can accomplish this so effectively as that of Christian parents. It is the duty and the privilege, and should be the joy, of Christian fathers and mothers to set the ministry as a profession before their sons in such fashion that it may have at least an even chance, if we may so express it, in competition with other lines of life, when the sons come to the parting of the ways. When the writer graduated from college, his father said to him, "I should be glad to have you with me in business; for I am alone, and your brothers will not be ready for it for years to come. But I think you will rather incline to a profession; and whichever you choose, I will aid you to the best of my ability. I will only say that nothing would gratify me so much as that you should be led to find your way clear to devote your life to the ministry of the Gospel." It was a fine instance of Christian self-effacement—or rather, and better, of a father's genuine and generous Christian ambition for an eldest son; and, heartily sympathized with and seconded as it was by the gracious mother, it had no small influence in inclining the son to the sacred calling. If but a tithe of Christian parents would follow so worthy an example, the ministry would reap and garner the Levitical first-fruits of the Church's sons, and the now thinned and thinning ranks of the Lord's host would be fast recruited to full battalions.

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## VII.

### MODERN THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.\*

WE may as well confess at the outset that there is no such thing as a modern theory of the Atonement, in the sense in which there is a modern theory, say, of the Incarnation—the *kenosis* theory to wit, which is a brand-new conception, never dreamed of until the nineteenth century was well on its course, and likely we may hope to pass out of notice with that century. All the theories of the Atonement now current readily arrange themselves under the old categories, and have their prototypes running back more or less remotely into the depths of Church history.

The fact is, the views men take of the Atonement are largely determined by their fundamental feelings of need—by what men most long to be saved from. And from the beginning three well-marked types of thought on this subject have been traceable, corresponding to three fundamental needs of human nature as it unfolds itself in this world of limitation. Men are oppressed by the ignorance, or by the misery, or by the sin in which they feel themselves sunk; and, looking to Christ to deliver them from the evil under which they particularly labor, they are apt to conceive His work as consisting predominately in revelation of divine knowledge, or in the inauguration of a reign of happiness, or in deliverance from the curse of sin.

In the early Church, the intellectualistic tendency allied itself with the class of phenomena which we call Gnosticism. The longing for peace and happiness that was the natural result of the crying social evils of the time, found its most remarkable expression in what we know as Chiliasm. That no such party-name suggests itself to describe the manifestation given to the longing to be delivered from the curse of sin, does not mean that this longing was less prominent or less poignant: but precisely the contrary. The other views were sloughed off as heresies, and each received its appropriate designation as such: this was the fundamental point of sight of the Church itself, and as such found expression in

\* An address delivered at the "Religious Conference," held in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, on October 13, 1902.

numberless ways, some of which, no doubt, were sufficiently bizarre—as, for example, the somewhat widespread representation of the Atonement as centering in the surrender of Jesus as a ransom to Satan.

Our modern Church, you will not need me to tell you, is very much like the early Church in all this. All three of these tendencies find as full representation in present-day thought as in any age of the Church's life. Perhaps at no other period was Christ so frequently or so passionately set forth as merely a social Saviour. Certainly at no other period has His work been so prevalently summed up in mere revelation. While now, as ever, the hope of Christians at large continues to be set upon Him specifically as the Redeemer from sin.

The forms in which these fundamental types of thinking are clothed in our modern days, differ as a matter of course, greatly from those they assumed in the first age. This difference is largely the result of the history of thought through the intervening centuries. The assimilation of the doctrines of revelation by the Church was a gradual process; and it was also an orderly process—the several doctrines emerging in the Christian consciousness for formal discussion and scientific statement in a natural sequence. In this process the doctrine of the Atonement did not come up for formulation until the eleventh century, when Anselm gave it its first really fruitful treatment, and laid down for all time the general lines on which the atonement must be conceived, if it is thought of as a work of deliverance from the penalty of sin. The influence of Anselm's discussion is not only traceable, but has been determining in all subsequent thought down to to-day. The doctrine of satisfaction set forth by him has not been permitted, however, to make its way unopposed. Its extreme opposite—the general conception that the atoning work of Christ finds its essence in revelation and had its prime effect, therefore, in deliverance from error—was advocated in Anselm's own day by perhaps the acutest reasoner of all the schoolmen, Peter Abelard. The intermediate view which was apparently invented five centuries later by the great Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, loves to think of itself as running back, in germ at least, to nearly as early a date. In the thousand years of conflict which has raged among these generic conceptions each has taken on protean shapes, and a multitude of mixed or mediating hypotheses have been constructed. But, broadly speaking, the theories that have divided the suffrages of men easily take places under one or other of these three types.

There is a fourth general conception, to be sure, which would



need to be brought into view were we studying exhaustive enumeration. This is the mystical idea which looks upon the work of Christ as summed up in the incarnation; and upon the saving process as consisting in an unobserved leavening of mankind by the inworking of a vital germ then planted in the mass. But though there never was an age in which this idea failed entirely of representation, it bears a certain aristocratic character which has commended it ordinarily only to the few, however fit: and it probably never was very widely held except during the brief period when the immense genius of Schleiermacher so overshadowed the Church that it could hardly think at all save in the formulas taught by him. Broadly speaking, the field has been held practically by the three theories which are commonly designated by the names of Anselm, Grotius and Abelard; and age has differed from age only in the changing expression given these theories and the relative dominance of one or another of them.

The Reformers, it goes without saying, were enthusiastic preachers of the Anselmic conception—of course as corrected, developed and enriched by their own deeper thought and truer insight. Their successors adjusted, expounded and defended its details, until it stood forth in the seventeenth century dogmatics in practical completeness. During this whole period this conception held the field; the numerous controversies that arose about it were rather joined with the Socinian or the mystic than internal to the circle of recognized Church teachers. It was not until the rise of Rationalism that a widely spread defection became observable. Under this blight men could no longer believe in the substitutive expiation which is the heart of the Anselmic doctrine, and a blood-bought redemption went much out of fashion. The dainty Supranaturalists attained the height only of the Grotian view, and allowed only a “demonstrative” as distinguished from an “ontological” necessity for an atonement, and an “executive” as distinguished from a “judicial” effect to it. The great evangelical revivals of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, swept away all that. It is probable that a half-century ago the doctrine of penal satisfaction had so strong a hold on the churches that not more than an academic interest attached to rival theories.

About that time a great change began to set in. I need only to mention such names as those of Horace Bushnell, McLeod Campbell, Frederick Dennison Maurice, Albert Ritschl, to suggest the strength of the assault that was suddenly delivered against the central ideas of an expiatory atonement. The imme-

diate effect was to call out an equally powerful defense. Our best treatises on the atonement come from this period; and Presbyterians in particular may well be proud of the part played by them in the crisis. But this defense only stemmed the tide: it did not succeed in rolling it back. The ultimate result has been that the revolt from the conceptions of satisfaction, propitiation, expiation, sacrifice, reinforced continually by tendencies adverse to evangelical doctrine peculiar to our times, has grown steadily more and more widespread, and in some quarters more and more extreme, until it has issued in an immense confusion on this central doctrine of the Gospel. Voices are raised all about us proclaiming a "theory" of the atonement impossible, while many of those that essay a "theory" seem to be feeling their tortuous way very much in the dark. That, if I mistake not, is the real state of affairs in the modern Church.

I am not meaning to imply that the doctrine of substitutive atonement—which is, after all, the very heart of the Gospel—has been lost from the consciousness of the Church. It has not been lost from the hearts of the Christian community. It is in its terms that the humble Christian everywhere still expresses the grounds of his hope of salvation. It is in its terms that the earnest evangelist everywhere still presses the claims of Christ upon the awakened hearer. It has not even been lost from the forum of theological discussion. It still commands powerful advocates wherever a vital Christianity enters academical circles: and, as a rule, the more profound the thinker, the more clear is the note he strikes in its proclamation and defense. But if we were to judge only by the popular literature of the day—a procedure happily not possible—the doctrine of a substitutive atonement has retired well into the background. Probably the majority of those who hold the public ear, whether as academical or as popular religious guides, have definitely broken with it, and are commending to their audiences something other and, as they no doubt believe, something very much better. A tone of speech has even grown up regarding it which is not only scornful but positively abusive. There are no epithets too harsh to be applied to it, no invectives too intense to be poured out on it. An honored bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church tells us that "the whole theory of substitutional punishment as a ground either of conditional or of unconditional pardon, is unethical, contradictory and subversive."\* He may rightly claim to be speaking in this sweeping sentence with marked discretion and unwonted clarity. To do justice to the hateful theme requires, it seems, the tumid turmoil

\* Bishop Foster, in his *Philosophy of Christian Experience*.

and rushing rant of Dr. Farrar's rhetoric. Surely if hard words broke bones, the doctrine of the substitutional sacrifice of the Son of God for the sin of man would long ago have been ground to powder.

What, then, are we offered instead of it? We have already intimated that it is confusion which reigns here: and in any event we cannot go into details. We may try, however, to set down in few words the general impression that the most recent literature of the subject makes.

To obtain a just view of the situation, I think we ought to note, first of all, the wide prevalence among the sounder thinkers of the Grotian or Rectoral theory of the atonement—the theory, that is, that conceives the work of Christ not as supplying the ground on which God forgives sin, but only as supplying the ground on which He may safely forgive sins on the sole ground of His compassion. The theory of hypothetical universalism, according to which Christ died as the proper substitute for all men on the condition, namely, that they should believe—whether in its Remonstrant or in its Amyraldian form—has in the conflict of theories long since been crushed out of existence—as, indeed, it well deserved to be. This having been shoved out of the way, the Grotian theory has come to be the orthodox Arminian view and is taught as such by the leading exponents of modern Arminian thought whether in Britain or America; and he who will read the powerful argumentation to that effect by the late Dr. John Miley, say for example, will be compelled to agree that it is, indeed, the highest form of atonement-doctrine conformable to the Arminian system. But not only is it thus practically universal among the Wesleyan Arminians. It has become also, under the influence of such teachers as Drs. Wardlaw and Dale and Dr. Park, the mark also of orthodox Nonconformity in Great Britain and of orthodox Congregationalism in America. Nor has it failed to take a strong hold also of Scottish Presbyterianism: it is specifically advocated by such men of mark and leading as, for example, Dr. Marcus Dods. On the Continent of Europe it is equally widespread among the saner teachers: one notes without surprise, for example, that it was taught by the late Dr. Frederic Godet, though one notes with satisfaction that it was considerably modified upward by Dr. Godet, and that his colleague, Dr. Gretillat, was careful to correct it. In a word, wherever men have been unwilling to drop all semblance of an “objective” atonement, as the word now goes, they have taken refuge in this half-way house which Grotius has builded for them. I do not myself look upon this as a particularly healthful sign of the times. I do not myself think that, at

bottom, there is in principle much to choose between the Grotian and the so-called "subjective" theories. It seems to me only an illusion to suppose that it preserves an "objective" atonement at all. But meanwhile it is adopted by many because they deem it "objective," and it so far bears witness to a remanent desire to preserve an "objective" atonement.

We are getting more closely down to the real characteristic of modern theories of the atonement when we note that there is a strong tendency observable all around us to rest the forgiveness of sins solely on repentance as its ground. In its last analysis, the Grotian theory itself reduces to this. The demonstration of God's righteousness, which is held by it to be the heart of Christ's work and particularly of His death, is supposed to have no other effect on God than to render it safe for Him to forgive sin. And this it does not as affecting Him, but as affecting men—namely, by awaking in them such a poignant sense of the evil of sin as to cause them to hate it soundly and to turn decisively away from it. This is just Repentance. We could desire no better illustration of this feature of the theory than is afforded by the statement of it by one of its most distinguished living advocates, Dr. Marcus Dods.\* The necessity of atonement, he tells us, lies in the "need of some such demonstration of God's righteousness as will make it possible and safe for Him to forgive the unrighteous." Whatever begets in the sinner true penitence and impels him toward the practice of righteousness will render it safe to forgive him. Hence Dr. Dods asserts that it is inconceivable that God should not forgive the penitent sinner, and that Christ's work is summed up in such an exhibition of God's righteousness and love as produces, on its apprehension, adequate repentance. "By being the source, then, of true and fruitful penitence, the death of Christ removes the radical subjective obstacle in the way of forgiveness." "The death of Christ, then, has made forgiveness possible, because it enables man to repent with an adequate penitence, and because it manifests righteousness and binds men to God." There is no hint here that man needs anything more to enable him to repent than the presentation of motives calculated powerfully to induce him to repent. That is to say, there is no hint here of an adequate appreciation of the subjective effects of sin on the human heart, deadening it to the appeal of motives to right action however powerful, and requiring therefore an internal action of the

\* In an essay in a volume called *The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought: A Theological Symposium* (London: James Clarke & Co., 1900). In this volume seventeen essays from as many writers are collected, and from it a very fair notion can be obtained of the ideas current in certain circles of our day.



Spirit of God upon it before it can repent: or of the purchase of such a gift of the Spirit by the sacrifice of Christ. As little is there any hint here of the existence of any sense of justice in God, forbidding Him to account the guilty righteous without satisfaction of guilt. All God requires for forgiveness is repentance: all the sinner needs for repentance is a moving inducement. It is all very simple; but we are afraid it does not go to the root of matters as presented either in Scripture or in the throes of our awakened heart.

The widespread tendency to represent repentance as the atoning fact might seem, then, to be accountable from the extensive acceptance which has been given to the Rectoral theory of the atonement. Nevertheless much of it has had a very different origin and may be traced back rather to some such teaching as that, say, of Dr. McLeod Campbell. Dr. Campbell did not himself find the atoning fact in man's own repentance, but rather in our Lord's sympathetic repentance for man. He replaced the evangelical doctrine of substitution by a theory of sympathetic identification, and the evangelical doctrine of expiatory penalty-paying by a theory of sympathetic repentance. Christ so fully enters sympathetically into our case, was his idea, that He is able to offer to God an adequate repentance for our sins, and the Father says, It is enough! Man here is still held to need a Saviour, and Christ is presented as that Saviour, and is looked upon as performing for man what man cannot do for himself. But the gravitation of this theory is distinctly downward, and it has ever tended to find its lower level. There are, therefore, numerous transition theories prevalent—some of them very complicated, some of them very subtle—which connect it by a series of insensible stages with the proclamation of human repentance as the sole atonement required. As typical of these we may take the elaborate theory (which, like man himself, may be said to be fearfully and wonderfully made) set forth by the modern Andover divines. This finds the atoning fact in a combination of Christ's sympathetic repentance for man and man's own repentance under the impression made upon him by Christ's work on his behalf—not in the one without the other, but in the two in unison. A similar combination of the revolutionary repentance of man induced by Christ and the sympathetic repentance of Christ for man meets us also in recent German theorizing, as, for example, in the teaching of Häring. It is sometimes clothed in "sacrificial" language and made to bear an appearance even of "substitution." It is just the repentance of Christ, however, which is misleadingly called His "sacrifice," and our sympathetic repentance with Him that is called our participation in His

"sacrifice"; and it is carefully explained that though there was "a substitution on Calvary," it was not the substitution of a sinless Christ for a sinful race, but the substitution of humanity *plus* Christ for humanity *minus* Christ. All of which seems but a confusing way of saying that the atoning fact consists in the revolutionary repentance of man induced by the spectacle of Christ's sympathetic repentance for man.

The essential emphasis in all these transition theories falls obviously on man's own repentance rather than on Christ's. Accordingly the latter falls away easily and leaves us with human repentance only as the sole atoning fact—the entire reparation which God asks or can ask for sin. Nor do men hesitate to-day to proclaim this openly and boldly. Scores of voices are raised about us declaring it not only with clearness but with passion. Even those who still feel bound to attribute the reconciling of God somehow to the work of Christ are often careful to explain that they mean this ultimately only, and only because they attribute in one way or other to the work of Christ the arousing of the repentance in man which is the immediate ground of forgiveness. Thus Dean Freemantle tells us that it is "Repentance and Faith" that "change for us the face of God." And then he adds, doubtless as a concession to ingrained, though outgrown, habits of thought: "If then the death of Christ viewed as the culminating point of His life of love, is the destined means of repentance for the whole world, we may say also that it is the means of securing the mercy and favour of God, of procuring the forgiveness of sins."\* And Dr. (now Principal) Forsythe, whose fervid address on the Atonement at a great Congregationalist gathering a few years ago quite took captive the hearts of the whole land, seems really to teach little more than this. Christ sympathetically enters into our condition, he tells us, and gives expression to an adequate sense of sin. We, perceiving the effect of this, His entrance into our sinful atmosphere, are smitten with horror of the judgment our sin has thus brought on Him. This horror begets in us an adequate repentance of sin: God accepts this repentance as enough; and forgives our sin. Thus forgiveness rests proximately only on our repentance as its ground: but our repentance is produced only by Christ's sufferings: and hence, Dr. Forsythe tells us, Christ's sufferings may be called the ultimate ground of forgiveness.†

It is sufficiently plain that the function served by the sufferings and death of Christ in this construction is somewhat remote. Accordingly they quite readily fall away altogether. It seems

\* *The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought*, as cited.

† *The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought*, as cited.

quite natural that they should do so with those whose doctrinal inheritance comes from Horace Bushnell, say, or from the Socinian theorizing of the school of Ritschl. We feel no surprise to learn, for example, that with Harnack the sufferings and death of Christ play no appreciable part. With him the whole atoning act seems to consist in the removal of a false conception of God from the minds of men. Men, because sinners, are prone to look upon God as a wrathful judge. He is, on the contrary, just Love. How can the sinner's misjudgment be corrected? By the impression made upon him by the life of Jesus, keyed to the conception of the Divine Fatherhood. With all this we are familiar enough. But we are hardly prepared for the extremities of language which some permit themselves in giving expression to it. "The whole difficulty," a recent writer of this class declares, "is not in inducing or enabling God to pardon, but in moving men to abhor sin and to want pardon." Even this difficulty, however, we are assured is removable: and what is needed for its removal is only proper instruction. "Christianity," cries our writer, "is a revelation, not a creation." Even this false antithesis does not, however, satisfy him. He rises beyond it to the acme of his passion. "Would there have been no Gospel," he rhetorically demands—as if none could venture to say him nay—"would there have been no Gospel had not Christ died?"\* Thus "the blood of Christ" on which the Scriptures hang the whole atoning fact is thought no longer to be needed: the Gospel of Paul, which consisted not in Christ *simpliciter* but specifically in "Christ as crucified," is scouted. We are able to get along now without these things.

To such a pass have we been brought by the prevailing gospel of the indiscriminate love of God. For it is here that we place our finger on the root of the whole modern assault upon the doctrine of an expiatory atonement. In the attempt to give effect to the conception of indiscriminate and indiscriminating love as the basal fact of religion, the entire Biblical teaching as to atonement has been ruthlessly torn up. If God is love and nothing but love, what possible need can there be of an atonement? Certainly such a God cannot need propitiating. Is not He the All-Father? Is He not yearning for His children with an unconditioned and unconditioning eagerness which excludes all thought of "obstacles to forgiveness"? What does He want but—just His children? Our modern theorizers are never weary of ringing the changes on this single fundamental idea. God does not require to be moved to forgiveness; or to be enabled to pardon; or even

\* Mr. Bernard J. Snell. in *The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought*.

to be enabled to pardon safely. He raises no question of whether He can pardon, or whether it would be safe for Him to pardon. Such is not the way of love. Love is bold enough to sweep all such chilling questions impatiently out of its path. The whole difficulty is to induce men to permit themselves to be pardoned. God is continually reaching longing arms out of heaven toward men: oh, if men would only let themselves be gathered unto the Father's eager heart! It is absurd, we are told—nay, wicked—blasphemous with awful blasphemy—to speak of propitiating such a God as this, of reconciling Him, of making satisfaction to Him. Love needs no satisfying, reconciling, propitiating; nay, will have nothing to do with such things. Of its very nature it flows out unbought, unpropitiated, instinctively and unconditionally, to its object. And God is Love!

Well, certainly, God *is* Love. And we praise Him that we have better authority for telling our souls this glorious truth than the passionate assertion of these somewhat crass theorizers. God *is* Love! But it does not in the least follow that He is nothing but love. God *is* Love: but Love is not God and the formula "Love" must therefore ever be inadequate to express God. It may well be—to us sinners, lost in our sin and misery but for it, it must be—the crowning revelation of Christianity that God is love. But it is not from the Christian revelation that we have learned to think of God as nothing but love. That God is the Father of all men in a true and important sense, we should not doubt. But this term "All-Father"—it is not from the lips of Hebrew prophet or Christian apostle that we have caught it. And the indiscriminate benevolencism which has taken captive so much of the religious thinking of our time is a conception not native to Christianity, but of distinctly heathen quality. As one reads the pages of popular religious literature, teeming as it is with ill-considered assertions of the general Fatherhood of God, he has an odd feeling of transportation back into the atmosphere of, say, the decadent heathenism of the fourth and fifth centuries, when the gods were dying, and there was left to those who would fain cling to the old ways little beyond a somewhat saddened sense of the *benignitas numinis*. The *benignitas numinis*! How studded the pages of those genial old heathen are with the expression: how suffused their repressed life is with the conviction that the kind Deity that dwells above will surely not be hard on men toiling here below! How shocked they are at the stern righteousness of the Christian's God, who loomed before their startled eyes as He looms before those of the modern poet in no other light than as "the hard God that dwelt in Jerusalem!" Surely the



Great Divinity is too broadly good to mark the peccadillos of poor puny man; surely they are the objects of his compassionate amusement rather than of His fierce reprobation. Like Omar Khayyam's pot, they were convinced, before all things, of their Maker that "He's a good fellow and 'twill all be well."

The query cannot help rising to the surface of our minds whether our modern indiscriminate benevolencism goes much deeper than this. Does all this one-sided proclamation of the universal Fatherhood of God import much more than the heathen *benignitas numinis*? When we take those blessed words, "God is Love," upon our lips, are we sure we mean to express much more than that we do not wish to believe that God will hold man to any real account for his sin? Are we, in a word, in these modern days, so much soaring upward toward a more adequate apprehension of the transcendent truth that God is love, as passionately protesting against being ourselves branded and dealt with as wrath-deserving sinners? Assuredly it is impossible to put anything like their real content into these great words, "God is Love," save as they are thrown out against the background of those other conceptions of equal loftiness, "God is Light," "God is Righteousness," "God is Holiness," "God is a consuming fire." The love of God cannot be apprehended in its length and breadth and heighth and depth—all of which pass knowledge—save as it is apprehended as the love of a God who turns from the sight of sin with inexpressible abhorrence, and burns against it with unquenchable indignation. The infinitude of His love would be illustrated not by His lavishing of His favor on sinners without requiring an expiation of sin, but by His—through such holiness and through such righteousness as cannot but cry out with infinite abhorrence and indignation—still loving sinners so greatly that He provides a satisfaction for their sin adequate to these tremendous demands. It is the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity, after all, not that it preaches a God of love, but that it preaches a God of conscience. ✓

A somewhat flippant critic, contemplating the religion of Israel, has told us, as expressive of his admiration for what he found there, that "an honest God is the noblest work of man."\* There is a profound truth lurking in the remark. Only it appears that the work were too noble for man; and probably man has never compassed it. A benevolent God, yes: men have framed a benevolent God for themselves. But a thoroughly honest God, perhaps never. That has been left for the revelation of God Himself

\* Cf. Mr. Edward Day's *The Social Life of the Hebrews*, Preface. He is quoting apparently the late Mr. Ingersoll.

to give us. And this is the really distinguishing characteristic of the God of revelation: He is a thoroughly honest, a thoroughly conscientious God—a God who deals honestly with Himself and us, who deals conscientiously with Himself and us. And a thoroughly conscientious God, we may be sure, is not a God who can deal with sinners as if they were not sinners. In this fact lies, perhaps, the deepest ground of the necessity of an expiatory atonement.

And it is in this fact also that there lies the deepest ground of the increasing failure of the modern world to appreciate the necessity of an expiatory atonement. Conscientiousness commends itself only to awakened conscience; and in much of recent theologizing conscience does not seem especially active. Nothing indeed is more startling in the structure of recent theories of atonement, than the apparently vanishing sense of sin that underlies them. Surely, it is only where the sense of the guilt of sin has grown grievously faint, that men can suppose repentance to be all that is needed to purge it. Surely it is only where the sense of the power of sin has profoundly decayed, that men can fancy that they can at will cast it off from them in a “revolutionary repentance.” Surely it is only where the sense of the heinousness of sin has practically passed away, that man can imagine that the holy and just God can deal with it lightly. If we have not much to be saved from, why, certainly, a very little atonement will suffice for our needs. It is, after all, only the sinner that requires a Saviour. But if we are sinners, and in proportion as we know ourselves to be sinners, and appreciate what it means to be sinners, we will cry out for that Saviour who only after He was perfected by suffering could become the Author of eternal salvation.

PRINCETON.

B. B. WARFIELD.

## VIII.

### A STUDY IN TEXTUAL CRITICISM.

PROF. LIBBY, of Wisconsin, published in 1900, through the American Historical Association, a critical examination of Gordon's *History of the American Revolution*. His purpose was to estimate the value of the book and the impartiality of the author. He proves that out of 2000 pages, 1500 are taken largely from other histories, but that Gordon "passed judgment upon the whole production and gave to certain portions of it a characteristic animus which is easily recognizable. . . . The work must have been done under his constant supervision, and nowhere, unless it be in the foreign letters, do we fail to find traces of its presence."

Dr. Libby's interest is in showing plagiarism and bias, and thus destroying a false reputation for impartiality; and his conclusion is that "beyond cavil, no part of Gordon's history can any longer be taken as authority on the American Revolution." Dr. Libby evidently never thought of the value of the facts he adduces in helping to a study of the Synoptic Problem. But there is abundant material here for that purpose, and one interesting passage may be set before the textual student of the Bible, since it gives side by side three accounts of the same event. A few explanatory remarks are prefixed.

Lord Cornwallis surrendered the British army to the French and Americans at Yorktown in 1781. Dodsley's *Annual Register* for that year contains an account written for English readers. William Gordon, a Nonconformist minister, had emigrated from Ipswich, England, in 1770, and had settled at Roxbury, Mass. On the outbreak of trouble he sided with the colonists, as did most Nonconformists on both sides the Atlantic. He became very active for the cause of liberty, by voice and pen; he was in touch with politicians who rather despised him, and with soldiers like Gates and Greene. A letter of his in 1775 is still extant, describing the battles of Lexington and Concord. Perhaps inspired by such ephemeral productions, he set about compiling a history of the Revolution. Dr. David Ramsay was intent on the same task: he was born in Pennsylvania, but had migrated to South Carolina,

where he had been a member of the Committee of Safety, 1776-1780, and after imprisonment by the British had been sent to Congress, 1782. He placed his manuscript at Gordon's disposal, before publishing his *History of the Revolution in South Carolina*, 1785. Gordon returned to England to publish; but his brother Nonconformists assured him that the tone of his history would not suit there. Two literary Unitarian ministers helped him; they deleted more than a hundred pages of his manuscript, and drew freely on the *Annual Register* and other publications, as Gordon avows in his Preface. He published in England in 1788, and in America 1789. The *Literary Magazine* of 1789 referred to a long passage taken bodily from the *Annual Register* of 1781 as characteristic of Gordon's style, so soon was the original source forgotten.

On the statements in Gordon's Preface, he had compiled from the *Register* and from Ramsay, though no one would readily suspect how much he had thus borrowed. Dr. Libby does not tell us whether Ramsay acknowledges indebtedness to the *Register*, but he points out the internal evidence. It is, of course, possible that Ramsay, like Burke,<sup>1</sup> compiling for the *Register*, had access to the original English official reports, but as no means exist of checking this hypothesis, it is simpler to assume dependence of Ramsay on the *Register*.

Now we can reproduce from Dr. Libby's pamphlet three columns describing the closing scene at Yorktown, in October, 1781. Passages borrowed from the *Register* are here put in *italics* both in the original and in the copy, and Gordon's apparent dependences on Ramsay in SMALL CAPITALS; omissions are indicated by empty square brackets. Cross-references are numbered, and in the originals are marked R if appropriated by Ramsay, G if by Gordon.

ANNUAL REGISTER, 1781,  
pp. 133-135.

But things were now drawing to that <sup>G7</sup>*crisis which could no longer be averted. The works were everywhere sinking under the weight of the enemy's artillery* and Lord Cornwallis himself could not but concur in opinion . . . that a <sup>G8</sup>*continuance of the same fire only for a few hours longer would reduce them to such*

RAMSEY (*sic*), 1785,  
II, 326.

By this time the works of the besieged (*sic*) were so broken that they were assailable in many places, and<sup>1</sup> the troops <sup>2</sup>*were exhausted* [] by constant watching and unceasing [] *fatigue*. <sup>G9</sup>The time in which relief from New York was promised had elapsed. Longer resistance could answer no purpose, and might occasion the

GORDON, 1788,  
IV, 194-195.

Matters were now hastening to a <sup>7</sup>*crisis which could not be* [] longer averted. The British works <sup>8</sup>*were* [] sinking under the weight of the American and French artillery. The <sup>8</sup>*continuance of the allied* [] *fire, only for a few more hours* [], *would reduce them to such a condition that it would be rashness* [] *to attempt*



a condition that it would then become desperate to attempt their defence. . .

R<sup>1</sup> The troops were not only diminished by loss and by sickness, but<sup>G10</sup> the strength and spirits of those in the works<sup>R2</sup> were exhausted and<sup>G11</sup> worn down by constant watching and unremitting fatigue. . . . R<sup>3</sup> Lord Cornwallis accordingly wrote a letter to General Washington on the same day, the 17th, proposing a cessation of arms for twenty-four hours, and that commissioners might be appointed on both sides for settling the terms of capitulation. . . . R<sup>4</sup> It was remarkable that the<sup>G13</sup> commissioner appointed by the Americans to settle the terms, and who himself<sup>R6</sup> drew up the articles of a capitulation by which<sup>G19</sup> a British army became prisoners to his country, was<sup>R5</sup> Colonel Laurens, son of that Mr. Laurens, late president of the Congress, who was then, and had been for a considerable time, a close prisoner in the Tower of London.

loss of many valuable lives.

<sup>3</sup>Lord Cornwallis,<sup>G12</sup> therefore, on [ ] the 17th wrote a letter to general Washington, requesting a cessation of arms for twenty four hours, and that commissioners might be appointed [ ] for digesting [ ] terms of capitulation.<sup>4</sup> It is remarkable,<sup>G17</sup> while<sup>G14</sup> lieutenant-<sup>5</sup> colonel Laurens, the officer employed by general Washington on this occasion,<sup>G18</sup> was<sup>6</sup> drawing up [ ] articles [ ] by which a numerous British army became prisoners,<sup>G20</sup> [ ] that his<sup>G15</sup> father was closely confined in the Tower of London.

their defence. <sup>9</sup>THE TIME for expecting RELIEF FROM NEW YORK WAS ELAPSED.

<sup>10</sup>The strength and spirits of the royal troops <sup>11</sup>were worn down by constant watching and unremitting fatigue. <sup>12</sup>LORD CORNWALLIS THEREFORE sent out a flag at 10 o'clock in the morning of THE 17TH, with a LETTER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, REQUESTING A CESSATION OF ARMS FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, AND THAT COMMISSIONERS MIGHT BE APPOINTED FOR DIGESTING THE TERMS OF capitulation. . . . <sup>13</sup>Commissioners were appointed—the side of the allies, viscount de Noaille, and <sup>14</sup>LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LAURENS, <sup>15</sup>whose FATHER was in close CONFINEMENT at <sup>16</sup>THE TOWER [ ], <sup>17</sup>WHILE the son <sup>18</sup>WAS DRAWING UP ARTICLES BY WHICH an English nobleman and <sup>19</sup>a British army became prisoners.

Two comments may be added, one as to fact, one as to form. Laurens senior and Ramsay were both of South Carolina, both on the Committee of Safety, both members of Congress, both prisoners to the British, and both died at Charleston. Was there some personal feeling between them that led Ramsay to tone down the mention of his illustrious fellow-townsmen, or has he rendered him ample justice in another part of his works? Such are the alternatives that suggest themselves at first; but it seems that Ramsay was largely helped by his wife, a daughter of Henry Laurens, who doubtless felt some delicacy in over-praising her father.

The French commissioner signed his own name, Noailles, with an s, according to a *fac-simile* in Justin Winsor. If this was his

uniform practice, it warns us that Gordon was not precise in detail. But Dr. Libby in this context twice spells Ramsey with an e, elsewhere ten times with an a, apparently referring to the same man. Therefore minute criticism turning on single letters can hardly avail except to corroborate conclusions otherwise arrived at.

The verbal coincidences may now be discussed in order, and Ramsay is entitled to priority. The references are to the numbers inserted in the texts :

1. All reference to diminished numbers is suppressed, for otherwise the insertion of the word " numerous " near the end would be discrepant. The difference of opinion is evidently due to the national feeling of the two writers.

2. This passage is shortened and one word changed ; no reason is apparent.

3. The change of " accordingly " may be a slight improvement in style. The omission of [the same day] suits the new context. The change of the capital G in " General " agrees with Ramsay's disuse of capitals in these military titles. The change of " proposing " into " requesting " is appropriate in an American, emphasizing the fact that a favor is being asked by a defeated man. But this change necessitates the omission of the words [on both sides]. The change of " settling " into " digesting " is natural to a man who was both a doctor and a member of a Legislature. The word [the] in the *Register* implies a previous reference to a decision to capitulate ; Ramsay knows only the American side, not what had passed between the British officers, so omits it and brings out that this letter is the first overture to the allies.

4. Ramsay passes a whole page of the *Register* before this quotation.

5. He knows the exact rank of his fellow-townsmen, his brother-in-law. Again he drops the capital letter.

6. The change of tense is necessitated by the structure of the sentence. The omission of [the] is not necessary as in case 3, and the style is about as neat with it as without. The omission of [of a capitulation] is necessary for good style, as the phrase is now just above. The word " numerous " is inserted from patriotic motives—whether it was justified is not quite clear, English historians say 8000 surrendered to 18,000. The change of " a close prisoner " improves the style, for even to say " closely imprisoned " would jar with the word " prisoners " just above, and there is no noun " confinee."

On the whole, we may say that Ramsay follows his source very

closely, but makes many trifling improvements for style. Nearly all are abbreviations, though all for reason; the only two expansions are from patriotic motives.

Gordon's text offers more complicated phenomena—perhaps due to the fact that three men were concerned in editing it, and that an original American bias had been deliberately removed and an English flavor added, so far as at least to render the book readable by both sides. The animus that Dr. Libby recognizes is apparently for Gates against Washington, and not for either side as a whole. This complication is, however, the more instructive in a textual study.

7. The change of "no longer be" is perhaps for the worse, for the rhythm is hardly improved; no object is obvious. The word "enemy" must disappear from a book to sell on each side of the Atlantic, and so the terms "British, American and French" had to be inserted. But the dropping of [everywhere] seems accidental.

8. Three petty alterations here appear causeless.

9. The quotation from Ramsay is slightly shortened, and the transposition of the word "was" produces bad grammar.

10. The quotation from the *Register* is also transposed and shortened. The stately balance of Burke's sentence is spoiled by omitting [exhausted and]. The word "royal" suits the final non-partisan tone.

11. This part is evidently from the *Register*, not from Ramsay, as the words "unremitting" and "worn down" indicate.

12. But the word "therefore" enables us to credit this to Ramsay. The mention of the hour may be due to Gates, or to some English officer. It is quite a variety to find some original information in Gordon. He is obliged therefore to omit [wrote], but faithfully reproduces Ramsay's little g in "general," and his "requesting," which though flattering to an American, is not obnoxious to an Englishman. But the reinsertion of "the" at the end will not bear close inspection; it serves only to show that the *Register* was still at hand.

13. This sentence is a perfect patchwork of both sources. Original contributions are the bad grammar introduced, the name of the French commissioner (misspelt?) and the allusion to the English nobleman. This is apparently another trivial error, for the title was new, and therefore was presumably British and not English; as the word "British" was under Gordon's eye, and he was evidently not English in the strict sense of the word, he ought to have been more precise. But as the title is extinct, it is hard to be quite sure of his blunder.

14. The use of the capital here is singular. He borrows it from the *Register*, without giving a capital to "viscount" or "lieutenant."

15. This is a peculiarly intricate combination of sources.

16. The omission of [of London] is puzzling. If an English writer and an American writer both thought the phrase necessary, why did Gordon cut it out? Did his coadjutor, named Towers, feel personally affected?

19. This sentence may be from either source: verbally it matches the *Register*, omitting Ramsay's embellishment; but its close appears to show dependence on Ramsay, for the words "to his country" would have been perfectly correct.

Summing up Gordon then as an editor, he is most mechanical in his compilation; he shortens, he transposes, he welds, he hardly ever adds, he generally spoils, but occasionally adapts for two sets of readers.

Now when from these textual phenomena we turn to our three Gospels, we observe the same kind of phenomena. Hence there is some support to the familiar theory that the editor of the Greek Matthew used as sources Mark and the Logia, combining shortening and altering, besides adding freely from his own knowledge. Luke avows that he knows predecessors, and the probability of his having had these two before him is even stronger.

In the *Expositor* for November, 1889, Prof. Godet replied to a similar argument by Dr. Plummer, which rested at one point on an hypothesis and not altogether upon facts. He summed up that the striking differences between the synoptists "are modifications introduced naturally and involuntarily in oral transmission; we must renounce the theory that the evangelists wrote in dependence on each other." But when we again see in two out of these three documents, of which one is avowedly dependent on the others, just the same phenomena of abbreviation, transposition, conflation of phrase, and amalgamation of information which Matthew and Luke present, then surely we have a strong presumption that the similarity in these two Gospels is due to previous transmission in writing, not only by word of mouth; or in other words, the written Gospel according to Mark lay before Matthew and Luke when they were writing, independently of one another.

But these phenomena also afford a means of testing some canons of textual criticism, which lie at the base of the work by Westcott and Hort, but which rest largely on the *dicta* of Bengel and Griesbach, and appear seldom if ever to have been verified. This general acceptance is the more startling because it does not appear what special qualifications a theologian possesses for laying down



textual canons. He may have read, collated and discovered several manuscripts, but unless he has copied several, he builds on theory, not on experience. A lawyer's clerk, a scrivener, a compositor, or a printer's reader would appear a far better expert. And in 1883 these canons were openly challenged in the *Expositor* by such an expert, who apparently received no reply.

Is it right to assume that a hard reading is more original than an easy one, on the assumption that a scribe generally improves what he finds?

Speaking generally, Ramsay does improve, but Gordon usually impairs. Looking at details, would this canon guide us in case 2 to "unremitting" rather than "unceasing" if we did not know the relative dates? Or in case 3 to "accordingly" rather than "therefore"? It would have guided us to "digesting" rather than to "settling," a wrong result. It would have left us uncertain at 7 and 8 between the various readings. It would have guided us to Gordon's bad grammar in 9, and perhaps to his poor style in 10, as certainly to his broken construction in 13; but it would have kept us to the bad grammar in the *Register*, "and who himself," a solecism omitted by both copyists. Ramsay, however, has in correcting this blunder introduced another, for his sentence ought to read, "It is remarkable that while . . . ." but he has deferred the word "that." The canon in question would bid us take this as original and prior to the *Register*. The word "articles" standing alone in Ramsay is hard, 6, and this canon would bid us understand the *Register* as an expansion for easier understanding. Similarly the ambiguous phrase "the Tower" would be singled out as the prototype.

Therefore the canon is not simply often wrong, but it is more often wrong than right in these examples.

Again, is it true that a shorter reading is more original than a longer, on the supposition that transcribers deliberately incorporate marginal notes and glosses, or fill out from parallel accounts? What are the facts in these short extracts?

Gordon avows that he varies his quotations for method and conciseness. Thus in his second sentence he drops a word, in his third he replaces three words by two, in his fourth he shortens Ramsay. The sentence 1 in the *Register* is shortened by both historians, and so is the long sentence last quoted. Three trifling additions are made by Gordon, but are traceable to his independent knowledge, and not to mere transcriptional reasons.

Thus Bengel and Griesbach, who laid down these canons, find very little support from these instances. The corollaries drawn from them are in like case: Westcott and Hort inferred that con-

flation is very common, and that deliberate blending of parallel phrases is more frequent than accidental or deliberate dropping of half a sonorous phrase. The example marked R2 and G11 is in flat contradiction to this theory, which finds but scant support in Gordon's closing sentences.

The three fundamental canons on which the favorite New Testament text of to-day is constructed, do not come out well when tested by the methods of compilers deliberately and leisurely comparing their sources, and utilizing them with the vantage of personal knowledge.

It may be pleaded on their behalf that for one or two deliberate and leisurely revisions undertaken by Lucian or Eusebius, there have been hundreds of hasty transcriptions as a mere piece of business, and that the canons do apply to such cases. But Mr. Alfred Watts, after his fifteen years' experience in a printing office, asserts without any misgiving that when transcribers go out of their way to make as editors one change for the better, they go on in their own way as copyists to make twenty or fifty changes for the worse. He supplies also pages of examples to show the easy occurrence of omission, and the comparative rarity of the opposite vice. He sums up a careful examination of sixty pages of proofs, in which he finds 101 words changed, 256 dropped, eight added and fourteen doubled.

If it be further pleaded that most of the copyists of the New Testament were neither skilled editors nor careless professional scribes, but earnest Christians just interested in securing a faithful transcript, and that the canons may hold in their case, then an experiment under similar conditions may be of value. A dozen intelligent Christians were desired to copy exactly two passages; eight of these were theological students and knew something of the theories of textual criticism; all were urged to be scrupulously precise, were interested in the subject-matter, and had abundance of time. The result was to show that additions were absent, omissions frequent, alterations nearly always for the worse. Is it not high time that these canons were subjected to a thorough testing?

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WILLIAM THOMAS WHITLEY.

## IX.

### THE EPIC VERSE OF MILTON—"PARADISE LOST."

IN the study of Milton as a poet we mark two distinct periods. The first (1608-'38) ends with his return from Italy. In this, we note the composition of his earlier and shorter poems, including such notable specimens as "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity," "L'Allegro," "Il Penseroso" and "Comus," these last three appearing, naturally, at the close of the period (1634). Passing the intervening era of prose production (1640-'60), we come to the second and more distinctive poetic period, extending, practically, to the close of the author's life, in 1674. In this era, he composed his three elaborate poems—his two epics, "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained," and his semi-dramatic poem, "Samson Agonistes." It is with his epics, and, most especially, his "Paradise Lost," that we now have to do—"that extraordinary production," as Macaulay states it, "which the general suffrage of critics has placed in the highest class of human compositions." Some such a poem was among the earliest plans of his life. He promises his countrymen that it will appear in due time. Even in boyhood he was fond of romance and chivalry and loved to read of the semi-historical King Arthur of Britain. When at Cambridge, he speaks of his possible treatment in the future "of some graver subject" than that which occupied his mind in university days—

"Such where the deep transported mind may soar  
Above the wheeling poles; and at Heaven's door  
Look in."

In his complimentary letter to Manso, Tasso's patron at Naples, he hopes for such a friend at court, if he ever shall sing of Arthur and his knights. So to Diodati's memory he speaks of his "pipe, sounding strains of an unknown strength." In this same connection, the well-known "Cambridge Manuscripts" have an important place, wherein he jots down themes for possible discussion and looks far ahead to some worthy topic. Amid the distractions of civil war, his mind is still upon an epic. He first planned a national epic with King Arthur as hero. Among these partially

projected schemes are no less than four separate plans of "Paradise Lost," a quarter of a century prior to its publication. Even in his prose writings this poetic tendency appears. In his "Apology for Smectymnuus," he says "that he betook himself to lofty fables and romances which recount, in solemn cantos, the deeds of knighthood." He hopes to write yet, as he says, "in a still time, when there shall be no more chiding." In his "Reason for Church Government" he speaks of "an inward prompting growing daily upon him, that by labor and study, joined with a strong propensity of nature, he may perhaps leave something so written to after times as that they should not willingly let it die." In this coming composition, he adds, "that he shall fix all the industry and art he can unite to the advancing of his native tongue, that what the Greeks and Romans and Italians and Hebrews did for their respective vernaculars he, in his proportion, must do for his." The worthier the theme, the more desirous he is that it shall be presented in his native English and not in the Latin or Anglo-Latin diction of the schools. In the same connection, there follows an account "of what the mind, at home in the spacious circuits of her musing," hath proposed to herself to accomplish, however difficult the undertaking may be. He wonders whether it shall be Homeric or Virgilian; whether like to Tasso and Job, or, perchance, Aristotle; and what personage prior to the Conquest would be an appropriate hero. He questions whether this outlined poem shall be dramatic, after the method of the great Greek tragedies, or lyric and descriptive, like to the Canticles of Solomon or Saint John's Apocalypse. On such open questions his active mind is musing. "As far as life and leisure will extend," he says, "so soon as the land has freed herself from her present bondage, under which no splendid work can flourish," this governing ambition is to be fulfilled. Such may be said to have been the antecedents and anticipations of Milton's epic work and such his partial preparation for it.

The original form of "Paradise Lost," published in 1667, was in ten books. In the second edition of 1673-4 it was issued in twelve books, after the plan of the "Faerie Queene" and the "Æneid." It is to the credit of Addison as a literary critic that, early in the year 1712, he devoted eighteen separate papers of the *Spectator* to the examination of this as yet only English epic of note. He may justly be said thereby to have introduced Milton's poem with special favor to the English public of his day, and to have laid the foundations for that continuous and appreciative criticism which it has since received. This generous comment was especially timely, inasmuch as the epic had been



waiting forty years and more for just such an exponent and friend. It was alike to Addison's praise and to his good fortune that he thus was inclined and enabled to do for Milton what John Dryden in the previous century did for Shakespeare and the English drama in general.

Addison goes on to examine the poem, as he states, "by the rules of epic poetry," and tests it, thus, according to the three Aristotelian essentials — Unity, Completeness and Sublimity, favorably comparing it, in each of these particulars, with the "Iliad" and the "Æneid," discussing its contents, its characters, its sentiments and diction, its merits and defects. To this day, no student of English verse who desires to form a just estimate of Milton's epic work and place can safely neglect this notable critique, far in advance, as it was, of anything as yet attempted in the line of literary criticism.

The tradition that Milton did not receive more than a few pounds for his epic seems to be well founded. According to Gladstone, it was the first instance in English literature of actual payment for literary work.

The most concise analysis of the scheme of the poem is that which divides it into three sections, of four books each.

In the First Section (Books I-IV), this world and the two worlds beyond, of good and evil, are revealed and man is seen in his relation to these two conflicting agencies. It is the old Persian idea of dual forces warring for mastery. In the Second Section (Books V-VIII), Raphael appears and speaks of what occurred prior to the creation of Adam and in what way those far-distant events affected the later history of the human race. In the Third Section (Books IX-XII), the Fall of Man is revealed and its dire results shown, and in the place of Raphael's narration of the past, the future is disclosed through the agency of Michael, the archangel. This vision involves the revelation of God as Redeemer: His plan for human salvation, and the way in which He upholds and applies that plan in the fullness of time and in obedience to the demands of justice and the divine government. A more minute analysis of the poem is given by Milton himself, in the second edition of 1673, in the form of what he calls "The Arguments" prefixed to the several books, as a logical and literary outline or Table of Contents. From such an outline the reader can form some correct estimate of the mental and literary character of the epic and the degree of success with which the poet has compassed and completed his original plan, and thus be enabled to view intelligently the place which it holds among its historic rivals. It is from the study of "Paradise Lost" that

the close relation of Milton to Homer and Dante and Shakespeare has been urged and the question opened whether or not he belongs with Shakespeare to the same literary order, or is to be classed as the first name in the second list of English poets, including such notable examples as Tennyson and Robert Browning. In so far as tradition and the history of opinion are concerned, the names of Milton and Shakespeare are inseparably joined, as indicating the highest attainment of poetic art in England. Nor is there as yet any indication of the reversal of this conclusion. Such a high estimate of Milton, it is to be urged, is based on his entire literary work, in verse and prose, in lyric and descriptive, as well as in epic poetry, in his "*Areopagitica*" and "*L'Allegro*" and "*Comus*" as in his epics and his "*Samson Agonistes*."

In the study of "*Paradise Lost*," one of the first and most fruitful questions confronting the student pertains to the Sources of the author's epic material. Not only must we concede that Milton made use of material gathered from various quarters, but that he did so openly and with a definite literary purpose. As he himself stated it, "To borrow and to better in the borrowing is no plagiarism." Despite this frank confession, it seems to have been the rare delight of some over-sensitive critics, such as Mr. Gosse, to substantiate a charge of plagiarism against Milton and trace all that is best in his works to foreign authors. This theory has been pressed with special zeal against Milton in his composition of "*Paradise Lost*," his alleged indebtedness to Vondel's "*Lucifer*" being said to be extreme and wilful, while an ingenuous critic would see here nothing more than the natural and legitimate use which one writer would make of another, writing a few years before him on a similar topic. Moreover, Milton's plan was substantially perfected long before the appearance of "*Lucifer*" in 1654, while the epic of the Dutch poet bears on but a small portion of the English poem.

Some of the legitimate sources of the epic may be studied. The first was Scripture, especially as represented in the history, prophecy and poetry of the Old Testament. Here he had a spacious field and freely used it. This was, partly, because of his wide acquaintance with Hebraic and Oriental studies; partly, because the epic he was writing was characteristically a biblical epic; and partly, also, independently of these considerations, because he found in the Bible, as nowhere else, that wealth and aptness of poetic imagery of which he was in urgent need. The most hasty reader of the poem is impressed with the free and yet reverent manner in which, on the basis of some sublime scene in Ezekiel or in the Apocalypse, he has risen to the highest summits

of his verse and produced poetic effects possible by no other agency. Not only does Addison in the *Spectator* tell us of the indebtedness of English to Hebrew for pathetic terms, but acknowledges and illustrates it by way of diction and structure and general style, and with reference to what Longinus calls, elevation of sentiment.

Next to the Bible the Greek and Roman Classics furnished Milton with the suggestions he was seeking. Nor is this use of pagan literature in setting forth religious truth at all denied or concealed. From the first of his eighteen papers on "Paradise Lost" on to the last, Addison is speaking of Homer and Virgil, of the "Iliad" and the "Æneid," and is careful to show that Milton resorts to them with a settled purpose and the better to compass his literary ends. It must be added, however, that the English critic is always careful to show that of the three epic writers Milton takes the precedence, and of the three epics Milton's is the greatest, especially in its grasp and spirit. Of all the ancients Homer was to Milton the first, and, when outside of the sphere of his own nation and history, he was more at home at the centre of the old Greek mythology than in any other region open to his imagination. There was something in the Homeric conception that attracted and inspired him and incited him to his best work in epic verse.

An additional source of Milton's epic material was found in General History and Letters. It is known that he was thoroughly conversant with the earlier history of England. An accomplished Hebrew and classical scholar, versed also in the Dutch and Latin and other north and south European tongues, a devoted student from the twelfth year of his age, compassing the great departments of politics, theology, geography, mythology and literature, there was little in the world's history, as it lay before him in open record, with which he did not acquaint himself, so that, when he sat down to write, these vast resources were at hand or accessible. It was thus, as Addison tells us, "that Milton's genius, which was so great in itself, was strengthened by all the helps of learning."

Moreover, his genius retained all its freshness while, at the same time, making a normal use of every form of fact and truth coming within the scope of his purpose. Thus to utilize all acquired knowledge and still to exercise one's independent judgment is itself an evidence of genius. It is a rare illustration of acquisitive and original power in conjunction. Exception has been taken by critics that we have in "Paradise Lost" a "show of learning," that the poet would have us know by his references to truth and fact at large that he had compassed the circuit of

human knowledge so that nothing remained to be known. A careful study of Milton's spirit would surely correct this hasty conclusion, by which it would appear that, however dogmatic or polemic he was in his prose, he is notably temperate and modest in his verse. The pervading tone of his great epic is that of lowliness of spirit in the presence of God and the majestic theme he is discussing, while the detailed allusions so often made to the facts of human knowledge are an essential part of his plan on the literary side and in no sense adduced to give the appearance of elaborate learning. A poet who begins his epics, as Milton did, with an invocation to the Spirit to instruct him in his ignorance and illumine him in his darkness is not the man to make a proud exhibit of himself on any side of his varied attainment. Here, as elsewhere, there are some critics whose only mission is negative and destructive, and, be the merit what it may, they will find sufficient basis for their chosen work.

As to the epic itself, a brief discussion is now in place. That it has defects and faults no conscientious student can deny. "Spots in the sun," as Addison called them, there are, and Addison himself admits and illustrates them, as to the scheme of the poem, its character, sentiments and diction. A few of these may be cited. The successes of Satan and his allies are said to be too prominent, so as to raise the question as to whether Satan may not be the proper hero of the poem, as Dryden maintained. Some of the details of the poem as to sin and death are said to be improbable and revolting. The digressions are held to be too frequent and conspicuous, so as to violate the accepted principle as to episodes. His characters are said to be allegorical, the sentiments too pagan, and his diction too labored, involved and technical.

There are two defects which are of greater moment. The one is the absence of sustained passion. There is not as much of that fire and fervid force of thought and language, of poetic inspiration as we expect to find in such a poem. The epic is too studied and methodical, too restrained and academic; in a word, too Augustan and classical, if not, at times, conventional. That emotive energy which we find in his prose is not marked. Though the general movement is inspiring and there are occasional outbursts of passion, the passion is not continuous and accumulative, as in "Comus." This is especially noticeable after the second book. It could thus be called a didactic poem, somewhat educational in type and impression, the vast amount of learning it displays being partly responsible for such a result. The interpretation of "Paradise Lost" is a study of no light character.

Akin to this is a second defect—want of flexibility, mental and



literary. The poem to this extent is not popular or readable. We find it as difficult to plod through its twelve books as through the "Faerie Queene" or "Aurora Leigh" or "The Earthly Paradise." The structure and style are not sufficiently elastic. There is too little pliancy of idea and expression to sustain the reader's interest, not enough of that literary alertness and facile fluency that entice and hold the attention. At times, indeed, we find ourselves close on the borderland of prose. It is to this that Froude, in his "Life of Bunyan," refers when he says "that Milton was only partially emancipated from the bondage of the letter." The epic is often too rigid and unrelenting to commend itself to the average English reader.

Turning to the leading merits of the epic, we note, first, the scope of the poem, the greatness of its conception. This is such as to justify his calling his epic "an adventurous song,"

"That with no middle (ordinary) flight intends to soar  
Above the Æonian Mount, while it pursues  
Things unattempted yet in prose or verse."

It is thus that he invokes the aid of the Spirit that he may rise "to the height of this great argument." Including, as it does, heaven, earth and hell, the range of outlook is even wider than that compassed by Dante in Paradise, Purgatory and Inferno. In fact, the area is infinity itself, and, as such, while it accounts for some of Milton's most signal defects and errors, also magnifies the type and capacity of that genius that could construct an epic on so wide a scale and even approximately realize its spacious ideal. We have here, if nothing else, the essence of creative and imaginative verse, of epic and dramatic effect in unison, in that the poet's plan embraced the universe of being and of truth. There is nothing comparable to this in Homer, Vergil, Tasso or Lucan, in "The Cid" or "The Nibelungen Lied" or in any epic poet save the author of "The Divina Commedia." It is Pope's "Essay on Man" heightened and widened into immensity.

An additional feature of merit is seen in the variety and boldness of the imagery, as found in characters and scenes, constituting a real body of *dramatis personæ*. On the one hand, in the line of the personal and concrete, are the Trinity, God the Father, Son and Spirit; Abdiel, the unsinning seraph; Uriel, the regent of the sun; Gabriel, the guardian of Paradise; Michael, the archangel; Raphael, the divine messenger to Eden; Adam and Eve, the progenitors of the race. As exponents of evil, we see Satan, the leader of his rebel hosts; Beelzebub, Moloch, Chemos, Astoreth, Dagon, Rimmon, Belial and Azazel, Satan's trusted ally, and an innumerable host of fallen spirits.

In the line of the more impersonal and abstract are Sin, Death, Chaos, Night, Pandemonium, The Limbo of Vanity, Hell, Earth, Heaven, the Sea, "Gorgons and Hydres and Chimæras dire:" Giants and Pygmies, Cherubs and Seraphs, Dragons and Devils; War in Heaven and Lust and Crime on Earth; and "the waving, fiery sword" at the Gate of Eden, as the banished pair go forth. All this in such vividness and graphic boldness of character and scene, of place and time, is simply colossal, supernatural and infernal—a dramatic epic of the universe with the old Persian conception of God and Satan manifested in historical and Biblical perspective. It is the old English pagan epic of Beowulf and the Dragon reproduced and ennobled in the modern and Christian era of English letters.

A further feature is the suggestiveness and stimulus of the poem. No words can more justly express the final impressiveness of this epic than these. No one can read it in the spirit in which it is written and enter at all into what it is and what it means and not rise from the reading a stronger man, thinking more of truth and duty than ever, more firmly resolved than ever to seek and diffuse and defend the truth and to express more and more fully its leading lesson, that obedience to the Divine will is the source of all good. Literature is nothing if not quickening and ennobling: poetry is nothing if not inspiring, and fails of its end if it does not lift the life of the reader to the highest outlook and purpose. Milton was more than an English poet. He was an English literary force, doing his immediate work midway between Elizabethan and Augustan England, but doing his real work for all times and all peoples.

Two general characteristics of Milton's verse, and especially applicable to his epics, may be noticed. The first is its distinctive Christian spirit. In this respect the poetry is but the expression of the poet's personality. Though he did not enter the Church as minister or member, he carried his conscience with him into literature. In one of his prose pamphlets, in speaking of his literary plans, he says: "These are the inspired gifts of God . . . to cherish in a people the seeds of virtue." He began his poetic career with a paraphrase of some of the Psalms and verses on Christ's Nativity. The Sonnets follow, full of moral teaching. "L'Allegro," "Il Penseroso" and "Comus" are as notable for their Christian sentiment as for their lyric and descriptive beauty. In the epics, however, and especially in "Paradise Lost," this feature is conspicuous. In fine, he seems to have regarded poetry as a holy calling, and aimed to be what he said Spenser was—"a sage and serious poet."

Writing to Diodati, he gives his conception of a Christian bard. After reluctantly conceding that some poets abused their trust, he adds: "But the man who speaks of high matters, let him live sparsely: let herbs afford him his innocent diet, and let clear water in a beechen cup stand near him. To this let there be added a youth chaste and free from guilt; rigid morals and hands without stain and not ashamed to venture into the very presence of the unoffended God." Knowing, as he did, that every worthy knight swore to defend the interests of truth and justice and chastity, he adds: "Every free and gentle spirit ought to be born a knight," and devote his days to the defense and diffusion of the truth. He speaks of "the music of the spheres." It was in his view more than poetic imagery. He lived as if he often heard it and felt that his character must be worthy of such a high privilege. He relied, as he avows, "on the gracious aid of that Eternal Spirit who enriches the mind with all utterance and knowledge."

In all this Milton was a true successor of Caedmon, and the first and second epic poets of England are alike Christian. Who can estimate the dire results that would have followed had not Milton been what he was and done what he did in behalf of good literature in the profligate days of the English Restoration! "Nothing," says Southey, "was ever so unearthly as the poetry of Milton."

The second characteristic of Milton's verse is its sublimity. "Milton's chief talent," writes Addison, "lies in the sublimity of his thought." Present as this feature is in all his poems, it is naturally most evident in his epics, and most of all, in "*Paradise Lost*." All the conditions of the sublime as given by Longinus, negative and positive, are here fulfilled. According to the great Greek critic, it is opposed to bombast, false passion and puerility, its essentials being elevation of diction, sentiment and spirit. Aristotle speaks of the epic in a similar manner, as having unity, completeness and gravity of action, variety and fitness of character, clear and elevated diction and pertinent figures. In each of these several particulars, Milton is seen to comply with the criteria of the masters relative to that which is sublime and chiefly as to what is called elevation. The conception and construction and unfolding of the epic are all on a majestic scale, lifting the thought and feeling of the reader above all that is earthy and trivial to the celestial and inspiring. "The sublimest of men," says Channing, "his name is almost identical with sublimity." "It seems," write the brothers Hare, "that nothing could dwell in this mind but what was grand and sterling." He

had what Arnold calls "the grand style." His mental and moral constitution were great, so that when he wrote most naturally he wrote inspiringly, as Homer and Plato did among the Greeks. The Miltonic style is essentially Homeric, essentially elevated and impressive—an epic order of style by way of distinction, whether in verse or prose, the best example extant in English of dignity in literary art.

In all this there is something of the old Puritan temper and habit, that "intellectual seriousness" that marked the Cromwellian era of our native literature, degenerating, at times, into undue severity of manner and utterance, but, in the main, expressed in normal form and conducive to the best results in Church and State, society and letters.

A most suggestive additional characteristic of Milton's verse, had we time to discuss it, is found in the union of epic and lyric qualities that he so successfully effected, the practical fusion of sublimity and beauty—not so much that he passed with consummate ease from the graver strains and methods of heroic verse to the lighter strains of the lyric, as that he unified and fused them into a common literary product. It is with this in mind that Seeley writes, "that Milton is the only poetical genius which has yet arisen in the Anglo-Saxon family combining, in Greek perfection, greatness with grace." If we find lyric sweetness and charm in his epics, we find epic elevation and grandeur in his lyrics. Here we see the magnificent measurement of his genius, the latitude over which it ranges, the height to which it soars, and at this point, at least, he was superior to his great dramatic predecessor. Milton is more uniformly sublime than Shakespeare. As Thomson sings:

"Is not each great, each amiable Muse  
Of classic ages in our Milton met,  
A genius universal as his theme!"

It is Charles Lamb who suggested that, as a fitting preparation for the study of Milton, "a solemn cathedral service of song should be indulged in." Such a service would be equally befitting at the close of such a study, and in the line of fervent gratitude that such a man and such a poet adorns the annals of English letters—

"God-gifted organ-voice of England—  
Milton, a name to resound for ages."



## REVIEWS OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

### I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, By ANDREW MARTIN FAIRBAIRN, D.D., LL.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, etc. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. 8vo, pp. xxviii, 583.

It was to be expected that a work on *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion* written by the author of *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* would evince broad scholarship, strong intellectuality, stimulating suggestiveness, and deep religious feeling; and these qualities are strikingly exhibited in this book, the latest production of his pen. The style is, on the whole, remarkably lucid, though there are some places where there is a lack of definiteness and precision of statement. Wherever this, however, is the case, we would venture to hint that either confused thinking or the principle of concealment lieth at the door. There are many passages of great beauty in the work, the flow of the sentences is notably rhythmical, and the diction is, one might say, perfect.

Prof. Harnack, in his late and sensation-producing book, *What is Christianity?* remarks in the introductory Lecture: "Had they [these lectures] been delivered sixty years ago, it would have been our endeavor to try to arrive by speculative reasoning at some general conception of religion, and then to define the Christian religion accordingly. But we have lately become skeptical about the value of this procedure." Principal Fairbairn, however, does not agree with Harnack in these depreciatory remarks on the method referred to; for he says in the opening sentence of the Preface: "This book may be described as an attempt to do two things: first, to explain religion through nature and man; and, secondly, to construe Christianity through religion." The author states that he chose this method because as lecturer in India on the Haskell Foundation he was brought into touch with other religions than Christianity, and was thus led to a deeper investigation, both from the philosophical and the historical viewpoint. He felt then compelled to study his own faith in this new light, and the present work is the result of that study. The purpose of this production the author explicates in some detail in his introductory chapter, entitled "The Problem of the Christian Religion." This great problem is to explain or construe the Person of Christ, which Person is *the* mystery of the Christian religion. Doubtless, all of us will agree with this position. Dr. Fairbairn begins his discussion at this point by calling attention to the same apparent antithesis

that Harnack formulated when the latter declared that in reading the life of Christ as found in the Gospels, and then reading the creeds of Nice and Chalcedon, one passes from a world of Syrian peasants to that of Greek philosophers. But after the statement of the antithesis, Harnack and Fairbairn go poles apart; Harnack repudiating any metaphysical construction of the Person of Christ, and Fairbairn asserting, in words as weighty as they are true, that "but for the metaphysical conception of Christ, the Christian religion would long ago have ceased to live" (p. 4). But is this mystery of Christ's Person merely one that we make ourselves? Is it a purely artificial one? Fairbairn answers, No; His person is a natural mystery, not a manufactured one. Why is it a mystery? He replies: On account of the part Christ has played in universal history—the place he has filled, and the things He has achieved in the collective life of man. But does not, we ask, the wonderful picture of Jesus in the Gospels also indicate that there must have been some mystery connected with His person? This Dr. Fairbairn will not *at this point* admit; on the contrary, he says: "It were an easy thing to construe the life of Jesus, isolated from its historical context, in the terms of a severe naturalism" (p. 14). This is going too far, and the author, as we shall see, practically repudiates the position in the latter part of the work. But it is not sufficient to conceive Christ merely in this manner. We must remember that He "stands for a whole order of thought, a way of regarding the universe, of conceiving God and man in themselves and in their mutual relations" (p. 16). Therefore, the Philosophy of the Christian Religion is compelled to discuss such questions as these in addition to those connected with Christ in history. This gives our author the two Books into which he divides his work: I. Questions in the Nature of Philosophy and Mind which affect Belief in the Supernatural Person; II. The Person of Christ and the Making of the Christian Religion. One might think from these headings that our author had changed his purpose as announced: First, to explain religion through nature and man; and, secondly, to construe Christianity through religion." And we are afraid Dr. Fairbairn cannot be entirely acquitted of the charge of using two organizing principles at the same time. In successive chapters he shows how the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of ethics (with the questions as affected by the problem of evil) and the philosophy of history point to the existence of the Supernatural Being we call God; and how also some of these lines of thought point to the probability that there would be such a supernatural Person as Jesus Christ. Therefore, it is only on the supposition, after a somewhat loose fashion, that religion is equated with theism that we could say, either that religion was here explained through nature and man, or that the Person of Christ was construed through religion. In the last three chapters, however, of this first Book the author discusses the philosophy of religion, and lays down as the result certain canons of criticism for the interpretation of the Christian Religion; so that, perhaps, our author meant to imply that the previous discussion was merely introductory to the explanation of religion. But even so, the order of thought, seeing that the Person of Christ is construed, before the philosophy of religion is reached, is of a disconnected character.

Let us examine all of these chapters more closely. In the first one, the writer considers the great questions in the Philosophy of Nature that bear on our belief in the Supernatural Person, Jesus Christ; and on account of its basal nature we should examine with some care his treatment of this subject. The fundamental problem, he declares, is necessarily the relation of nature to the supernatural. Modern science has taught us that all things are bound together in a system, an order whose reason is in itself, and under a reign of law—all of which would be disturbed or broken up by the inter-

vention of any higher power or law. Dr. Fairbairn says, and I think we should agree with him, that this is too great a question to be argued, as if it concerned old and exhausted commonplaces as to the possibility and credibility of miracles. Hume's argument against miracles was inconsistent with his own philosophy, and therefore fell to the ground. But the position "that we live under an order or system that has no room for a supernatural Person, must be discussed as a principle involved in the most fundamental of all questions, viz., in what terms must we interpret this order or system? What does *nature* mean and what include? Does man make it, or does it make man? Is thought the product of experience, or is experience made possible by the factors which transcend it?" (pp. 27, 28). These questions are answered with great force and acumen by showing in a long discussion that nature is intelligible only through its interpretation by mind; and to say that it is intelligible means that it embodies intelligence. The inference is obvious: "There is such a correspondence between the mind and the universe, between the intelligible we think and the intellect we think by, that their relation can only be explained by identity of source, *i. e.*, by their both being the expression of a single supreme Intelligence" (p. 37). This argument of Dr. Fairbairn's is known often as Rational Realism, and is unquestionably valid. But it is not essential to its validity that it should be based on Berkleian Idealism, and the writer in some passages comes so close to this that it is a question whether he adopts it or not. This argument, then, from the world of Nature, gives us the existence of a Supreme Intelligence as its Author. But what is the explanation of the source or cause of the mind itself that interprets nature? And the answer made, after a careful, searching examination of the theory of Evolution as a possible sufficient reason, is that mind could have been produced by Creative Mind only, even if the process was that of Evolution. And this process would mean only the continued activity of the supreme Mind or of *God*, if we express the transcendental in philosophy in terms of the Supernatural in theology. Thus we get the existence of the Supernatural Being we call God.

What, however, queries the author, has this to do with the compatibility of the Supernatural Person Jesus Christ with the conception of Nature? And his answer, while strong and satisfactory in some respects, is not so in others. The old path at this point turned to the position that given a true Theism (an Almighty God), a miracle such as the Incarnation was at least possible. But this is not Dr. Fairbairn's full meaning, and indeed it is somewhat difficult to assert positively what it is exactly. That Nature cannot really be understood or conceived except through the Immanent Supernatural called God is reiterated. Then follow some idealistic declarations to the effect, that "the real creation of God is Spirit;" that "were mind withdrawn there would be no matter;" that matter has not the ability to know, and "what does not know does not really exist" (p. 57). From this it follows that "the real presence of God belongs to the system of rational experience and not to the field of mechanical energies." Hence, "what constitutes the universe a reality to God are the spirits he has created to inhabit it"; therefore, He cares for these spirits and "will remain in active relations with them," for only thus can He complete His creation through discipline and instruction. The Divine Being must be everywhere operative, and His beneficence leads Him to creative action that never ceases. Thus creation is a continuous process. "The Will of God is the energy of the universe, uniform and permanent in quantity, yet expressing itself in modes of an infinite variety" (p. 59). Evolution, therefore, is but the continuance of the creative process. "Why, then, may not new and higher types appear in the modes and forms of being known to history as



politics, ethics, religion? In other words, may not the very Power which determined the appearance of the first form, and the whole course of evolution from it, determine also the appearance of creative Persons in history and of all the events which may follow from their appearance? Might we not describe the failure of the fit or the needed man to appear at some supreme moment as a failure which affects the whole creation? And would not the work he did for God be the measure of the degree of the Divine Presence or quantity of the Divine energy immanent with Him? . . . . Would it not be absolutely consistent with the whole past history of the creative action as written in the living forms which have dwelt and struggled on our earth, that the Creator should do for the higher life of man what He has done for the lower—create the first form—*i. e.*, first not in the chronological but in the logical and essential, or typical and normative sense—the form after and from and through which the higher life may be realized?" (pp. 59, 60). Does this mean that Dr. Fairbairn throws the Incarnation into the evolutionary process, and thus gets rid of any antagonism between it and the scientific order of nature? Is the Incarnation supernatural only in the same sense in which any creative Person of a new and higher type in politics is supernatural—being the result of the continued creative activity of the Divine Being? Surely this cannot be Dr. Fairbairn's meaning, for this would destroy the true supernaturalism of the Person of Christ; and no one can read the second Book of his volume and doubt that its author accepts the mystery of the Incarnation, carrying with it the full Deity of Christ, in the Church's sense of those terms. To say the least, therefore, Dr. Fairbairn has expressed himself here in a very objectionable manner.

The lecture on the Philosophy of Ethics is one of the finest in the book. The untenable nature of utilitarian, hedonistic and evolutionistic ethics is exhibited in a striking way, and the imperious "ought" is brought forward to show conscience as an integral part of man's nature. But "we can conceive a personal conscience only where it can express a universal law, and moral freedom only where there is a supreme ethical Will to govern" (p. 84). What is valid in the ethics and arguments of Butler and of Kant is recognized, and some of their positions rightly criticised. The relation, finally, of this philosophy of ethics to the probability of the appearance of the supernatural Person, Jesus Christ, is brought out as follows: "If, then, man by his moral being touches the skirts of God, and God in enforcing His law is ever, by means of great persons, shaping the life of man to its diviner issues, what could be more consonant, alike with man's nature and God's method of forming or reforming it, than that He should send a supreme Personality as the vehicle of highest good to the race? Without such a Personality the moral forces of time would lack unity, and without unity they would be without organization, purpose or efficiency. If a Person has appeared in history who has achieved such a position and fulfilled such functions, how can He be more fully described than as the Son of God and the Saviour of man?" (p. 93). Putting the best interpretation upon these words, for their exact meaning might be doubtful in the light of the previous discussion, they certainly present the point strongly.

The question of the supernatural Person as affected by the problem of evil is discussed in two chapters. The first of these is historical and critical, showing how the thinkers of the past have looked at this problem, and estimating the importance of their contributions to the subject. The theories of optimism and pessimism are here subjected to keen and just criticism. The second of the chapters contains some suggestions toward a solution of the problem of evil. The treatment of moral evil is in some respects suggestive.



though it is difficult to say anything new on this theme. God is moved to create by the end, on the Divine side, of His own glory; on the created side, by the creature's good. But the good will of the Creator toward the creature must be conditioned by the capacity and capability of the created. The creatures must be spirits that are made in God's image, yet free to work out their own destiny. Freedom is the condition of the existence of moral beings. If God could interfere with their freedom to choose evil, they would become non-moral automata. In other words, God could not create persons who would be certain to keep their first estate. Their freedom necessarily carried with it the possibility of sinning. This is, of course, a disputed point and one on which we cannot dogmatize. We do not think Dr. Fairbairn has added much to the solution of the problem. How moral evil would call for the supernatural Person, Jesus Christ, is strikingly brought out: "On the contrary, if we may so express ourselves, evil was the mute but potent appeal of the creation to the Creator not to forsake the work of His hands; and was it not an appeal His own very honor bound Him to regard?"

"In this chapter we have labored to keep our thought strictly within the lines of a natural and rational theology, but the point whither the argument has been tending is clear: Nature cannot here speak the last word; 'we must wait the revelation of the Son of God. To allow evil to become and to continue without any purpose of redemption—i. e., to leave it as an ultimate fact and the final state of created existence—were to us an absolutely inconceivable act in a good and holy and gracious God. And so we may conclude this chapter with two questions: (a) May not the existence of evil explain and justify the event which we call the Incarnation? and (b) How can we conceive the justice and the goodness of God in relation to evil if His continued and final action toward it be excluded from consideration?" (pp. 167, 168).

The philosophy of history is next discussed as it bears on the great problem we are considering. The starting point is the position that creative energy can be studied even better in history than in the field of nature; for God is more immanent in man in one sense than in nature. The unity and order of history, the progress of civilization and the gradual development of the "ethical process"—all go to show that there is a God who governs the world. "And if when life is studied in the concrete present we can see only this conflict of lawless wills, how, when the whole is regarded, can there be any room for the idea of law, or progress, or purpose?" (p. 178). The only explanation is an overruling Providence. Modern research has proved that the main factors by which the higher ideas and emotions are evoked for incorporation in human conduct, custom or institution is religion. Thus we are led to take up the Philosophy of Religion.

One chapter in the treatment of this great subject deals with the idea and origin of religion. "Religion is subjectively man's consciousness of relation to supra-sensible being, and objectively the beliefs, the rites, the customs and the institutions which are incorporated in this consciousness" (p. 200). This is an admirable definition, especially as explicated in the next few pages. The term "consciousness" is taken, rightly we are sure, in the comprehensive sense as including "the whole energy of man as a reasonable spirit." We are glad to see that Principal Fairbairn emphasizes here especially the element of belief, or the intellectual element, as an essential of religion. As to the origin of religion, the author makes it to be subjectively the religious instinct; man is religious by a necessity of nature—which is, we are convinced, the right view of the matter. The origin of any particular religion is due to this subjective factor as influenced by environment, meaning by

that term race, place, ethnical relations, heredity, the social ideal and creative personalities.

The great historical religions are next subjected to examination. The reason the author gives for going into this discussion is that he is convinced there can be a philosophy of religion only when the religions are historically studied. We have not space even to indicate our author's treatment of this part of his subject, although it is extremely interesting and instructive. This discussion leads up naturally to "Founded Religions and their Founders." The part played by Jesus Christ in the Christian religion involves principles and problems which belong to the philosophy of religion and to its comparative study. This is the *raison d'être* of the present chapter. Dr. Fairbairn classifies religions in accordance with the division first clearly brought out by Prof. Whitney and afterwards adopted by others, viz., natural or spontaneous religions and founded or personal religions. Our author declares there are only three religions belonging to the latter class—Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Christianity. By the study of the two former religions Fairbairn endeavors to discover canons of criticism or regulative ideas for the interpretation of the Christian religion and states the following as the result of his study: I. The Founder and His Religion a unity. II. He has both an ideal and a historical significance. III. His historical significance determines the form of His religion. IV. His ideal significance determines its value for man. V. His Word never ceases. The author declares that we should not shrink from applying these regulative ideas to the connection between Jesus Christ and the Christian religion (p. 295). The application, however, of these canons of criticism is of the most informal and general character. They are applied, to be sure, in a loose way to Jesus and His religion, but not as an organizing principle. One has to search through the remainder of the volume here and there to see where the application comes in, and is sometimes extremely dubious whether he has found it. In fact the attempt to deduce such canons from two religions and to apply them as necessarily regulative of the connection between Jesus Christ and His religion, is a procedure of more than doubtful validity.

The enunciation of these regulative principles forms the transition to Book II of the work, which is entitled "The Person of Christ and the Making of the Christian Religion." The connection between Jesus Christ and the Christian religion can be studied, first of all, in the literature that contains the original sources bearing on the life of Jesus—that is, the Gospels and other Apostolic writings. Dr. Fairbairn sets forth the accepted view as to the priority of the Pauline Epistles to the Gospels, and without going into any critical discussion assumes as settled the genuineness of at least the larger Epistles of Paul and the historicity of the Evangelists and of the Book of Acts. The Gospel according to John is later on used as if it were genuine, though no formal declaration is made on this point. After this discussion the book is divided into three parts: I. The Founder as a historical Person, or Jesus as he appears in the Synoptical Gospels; II. The Creation of the Christian Religion by the Interpretation of the Person of Christ [by the Apostles]; III. The Religion of Christ as thus interpreted compared with the Ideal of Religion as conserved and exemplified in the Historical Religions. In his opening chapter in Part I the author sets forth, first, the naturalistic view of Jesus that was held by some during His life; and, waiving the question of the miracles of Jesus for the moment, Fairbairn asks, How does it happen on the basis of naturalism that such extraordinary and recreative historical consequences should have flowed from the life and death of a mere man? But the supernatural view as to Jesus gradually dawned on the Apostles.

as related by the Syuoptists, and culminated in the Gospel of John in the Logos doctrine. This supernatural view makes Jesus to be a rational and conscious unity. On any other view the Jesus that is depicted in the Evangelists is an insoluble enigma. Taking up now the miracles of Jesus, Dr. Fairbairn points out with great force and insight how sane and prudent they were, with what a loving purpose they were worked and in what moral service. These considerations enhance the probability that they happened, especially as connected with the Person found by other reasoning to be supernatural.

The chapter on the ethical transcendence of Jesus need not detain us. The usual view as to Jesus' being an ethical ideal and an absolutely sinless being is well presented. This does not prove the Deity of Jesus, but it paves the way for it.

The author now turns to the religious personality of Jesus as interpreted by Himself. The simplicity, spontaneity, profundity, and universal character of His teaching are exhibited by the author in excellent style. It is also pointed out that the flavor of the age and the people and the place so penetrates this teaching that it shows Jesus could not have been a shadowy unreality, as the mythical hypothesis makes out, but there must have been a living man among living men, revealing wonderful truths. Jesus' teaching as to His own Person is analyzed and His divine claim set forth in a masterly way. The nature and the consequences of the death of Jesus in His own eyes are subjected to a remarkably painstaking and minute study. The aim is to present it, of course, as was the case with reference to His doctrine of His Person, from a Biblico-theological viewpoint, exhibiting the legitimate meaning of Jesus' words, yet not reading into them the later developments of Apostolic thought. Perhaps Jesus' own interpretation of the significance of His death is as well brought out at the institution of the Lord's Supper as anywhere else. Fairbairn states Jesus' view thus: "He conceives Himself as the Lamb sacrificed in order to mark and seal the people of God—*i.e.*, establish His covenant; but He also at the same moment sits in the seat of the host or father, who sums up in himself the household, acts and speaks as their sole and responsible head. As the one He distributes the elements which symbolize the sacrifice; as the other He is the sacrifice which the elements symbolize" (p. 421).

In Part II the Apostolic interpretation of the Person of Christ is given. This is also a study in Biblical theology and a very excellent one. The views of Paul, John, and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews are presented, showing their conception of Christ's Person. Dr. Fairbairn gives the words of these writers their full significance and presents their conception as one setting forth the complete Deity of Our Lord. But how did the Apostles get such a high, sublime idea of the Person of Christ? Did Paul invent it? Was it the result of a mythical process? No, answers Fairbairn. The marvelous agreement of the Apostolic literature as to who Jesus was could have come only from the mind of Christ Himself; it was merely a reflection of His own teaching, and it was this conception of the Deity of Our Lord that created the Christian religion.

The last chapter of this Part II is on the Death of Christ and Christian Worship; and the suggestive plan is adopted of construing the death of Christ not as a doctrine, but through its function in the Christian religion. Why was Jesus Christ the object of such fervent adoration? Why was He worshiped with such devotion and love? The answer can be found only in the Apostolic interpretation of His death. As this is an interesting and important point we quote verbatim: "There is no other religion which has a crucified or slain person as the sole and sufficient medium through which



God approaches man and man approaches God. This surprised ancient as it has perplexed modern thought; but, considered simply as a matter of fact, without the Cross the religion could not have been. Christ is in the Apostolical records conceived as a Saviour who saves by the sacrifice of Himself, as 'the Lamb of God,' without blemish and without spot, 'slain from the foundation of the world,' yet offered at the end of the ages that He might redeem man by His precious blood. 'He is our passover sacrificed for us,' 'whom God set forth as a propitiatory (person), in order that He might be just and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus' " (pp. 481, 482). We have not space to go into the long discussion that follows, setting forth in detail the exact Apostolic interpretation of the death of Jesus; but, in addition to the quotation just given, we subjoin the following as being perhaps the most significant: "Christ offered Himself to God. Why? For our sins. Wherein was He distinguished from the Levitical high priests? He was sinless, they were sinful; and so while they needed to offer for themselves, He did not. How, then, shall we conceive a sacrificial act which was purely for others and in no respect for the offerer Himself? We may be too fastidious to use the terms 'vicarious' and 'substitutionary,' but it is easier to object to the terms than to escape the idea they express" (p. 500). These quotations would indicate that Fairbairn, while he does not emphasize as much as he might, yet accepts and teaches, the satisfaction theory of the Atonement.

The third part of this second book is one of the most valuable portions of the entire volume. The question is, Can the religion of Jesus Christ claim to be the ideal of religion? Is it fitted to be the only real and universal one? The answer is, yes; and for the following reasons, given in three separate chapters: 1. Christ founded a Kingdom in which all people of all tribes and nations could come. Its ideal was perfect obedience towards God, embodied in perfect duty to man. Men were to enter this Kingdom simply by becoming disciples of Jesus, not by obeying a multitude of positive laws, ceremonial, administrative, and coercive. Jesus Himself embodied the ideal of character and conduct. And though He was the Head of the Kingdom, His sovereignty was purely spiritual. These ideas were fitted to become universal ones in an ideal religion. 2. But the religion of Jesus can become the universal religion by reason of its idea of God as interpreted by Christ. This idea is dissociated from a tribe and attached to a person who reveals God's universal fatherhood. The value of individual man as man is set forth and the unity of the race proclaimed—one origin, one nature, one destiny. All persons without distinction can obtain salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. 3. The religion of Christ is also fitted to become the universal religion by reason of the freedom of its worship. It is not attached, like Judaism or Islamism, to one holy place. The God of Jesus Christ can be worshipped anywhere. Nor is this worship tied to an elaborate ritual or to stereotyped customs and usages as a ground of acceptance. The sole necessary institution for worship is Jesus Christ. The worshiper must come through Him. Such a religion as this, so admirably adapted to universal acceptance, can but be from God. Principal Fairbairn has given us in these last chapters a fine specimen of cogent Apologetic reasoning.

In a few concluding words the fact is pointed out that the function Christ has really fulfilled in History—the place He has actually occupied in the world—corresponds to the ideal conception of His Person. One might think that the author would do more than merely point out this fact, since he emphasized so greatly at the start the argument for the Incarnation based on Christ's place in History. We have only to recall certain words in the introductory chapter to see how true this is. "The principle which underlies the



discussion we may further state in these terms: the conception of Christ stands related to history as the idea of God is related to Nature—i.e., each is in its own sphere the factor of order or the constitutive condition of a rational system. The study of nature has been the means of unfolding, explicating and defining the contents of the idea of God; the study of history has developed, amplified and justified the conception of Christ" (pp. 17, 18). Dr. Fairbairn, however, does not see fit, for some reason, to go into a detailed examination and discussion of the Philosophy of History since the beginning of the Christian era in order to substantiate his thesis. He may take for granted that the *Gesta Christi* are so well known that a formal and protracted submission of evidence was unnecessary. But an author has no right to take for granted the truth of one of his main contentions, in fact what he announces as "the principle which underlies the discussion." We suspect that the confusion of organizing principles is responsible for the meagre fulfillment of the programme.

A few general remarks will conclude our review of the work.

- The theistic argumentation is notably incomplete. "Rational Realism," the moral argument, the interpretation of the Philosophy of History and (we should judge) of the Philosophy of Religion are adduced as evidence of the Divine existence. Probably the author limited himself to these because in his judgment they were also the ones that best pointed towards the coming of the Supernatural Person, Jesus Christ. Whether any of the other arguments could be equally well used in this way is a question into which we cannot enter.

A fact to which attention should be called and which has greatly surprised us is that Dr. Fairbairn has omitted altogether from his system the resurrection of Jesus Christ. This omission was, we should think, accidental. There can be no doubt as to the fundamental place it occupies in the historic facts connected with the life of Christ on which the Christian religion is built. If so, it cannot be omitted from a complete Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

We are almost as much surprised to discover that Principal Fairbairn has in this work no Eschatology. He brings out the doctrine of sin very well in connection with the significance of the death of Christ both as interpreted by Himself and by the Apostles, showing how Christ bore the guilt of our sin. But what, in its consequences, is the relation of sin to the next world, and how does Christ's work in our behalf bear on the life beyond the grave? Dr. Fairbairn does not say. Yet the New Testament writers have much to say on this point; and if Dr. Fairbairn does not believe that any eschatology whatever is essential to the Christian religion, he has cut himself loose from evangelical Christendom. But this omission must surely, like the former, be an accidental one.

We fear, on reading over our review, that we have not given to this work its due meed of praise; for, in spite of its being open to some serious criticisms, it is a great book. The Principal of Mansfield College has shown a wealth of knowledge, a fecundity of thought, a power of analysis and also of synthesis, a strength of reasoning, a happy faculty of "putting things," and other attainments and qualities that place him in the front rank of living Apologists. His work is a contribution to Christian Apologetics which no one interested in the subject can afford to miss.

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BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

LE SENTIMENT RELIGIEUX. Par HENRI BOIS, Professeur à la Faculté de Théologie Protestante de Montauban. 8vo, pp. 64. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1902.

In this pamphlet we have the discourse delivered by Prof. Bois at the

opening meeting of the theological school at Montauban for the session of 1901-1902. Like all that Prof. Bois writes it is notable at once for its eloquence and its precision of statement. The subject seems to have been chosen with conscious reference to the interest now being shown by the psychologists in the phenomena of religion. The discourse opens with a brief enumeration of the contributions recently made to the understanding of the psychology of religion, and an appeal to theologians, based on both scientific and apologetical grounds, to take up the study of that subject. On scientific grounds, since it is well, if piety is to be studied, that it should be studied by those who are themselves pious. On apologetical grounds, since if the investigation of the psychology of religion is left to those indifferent or hostile to religion, great risk is run of settling in the public mind more or fewer false prejudices concerning the whole subject, which it may prove later somewhat difficult to eradicate.

Prof. Bois chooses as his special subject in this discourse the religious feeling. His reason for this is that it is this that is generally considered to be the very essence of personal religion, the substance of piety. His mode of treatment leads him first to pass in review the different attempts that have been made to define the religious feeling and to ascertain its exact nature and significance, closing with his own; and then to seek to determine the relation of religious feeling to religious knowledge on the one hand and to religious volition on the other. The address ends with a few words of earnest exhortation to the students of Montauban, designed to carry home to them the lessons the discussion suggests.

The religious feeling, then, Prof. Bois urges, is in the first place not to be identified with physical modifications, as if it were merely the subjective expression of internal organic movements, manifesting themselves obscurely in consciousness,—in accordance with the widely adopted but absurd doctrine of James and Lange, Dumas and Ribot, that emotion in general is but a physical state becoming conscious of itself, that a mother mourning her dead child, for example, is not weeping because she is sorry but rather is sorry because she weeps! Neither is it on the other hand to be explained as merely the feeling of the infinite, as Schleiermacher once suggested and Max Müller insisted,—which seems all the more absurd to M. Bois because from his Neo-Kantian standpoint he hardly knows what "the infinite" means. Nor yet again is it to be confounded with the moral feeling, as the school of César Malan teaches, seeing that morality and religion can and do exist in separation. Nor even still further can it be reduced to the social feeling as Durkheim imagines, since history shows us that it is rather to individual initiative that religious sentiments commonly owe their origin. It has, nevertheless, points of very close resemblance to the social feeling. For precisely what the religious feeling is, is "a feeling analogous to the feeling which unfolds itself in the reciprocal relations of human persons, but a feeling relative to superhuman persons, and therefore a supra-social feeling, which unfolds itself in the relations of divers human persons with the deity, conceived as multiple or single" (p. 28). Two equally indispensable traits characterize this Divinity who is the object of the concrete, historical religious feeling: (1) *power*, by virtue of which he is the author of our being, or at least the sovereign of the world, or at least our *superior*; and (2) *likeness to us*, in virtue of which he is of our *kind*.

This definition, it will be observed, requires a *personal* deity as the involved object of the religious feeling. And M. Bois does not hesitate to draw out this implication with sharp emphasis. Buddhism, which is often advanced as a case of a religion without any god at all, he treats as merely an evanescent metaphysical speculation provoked by a progressive dissolu-

tion of previous religions,—an episode of pantheistic metaphysics between two periods of religion,—“the bitter and withered fruit of speculation, ripened in the bosom of a decomposition of religious faith.” Pantheism he looks upon as a stage in “the degradation, the progressive extinction of religion,” through which it passes before it vanishes into declared atheism. “Nowhere,” he remarks, “does humanity enter upon religion by way of pantheism, and much less by way of atheism. What we find at the beginning, in humanity already separated from its Creator by the fall and little by little losing knowledge of the one God, is belief in numerous personal gods, however diversely these gods may be conceived and imagined. But the feeling and the thought of man tend to emerge from this inferior state, in seeking to do justice to that need for unity so deeply rooted by God in our nature. This unity can be reached, however, by two contrary processes. The first consists in rising from the idea of multiple divine persons to the idea of a single divine person, ever greater and more powerful, and ever more personal in proportion as he is conceived more clearly as one. The object of the religious feeling and the religious feeling itself develop and purify themselves: this is *monotheism*. The other process consists in eliminating the plurality of persons by eliminating little by little the very idea of personality and by withdrawing from God first moral qualities, then intelligence, until what remains is nothing more than brute force, and soon only a substance more and more vague and amorphous, an I know not what, which has no name in any language: this is the degradation, the progressive extinction of religion, which passes through pantheism to vanish ultimately in declared atheism” (pp. 29-30).

For the proper estimation of this theory of the origin and development of religions it is needful to note that it professes to give account of them only as exhibited in “humanity already separated from its Creator by the fall, and little by little becoming ignorant of the one God.” A previous knowledge of the one God is therefore presupposed: and the monotheism which is presented as a development out of a precedent polytheism must be conceived therefore as a recovery of a lost primitive belief. Perhaps this scheme may strike some as superfluously complicated, and the query may very well arise why we may not look upon polytheism simply as a stage of religious deterioration; and monotheism as everywhere a survival of a more primitive state, wherever it is not obviously an importation from abroad. Assuredly the primary fact in the history of religion is the tendency of man to create his god in his own image. Mr. Andrew Lang appears to us to have adduced excellent reasons for believing that this is everywhere true; that unsophisticated man everywhere forms for himself a deity which is just a magnified man; and that the multiplication of spiritual existences marks a subsequent stage of development. M. Tarde seems to us to speak precisely to the point when he says: “It is necessarily in his own image, from the beginning, but in his psychological and not corporeal image, that the savage conceives his gods. He lends to them not his forms but his feelings, his passions, his ideas. This initial *psychomorphism* is the permanent element in the conception of God” (quoted on p. 27). If we confine ourselves to those religions which represent the upward look of man as he feels after God, if haply he may find Him—the whole body of the natural religions—we do not see but that this is the most rational account to give of their origin as well as the account most accordant with their own reminiscences. It goes without saying, of course, that the origin of the one religion which represents the reaching down of God to man to renew from His side the relations broken by and at the fall—the one supernatural religion—must be sought elsewhere.

The second part of M. Bois' address bases itself on the conclusion of the



former section, that the religious feeling is a feeling that unfolds itself in the personal relations between man and a deity conceived as personal; and raises the two further questions of (1) what are the relations of this religious feeling with the intellect, and (2) what are its relations with the will. The main purpose of this portion of the address seems to be to exhibit the variety and richness of the interrelations and interactions of the intellect, feelings and will in matters of religion. Subordinate only to this appears to be the desire to warn against the evils of intellectualism and emotionalism alike, and to assign the primacy in religion to the will. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter: "Thus from all sides stands out with great sharpness this great psychological law, that the will with its rational rule, duty, is indispensable for the foundation and maintenance of religious health; that the Christian ought to know how to guard himself from taking pleasure, even religious pleasure, for his direct end or for his criterion; and that it is only by the will and action determined by duty, that he will be able to acquire and conserve a normal and complete religious life, in which all parts of his nature shall dwell together, harmoniously combined and established, and in which he will give himself entirely to his God and his brethren, only to find that he is himself benefited by this gift. How can we fail to add that where this religious life is truly realized in its fullness, the ideal psychological synthesis of all the powers of the human Ego is found to be established by it? See St. Paul. Is there among the atheists, is there among the adherents of other religions, a richer and more original combination of strong and indomitable will, invincible dialectic, feeling pushed almost to mysticism and ecstasy, action constant and unintermitted? See above all Jesus. Does not praise change to humble adoration before that holy and pure soul, in which there is nothing but harmony, peace, calm and noble power, beauty, serenity, incomparable mastery of the world and himself, intimate and unbroken possession of his God? *Ecce Homo!* Here is the Man! here the masterpiece of God! here the perfect man, of whom it must be said that, in realizing the moral perfection, he has at the same time realized the psychological perfection of human nature by the sovereign intensity as well as by the irreproachable and indefectible equilibrium of all the elements of his being" (pp. 60-61).

It would carry us too far to enter upon a criticism of M. Bois' conception of the will as the primary factor in religion. Suffice it to observe the eloquence with which he sets it forth, and the balance with which he expounds it. Certainly no one will read the pamphlet without much satisfaction of spirit.

*Princeton.*

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC. By WILFORD L. ROBBINS, D.D., Dean of the Cathedral of All Saints, Albany, U. S. A. 39 Paternoster Row, London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. Pp. vi, 193.

This attractive and vigorous apologetic is one of the "Handbooks for the Clergy," edited by Arthur W. Robinson, B.D., Vicar of Allhallows, Barking-by-the-Tower, England. An interesting and useful volume entitled "An Essay toward Faith," by the same author and of almost the same size, was noticed in the PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for July, 1902. The present work does not aim to be a complete treatise on the Christian evidences. Many of the standard ones it leaves undiscussed and even unnoticed. It undertakes to set forth only those that, in view of existing conditions, are best adapted to its purpose; and this purpose is the single but sufficiently comprehensive one of "proving the reasonableness of believing that Jesus Christ was both divine and the supreme revelation of God."



The argument may best be summarized in the author's own words:

"Recognizing the avidity of the modern mind for facts, facts that are plain and indisputable, we made this our point of departure. We began with the character of Jesus Christ as portrayed in the Gospels, a character unrivaled in its beauty and the sway that it has gained over the hearts of men. The moral preëminence of Jesus Christ, and the unique influence that He has exercised in the subsequent history of the world, are facts which cannot be gainsaid. But facts demand an explanation, every effect presupposes a cause; in the interests of reason, we are driven to correlate facts, and seek the general law that they exemplify. Thus the character of Jesus Christ calls for the closest study, if we are to give account of so striking a phenomenon.

"In the course of this study, we are brought face to face with the divine claim that He put forward, and it seems impossible to disentangle this from the human perfection, which has won supreme allegiance from the conscience of mankind. We can, indeed, ruthlessly cut away this claim; but to do so is to destroy utterly the integrity of our only source of information concerning the character of Jesus Christ; and the figure left, after this process of excision, is thin and bloodless, emphatically *not* the Christ who has won the victories of which we are seeking explanation.

"We are next confronted with the alleged fact of the Resurrection. This event cannot be viewed in isolation, as a mere marvel, for it is closely allied to startling moral and religious phenomena. It is a turning point in history, inasmuch as the faith that transformed the character of the Apostles centred in its acceptance: and it was the keynote of the preaching that converted the world. Moreover, we find that nineteen hundred years have failed to produce a theory concerning this widespread belief which in any degree adequately accounts for it, save on the supposition that the event actually occurred.

"In examining the records of the life of Jesus Christ, we find them as well attested by external evidence as other documents of relatively the same age. And among the internal evidences of their trustworthiness, are some which appear to be of overwhelming force. The extraordinary consistency of the character of Jesus Christ, as set forth in the Four Gospels; the air of verisimilitude in the history of the Passion; these are facts that vouch for the substantial accuracy of the records, and far outweigh certain apparent discrepancies as to minor events.

"And finally, when we ask what relation Jesus Christ holds to the religious development of the pre-Christian world, whether there are signs of preparation for His coming; we are met by the Messianic hope of the long line of Hebrew prophets, a hope that found perfect fulfillment in Him. Moreover, Jesus Christ claimed the witness of prophecy as certifying to His divine claim. This fact, taken in conjunction with His acknowledged spiritual insight, becomes of signal moment in estimating the religious import of His life and character."

Having thus presented his argument, our author goes on to confirm it by calling attention to "the difficulties which encompass the rationalistic position"; and, finally, he brings forward the testimony of experience and "the witness of the Spirit." This, at least in the case of the Christian, gives demonstration. It changes the high probability of the inductive proof into certainty.

On this work thus outlined we venture the following remarks:

1. Its style and temper leave nothing to be desired. Concise, vigorous, chaste, in expression, its tone is both courteous and firm, and it neither insists on what is unessential nor concedes too much.

2. The discussion of "the exact degree of conclusiveness which may justly be demanded of Christian Evidences" is particularly pertinent and exceedingly happy. Most need to be taught that a religion based on facts, as Christianity is, cannot be mathematically demonstrated; and that this is not because it is uncertain, but because it is based on facts.

3. The presentation of the argument from the moral character and divine claims of Christ is peculiarly fine. There are a completeness and also a reserve in it which we do not remember to have seen equaled except by Bushnell.

4. The order in which the arguments are presented is natural and effective.

5. In the main we endorse the estimate of "the witness of prophecy." It is true that its force is to be found in the perfect fulfillment in Christ of the Messianic hope of the long line of Hebrew prophets. Yet while this is so, we are not ready to abandon the old argument from particular predictions. This has been unduly exalted and it does need restatement; but, according to the New Testament itself, it is sound in principle and must always be effective.

6. On the whole, we have no hesitation in pronouncing this little book as the freshest and most judicious statement of the case for Christianity that we have read for many a day.

WHY WE BELIEVE THE BIBLE. By HENRY MELVILLE KING, Author of "Our Gospels" and "The Messiah in the Psalms." New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street. Pp. 231.

The Tract Society have one of the best of their many excellent publications in this attractive volume. A presentation of the chief reasons why we believe the Bible, it is also a vindication of Christianity, the religion of the Bible. This it does by "The Light from the Monuments," "The Voice of History," "The Witness of the Bible Itself," "The Proof from Miracles," "The Testimony from Christian Experience," and "The Evidence from the Triumphs of Christianity." It thus appears that this book might well be used in connection with the one just noticed by Dean Robbins. The evidences on which it dwells are mainly those which he passes over; and in discussing the argument from Prophecy the side which it develops is that which, as has been observed, Dean Robbins would seem rather to slight. It is more elementary also; and while the Clergy would not find in it so much to interest and to convince, perhaps, as in the work just reviewed, we have no doubt that the average mind would be more affected by it. Though its line of argument is old, it is one that can never become antiquated; and it is presented with marked vigor and freshness.

THE DICTUM OF REASON ON MAN'S IMMORTALITY; OR, DIVINE VOICES OUTSIDE OF THE BIBLE. By REV. DAVID GREGG, D.D., Pastor of Lafayette Avenue Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. New York: E. B. Treat & Co., 241-243 West 23d St., 1902. Pp. 73.

This booklet understates the content of "the dictum of reason on man's immortality" and overstates the importance of that dictum in confirming Scripture. Nevertheless, it is attractively written and well reasoned; and with its contention and application most Christians are, and all Christians ought to be, in heartiest accord.

*Princeton.*

W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY, with its Bearings on the Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch. By JOHN WILLIAM MCGARVEY, LL.D., President of the College of the Bible, Lexington, Ky. Cincinnati, O.: The Standard Publishing Co. [1902]. Pp. xxiii, 304.

Step by step through their argument the author follows those critics who deny the genuineness of Deuteronomy. He has done his work ably. The style, indeed, lacks chasteness and elegance, and there is an occasional crudeness about the exegesis; but insight and discrimination and sound judgment are everywhere manifested.

It is regrettable that a book of the size of the present volume is necessary; but the fault of bulk, and of tediousness too, lies with those critics who attack the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy. Not content with advancing facts that are relevant to their argument, prominent critics have accumulated a mass of material which, while it is consistent with the late composition of the book, is also quite as harmonious with its publication in Mosaic times. They have also advanced numerous shallow arguments. The relevant and irrelevant, the valid and invalid, are thrown together promiscuously in one heap. And through this mass the student of the Bible and the public expositor must patiently work their way. Moreover, the method which piles up this miscellaneous heap is vicious, debate is removed from essentials, the true proportions of the phenomena which are really determinative are in danger of being lost sight of, and the discussion is rendered trifling. But as yet there is no promise of the better day when a smaller volume than Dr. McGarvey's will suffice to review the argument.

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE GRAMMAR OF PROPHECY: an Attempt to Discover the Method Underlying the Prophetic Scriptures. By R. B. GIRDLESTONE, M.A., Hon. Canon of Christ Church, and formerly Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, His Majesty's Printers, 1901. Pp. xiii, 192.

The title of the book might lead one to expect a systematic statement of the elementary principles which govern prophecy and its interpretation. Principles find employment, it is true, and they are eminently sound; but they are not treated together nor at anticipated places. Hyperbole, for example, is discussed on pages 13-15; foreground and background in prophecy, on page 22; the future in terms of the past, in chapter ix, beginning on page 66. They are, moreover, seldom given formal statement, and they are not organized into a system. Instead of doing this, the author has preferred, first, to direct attention, in the midst of other matters and interspersed among them, to characteristic features of prophecy and their relation to interpretation. This examination, of course, yields principles; and on this general background he proceeds, secondly, to offer an interpretation of the principal pervasive prophecies of Scripture, especially of those which still await fulfillment. The book thus develops into a classification and brief exposition of the leading prophecies of the Old and New Testaments; and this portion, which embraces the last fifty pages of the book, is the best part both as regards the orderly disposition of the material and the maturity of thought. In the earlier part of the work, especially in chapters vii, viii, x, xi, the treatment strikes one as being in places very elementary indeed, and frag-



mentary: the exegesis, often as crude; and the conclusions, as being carelessly stated.

Canon Girdlestone, as the Christian public knows, is a believer in the genuineness and divine inspiration of the Scriptures. The tone of the book is consequently high, and is altogether agreeable to those who have obtained like precious faith with the author.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF THE ASSYRIAN LANGUAGE (Assyrian-English-German). By W. MUSS-ARNOLD. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard; London: Williams & Norgate; New York: Lemcke & Büchner. Parts 9, 10, 11, 12. 1899-1902. Pp. 513 to 768. \$1.25 a part.

The first sixty-four pages, forming the first part of this valuable dictionary, were reviewed by the present writer with considerable minuteness, and its plan and characteristics were described, in the PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for January, 1896, pp. 187-190; and part eight in the issue for April, 1900, pp. 373-374. The work has now exceeded the size at first proposed for the entire dictionary. The twelfth part ends on page 768 and carries the vocabulary to the word *simtu*. Evidently instead of the eight or nine fascicles of sixty-four pages each, as at first estimated for the lexicon, there will be required at least seventeen. The increase in size is due partly to the fact that the compiler ever keeps his work up to date, and incorporates in it as it proceeds the new words and meanings as they are determined. The dictionary has thus become an indispensable compendium of the attained results and current discussions in the field of Assyrian lexicographical research.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

DER ALTTESTAMENTLICHE UNTERBAU DES REICHES GOTTES von Lic. Dr. JULIUS BOEHMER. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902. Svo, pp. 228.

The author of this treatise has made previous valuable contributions in the department of Old Testament Theology. Besides several suggestive articles in periodicals on the criticism of the prophets, we have from his hand a monograph on the Biblical formula "In the Name of" and another on the Conception of the Kingdom of God and the Son of Man in Daniel. He is also the translator of Cheyne's "Introduction to the Book of Isaiah" into German. In the present work he sets himself the task of tracing the Old Testament antecedents for our Lord's characteristic use of the phrase "the kingdom of God." He justly complains that the indiscriminate carrying back of this phrase into Old Testament history, so as to designate by it the order of redemption from Paradise onward as an already existing organization, is unhistorical and must needs obscure the peculiar content of the idea where it does appear. It is also true, that what the average discussions of Jesus' doctrine of the kingdom bring in the way of exposition of the Old Testament basis for the later usage stands altogether too much under the spell of this vague theological terminology and represents but very seldom careful and independent examination of the Old Testament facts. That the deficiency of this treatment of the matter has been so long overlooked is due in part to the modern disposition to minimize our Lord's direct dependence on the canonical writings of the Old Testament and to magnify His indebtedness to the development of later Judaism as reflected in the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature. The author has some wholesome remarks on



this modern tendency and on the wrong perspective it may easily bring into our interpretation of New Testament teaching, especially that of Jesus. For, whether we assume an influence of Judaism upon the mind of Jesus or not, it after all remains undeniable that He and the New Testament writers in general recognized only the canonical books as Scripture, and meant to be in absolute harmony with their ideas, an attitude which must have differed in their own consciousness from the attitude assumed toward the extra-canonical literature of Judaism. Looking at it from a purely human standpoint, it is difficult to see why such an original mind as that of Jesus should not have been able deliberately to detach itself from the current Jewish beliefs and to work its way back to the as yet un-Judaized world of thought of the Old Testament.

Before entering upon the discussion proper the author gives carefully prepared statistical tables, in which the Old Testament vocabulary of all words expressing kingship or rule is exhibited not merely as predicated of God but also of man. The discussion itself is divided into three parts: From the earliest time until David—From David until Deutero-Isaiah—From Deutero-Isaiah until Daniel. In the first part the author sets forth how *Melekh* was originally a common-Semitic designation of the deity, shared in by the Israelites, who used it with application to Jahve both as a proper name and with appellative force. Even in this common-Semitic form the word emphasized historical origin of the relation of authority of the deity over its subjects, in distinction from *Ab* which represented this same relation as one existing by nature. God is king in so far as He has by some specific act seized the government. This is important because it offers the first point of contact for the later idea that the kingdom of God is the result of divine acts in the sphere of history, an idea on which ultimately the whole eschatological and soteriological usage of the conception is seen to rest. Among the other Semites this *Melekh* assumed more and more the character of a violent, cruel, bloodthirsty deity. The author thinks that in the time of Samuel and David, as a result of the strengthening of the Jahve religion, a reaction took place against the use of *Melekh* in proper names, because it was felt that Jahve could not in justice to his character be identified in name with this Semitic *Melekh*-deity. He tries to prove this from the disappearance of the names compounded with *Melekh* and the substitution of names compounded with Jahve and El in the later period. But it will occur at once that it was precisely Samuel who deprecated the institution of the human kingdom on the ground that the spirit in which it was desired encroached upon the kingship of God. Therefore, to Samuel and his followers Jahve was preëminently *Melekh*. The author endeavors to remove this contradiction by sharply distinguishing here between *Melekh* as appellative and *Melekh* as proper name for the deity. The former Samuel favored, the latter he disapproved of. We might reason, however, that on this view of the matter the proper course for the strict Jahvists would have been, not to discard the *Melekh* designation altogether, but to emphasize its appellative signification, and to continue the use of it as such in proper names, all the more since an urgent reason existed for upholding Jahve's kingship. We are not convinced that the few scattering data which can be gathered in this matter of theophoric names warrant any such definite conclusion as the author would draw. The relative increase of names with Jahve and El and the consequent decrease of names with *Melekh*, if an actual fact, may have simply been the result of the greater popularity of the Jahve-name from this time onward, and does not in itself compel us to assume that there was any conscious reaction against the title of *Melekh* as applied to Jahve. When the author further argues that the institution of the human kingdom of itself

must have had the effect of bringing the conception of Jahve as king into disuse, because the divine and the human kingships could not be harmonized, this seems to us again an illogical mode of reasoning. The protest against the kingdom of Saul ought to have had precisely the opposite result, that of emphatic insistence, by means of proper names and otherwise, upon Jahve's exclusive right to be considered the true king of Israel. And if, on the one hand, the conflict between Saul's kingdom and the prophetic representatives of Jahvism forced Jahve's kingship into the background, why should not, on the other hand, the harmony between these two forces, which was effected in the kingdom of David, have had the opposite result of bringing Jahve's kingship once more into prominence? The writer gives us the impression on pp. 49, 50, that this is actually his opinion: "Henceforth Jahve's kingship and that of David hang so closely together as to become occasionally more or less interchangeable conceptions." "Since the time of David the kingship of Jahve was no longer a mere idea, it had become a powerful reality." We are scarcely prepared after this for the remarkable statement on the same page, that "the *Melekh*-name of Jahve had to disappear as soon as the conflict which arose from the introduction of the human kingdom had come to an end through the reign of David," and that "the king in Israel could be called *Melekh* only, if Jahve was deprived of this title." It is certainly impossible to believe that, while Jahve and David shared the *substance* of kingship, the *name* was exclusively given to David and denied to Jahve. This same premise of the mutual exclusiveness of the human kingship and the denomination of Jahve as king also seriously affects the whole subsequent discussion of the period from David to Deutero-Isaiah. First of all, when God appears in the prophets as king, even in those prophets who predict a Messianic king in the future, the author is bound by his premise to look for a special reason why the prophets should have revived this *Melekh*-title, and he finds it in the prophetic conception of Jahve as a stern judge, and even suggests that this prophetic use attached itself formally to the pagan conception of the *Melekh*-deity as a destructive power. He finds it significant that the prophets began to do this since the time of Ahaz—*i. e.*, since the time when the worship of the pagan *Melekh* began to be introduced among Israel. Must we believe that the prophets under such circumstances made the innovation of calling Jahve *Melekh*—to be sure in Boehmer's view with a certain contrast to the pagan deity, Jahve being "the *true* destroyer," but after all with the contrast merely implied and not explicitly formulated? It seems to us that ordinary caution will have prevented the prophets from favoring in this way a religious syncretism which had just then assumed a new threatening form. And there is no reason whatever to ascribe to the prophets such an intention. If the *Melekh*-title had continued to belong to Jahve notwithstanding the human kingdom, the prophets could freely make use of it without being misunderstood. Even so it lent itself admirably to their message of judgment, although in our opinion the author too exclusively emphasizes this feature. In Isaiah xxxiii. 22, the kingship of Jahve is explicitly associated with his saving character, but unfortunately here the writer's critical view about the late origin of the prophecy prevents him from making it a corrective for his one-sided interpretation of the other passages. The close connection between the names Jahve Sebaoth and the *Melekh*-title in Isaiah alone proves that *Melekh* must express in a comprehensive way the supreme majesty and glory of Jahve. He is the King with the innumerable hosts of angels as his retinue; the title cannot, therefore, be restricted to his function as a judge of Israel. What is said about the individual prophets contains many valuable suggestions, *e. g.*, that in Hosea there was less room for the development of this attribute of Jahve, because

this prophet depicts the relation between God and Israel under the mystical figure of marriage. Of the greatest importance and most permanent value in this middle chapter of the book we consider the discussion of the features which the human kingdom bore to Israel and the manner in which this influenced the idea of Jahve's kingship. True, the material for this is drawn partly from "the sources J E in the Pentateuch" as documents of the prophetic period. But this need not hinder us from profiting by the lucid manner in which the author here groups a wealth of material derived from observation of the common popular attitude toward the king and therefore easily overlooked, thus giving us a more concrete knowledge of what a king meant for Israel and what was meant when this title was attributed to God. Our modern usage, as it makes us think of the king almost exclusively under the aspect of a constitutional ruler and executive of the law, more or less obscures the fact that to Israel the kingship was "a source of happiness, a fountain of blessing, a retreat for salvation." The kingship was a democratic institution. The king naturally took the part of the poor and oppressed, not of the powerful and violent; the king existed for the sake of Israel, not the reverse. It need not be pointed out how extremely important this fact is for a correct appreciation of the idea in our Lord's teaching. The fulness of soteriological import which it there possesses is thus naturally explained, and it will be neither necessary to say, with Johannes Weiss and other modern writers, that the kingdom-idea represents the perishable element in Jesus' teaching in contrast with the fatherhood-idea which is of everlasting significance, nor necessary with the Ritschlians to over-ethicize the kingdom-conception so as to empty it of all its soteriological and eschatological content.

In the period beginning with Deutero-Isaiah and closing with Daniel the author again tries to carry through his favorite idea that Jahve for a thorough recognition of his kingship was dependent on the disappearance of the human king. Even discounting the question of the genuineness of the second part of Isaiah, and assuming for a moment that this prophecy dates from or at least moves in the exilic kingless period, we need not on that account hold that, where it emphasizes Jahve's kingship, this is done because the kingship had come to an end, and because the prophet did not expect its future restoration as an instrument for the rule of Jahve. All that can be said on this theory is that, while the instrument for the present was wanting, the prophet naturally emphasizes the source of the salvation expected and so speaks of the kingship of Jahve absolutely without reflection upon its concrete realization. That an exclusion of the latter in the form of the Davidic kingship cannot be intended is proven by Isaiah lii. 12, "the sure mercies of David." For we cannot see our way clear to accepting the author's exegesis of this phrase. Boehmer thinks that here the promises once given to David are now transferred to the people; the people themselves became the true house of David. But on this view the qualification of these mercies as "sure" would sound almost ironical; if their "sureness" in David's case did not exclude their abrogation, so far as his family was concerned, then the people could not have felt much confidence in their own permanent retention of them, on which nevertheless the prophet throws great emphasis by calling them "sure." Other prophecies, which in their present connection show us the idea of Jahve's future kingship side by side with the expectation of a Davidic king, are brought down by the author to the post-exilic king and quoted for the same purpose, viz., to make out a later doctrine of Jahve's kingship independent of the Messiah's kingship and virtually excluding the latter, *e. g.*, Micah iv. 6, 7. Those who hold to the genuineness of these prophecies will have little use for this part of the



discussion. On the other hand this very part of the book has great value, because it so convincingly shows how in many prophecies and Psalms the term king is eschatologically applied to God, and that in the specific sense not of Ruler but of Saviour. Such passages as Isaiah xliii. 15, "I am Jehovah, your Holy One, the Creator of Israel, your King," and lii. 7, "Thy God becomes King," are conclusive in this respect. Still the author seems to us to press this eschatological meaning too much, when he thinks of it primarily or exclusively in Ps. xxix, cxlv, ciii. The "My king and my God" of Ps. v. 3, shows that even in a context which Boehmer interprets eschatologically the present kingship of God is a living reality to the Psalmist's mind.

From p. 175 onward the author discusses the revival of the conception of the Davidic king in "the post-exilic" period. What is here said corrects to a large extent the one-sided impression produced in the preceding pages concerning the Jahve-king of "Deutero-Isaiah" and many of the Psalms, as entirely detachable from and actually detached from the Messianic king. Nevertheless, the circles in which this revival of the Messianic hope took place are characterized even here as circles to which the preaching of Deutero-Isaiah had not penetrated or by which it had not been accepted. Besides Isaiah xxxiii, already referred to, such important pieces as Isaiah xi. 10-16, and Ps. ii, xviii (in its present form), xx, xlv, lxi, lxxii, lxxxix, cx, cxxxii are brought down to this period, as is also the song of Hanna, 1 Sam. ii. 1-6, with its reference to "the anointed of Jahve." Haggai and Zechariah are assumed to have connected Messianic expectations with the person of Zerubbabel. The writer places a more or less depreciating estimate upon this whole post-exilic development; it did not rise to the former height of the prophetic preaching. And still more disapprovingly does he express himself with regard to those pieces, Messianic or non-Messianic, in which the kingship of Jahve is associated with the subjugation of the Gentiles rather than with the salvation of Israel. In this he finds the remnant of the old-Semitic *Melekh*-conception come to new power. Strangely enough that beautiful passage, Ex. xix, 3-8, once regarded as the *sedes* for the most ancient Mosaic conception of the kingdom of God, is treated by the author as belonging to this development and is the first to fall under his condemnation. "A kingdom of priests" and "a holy nation" are made to mean, that in the future Israel will be to the Gentiles as priests are to their slaves; the Gentiles will have to toil and do service for their lords, who will receive from Jahve all the wealth of the nations for exclusive enjoyment. Truly, if this were the correct exegesis of the passage, and if the passage were actually post-exilic, we should have to exclaim with the author that this is indeed "a fall from the height of the prophetic religion." After all, however, the main reason for finding this thought in it is its unwarranted association with the prophecies in the second part of the "Deutero-Isaiah," from whose highly figurative language the same literal interpretation of a mere physical and political rule of Israel over the Gentiles is extracted. Instead of distributing these several representations of Jahve's kingship over the earlier and later periods, and making them contradictory one to the other in religious spirit and ethical tendency, it seems to us much more satisfactory and much more in keeping with the dignity of divine revelation to make them descriptive of various aspects of the same fundamental idea, intended to supplement and interpret one another. This can be easily done if only the critical hypothesis, which brings down so many of the strongest most politically-coloured Messianic prophecies to the post-exilic age and finds in them the spirit of the later Judaism, be abandoned. Kept in their proper setting as the work of the earlier prophets, they lose their one-sidedness and offensiveness. And, perhaps we may say, that on this view, the relative



absence of a pronounced Messianic prophecy in the personal sense from the later prophets was a divine safeguard against the Jewish tendency toward political self-exaltation. The prominence of the idea of the kingship of Jahve himself in the later prophecy, which, while not contradicting or excluding the earlier Messianic hope, yet keeps it more or less in the background, would thus be naturally explained. Did not our Lord Himself find it necessary, from a similar motive, to throw during the larger part of His public teaching nearly all the emphasis upon the idea of the kingdom of *God*, so as to hold the idea of His own Messianic kingship in reserve, until the time when, the conception of the kingdom having been fully set forth in its spiritual import and carefully guarded against all political misconceptions, the idea of the Messiahship could be safely brought forward and placed in the light of the regenerated kingdom-idea? Is it not possible to believe that this method was anticipated in the development of Old Testament prophecy?

Even more severe is the author's judgment on the Book of Daniel as representing the last offshoot of the Old Testament development of the idea of the divine kingship. Here also the idea in his opinion has not only political import, but, besides that, a political import devoid of all deeper ethical and religious value. Jahve's kingship here is identified with the world-supremacy, first given to the pagan powers, ultimately destined for Israel. The only ideal reason why the former cannot retain it and the latter must receive it lies in that with Israel alone is the knowledge of the true God, and in this Boehmer thinks to discover the influence of Hellenism. The great missionary thought which "Deutero-Isaiah" had connected with the conception is entirely lost sight of. One cannot help asking, if this be a correct appreciation of the spirit of Daniel, how it came about that of all Old Testament books, this book most strongly influenced our Lord in His teaching both with reference to the kingdom and with reference to His Messiahship. If the title "Son of man" with all the richness of its religious and ethical content was drawn from this source, then obviously Jesus must have held an infinitely higher opinion about the spiritual character of the book. And is it not true that the figure "like unto a Son of man," in contrast with the beasts representing the world-kingsdoms, points to a deep ethical interpretation of the nature and end of that rule which is to come to Israel? To many, we have no doubt, the opinion of Jesus in a matter of this kind will seem irrelevant; we on our part do not hesitate to pronounce it decisive. In conclusion we call attention to the interesting view worked out in the author's treatise on Daniel, and here repeated, that the mysterious figure appearing in chaps. viii. 15; x. 5, and xii. 6, is identical with the Son-of-man figure in chap. vii. This is important, because, if correct, it ascribes to the Messiah historic activity on behalf of Israel before His coming with the clouds of heaven, and therefore involves His preëxistence.

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

DIE BÜCHER EZRA UND NEHEMIA. Untersuchung ihres litterarischen und geschichtlichen Charakters. By Dr. CARL HOLZHEY. Munich: J. J. Leutner, 1902. Pp. 68. In the series of "Studien zur alttestamentlichen Einleitung und Geschichte."

This brief monograph is comprehensive in its scope, but necessarily summary in its treatment of the individual topics. It attempts rather to represent the whole post-exilic period, and the literary record of that period, from a new point of view, than to argue out each debatable point. The permanent contribution of this booklet to the large and rapidly growing litera-

ture of post-exilic criticism, is the fresh emphasis its author lays upon the *conflict* between the returned exiles and "the people of the land" (Samaritans, etc.), both as a historical fact and as a literary "tendency." Here in the one Persian province, side by side, dwelt a company of returned Jewish exiles and a mixed population that those Jews had turned into bitterest enemies by their exclusiveness. Whichever of these parties a modern critic may find himself siding with, he must acknowledge, when confronted with this situation, that the enmity so engendered was sure to be a factor of prime importance in the progress of the Restoration, and also in the recording of its history by its chronicler. An immediate benefit resulting from the adoption of this as the author's supreme motive, is his final justification thereby from the charge of ignorance or knavery in putting the contents of chapter iv, verses 6-23, where they stand. Hitherto criticism has been giving us our choice between these alternatives in our judgment of the mental and moral characteristics of the writer of Ezra: either because he was hazy in his chronology or because, though knowing better, he had reasons for misrepresenting the true order of events, he placed these facts of *Xerxes'* and *Artaxerxes'* reigns concerning the building of the *city walls* right in the midst of the facts of *Darius'* reign concerning the erection of the *temple*. Some writers have been in the habit of escaping the consequences of this alternative by renaming Cambyses and Pseudo-Smerdis, and by interpreting *walls* as meaning *temple*,—surely a most hazardous proceeding. But the older view of Keil and Bertheau, so summarily dismissed by later writers (for example, by Driver in his Introduction), is after all, it seems, the true view. The exaltation of the *anti-foreign "tendency"* of the author of Ezra to a supreme place is going to make it possible for critics of all shades of prepossession to return to this view. When the author once launched on this topic of primary interest to himself and his Jewish audience—the relation of the anti-Jewish party in Palestine to the great events of the Restoration—he continued on to the point where he could introduce *documentary evidence* of their bitter hostility, and of the causal connection between that hostility and the long delay in the consummation of the Restoration. Other steps, which it was confidently predicted must be taken by criticism when once it grants the genuineness of the Aramaic documents of Ezra, have been taken by Holzhey, and by other very recent writers, as Johannes Nikel. While Geissler has been proving for us that the memoirs of Ezra are authentic, Nikel, Holzhey and others have been vindicating for us the trustworthiness of the edict of Cyrus in chapter i, and of much else that critics rejected five years ago. It is refreshing to see these saner views coming to prevail concerning the work of "the Chronicler."

Princeton.

JAMES OSCAR BOYD.

THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS. By J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D., Canon of Westminster and Chaplain in Ordinary to the King. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. 16mo, pp. xii, 161. Price, 2s. 6d., net.

Dr. Robinson's Study of the Gospels belongs to an interesting series of Handbooks for the Clergy, edited by Arthur W. Robinson, B.D. The editor has chosen his subjects and writers with the view of presenting "in a clear and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard both to aims and methods, as experience may have shown to be valuable." The reader who takes in hand this number of the series cannot fail to be impressed by the charming way in which Dr. Robinson has fulfilled his task. The subject

falls within the province defined by the editor as that of methods, and the eminently practical end to be subserved Dr. Robinson has met by a happy union of process and result. The publishers have added their part in rendering the book attractive, with tasteful binding, a page pleasing and free from typographical defects.

The book is divided into six chapters, treating of The Origin, Date and Authorship of the Synoptic Gospels, The Use of St. Mark's Gospel by St. Matthew and St. Luke, The Great Sermon in St. Matthew and St. Luke, The Use of the Non-Markan Document by St. Matthew and St. Luke, The Contrast Between the Synoptic Narratives and St. John's Gospel, and Considerations Bearing on the Authorship of the Fourth Gospel. At the close of chapter ii notes have been added on a further Comparison Between St. Mark and His Successors, and On the "Title Son of Man"; after chapter iv also A Comment on Matt. xi. 25-30, and after chapter vi On Some Books of Reference and Methods of Study.

From this review of the contents it will be seen that the discussion moves in the sphere of the higher criticism of the Gospels. Three principal themes emerge: the origin, date and authorship of our four Gospels, the Synoptic problem and the Johannine problem. For reasons arising from the nature of our Gospels, Dr. Robinson has followed the usual method of treating the question of the origin, date and authorship of the Synoptic Gospels first, thus bringing it into close connection with his discussion of the Synoptic problem. After a few introductory remarks on the origin of the New Testament Canon, Dr. Robinson begins with the third Gospel, finding evidence in Acts that its author was a companion of Paul. This companion Dr. Robinson does not hesitate to identify with St. Luke, who is also the author of the Gospel, since both books come from the same hand. He accepts also the view maintained by Prof. Ramsay, and urged with convincing force by Dr. T. Zahn, that the third Gospel and Acts constitute but the first and second books of a larger historical treatise planned by Luke, but so far as we know never completed (St. Paul the Traveler, p. 27, *Einleitung*, II, 370 f.). The *κατά* in the titles of our Gospels is correctly interpreted as expressing the Church's opinion regarding direct authorship, having been added as early as the first collection of the Gospels into the Canon. For Luke a date after 70 is favored.

Dr. Robinson's theory of the relation of Matthew and Luke to Mark aids him in fixing the date of the second Gospel. Mark must have written before Matthew and Luke, "probably before the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70." In confirmation of the view that Mark was the author appeal is made to tradition, according to which John Mark in dependence on Peter composed the Gospel for Roman readers. A part of this tradition is very early, coming from the presbyter in Asia Minor, from whom Papias, writing in the first quarter of the second century, received it. The testimony of this early presbyter, whom some scholars identify with the apostle John, indicates that Mark's Gospel was subjected to two criticisms in Asia Minor, its lack of order and its incompleteness. We cannot now tell what standard underlay these judgments, but the textual history of our second Gospel reveals the fact that in its earliest transmitted form the Gospel ends abruptly with the words (xvi. 8) *ἐφοβήντο γάρ*. Of the two endings which were supplied to complete the Gospel, a longer one of twelve verses must have arisen very early in Asia Minor, for we find it cited as part of the Gospel by Irenæus (c. haer. III, 10, 6), while in an Armenian manuscript of the year 986, Mr. Conybeare has found this ending with the superscription "of the presbyter Ariston" (Expositor, IV, VIII, p. 241 ff.). A shorter ending of two verses seems to have arisen at a later time in a region where the



longer ending was not current. Various theories are urged to explain these facts. Mr. Conybeare suggests Ariston, a presbyter mentioned by Papias, as the author of the longer ending. Dr. Rhorbach (*Der Schluss des Markusevangeliums*) and Dr. Harnack (*Die Chronologie*, I, 696; cf. Zahn, *Einleitung*, II, 237 f.) accept this suggestion, but go further and deny the originality of the earliest transmitted text. They maintain that the Gospel was originally complete, but that the ending, as it came from the hands of Mark, was intentionally removed and the longer ending substituted for it. Dr. Robinson agrees with Dr. Rhorbach and Dr. Harnack in holding that our Gospel once existed in a complete form, but thinks that the original ending has been lost, because Mark was little appreciated in the early Church, was copied infrequently, and, in fact, came near to being entirely lost. The textual history of the Gospel shows that but one copy was left in circulation, from which the last codex-leaf had been lost, and from this copy, thus mutilated through neglect, our earliest transmitted text is descended (pp. 5, 67). The evidence adduced by Dr. Rhorbach for the intentional mutilation of Mark does not seem to me conclusive, while Dr. Robinson's view rests on the hypothesis that Mark's Gospel once existed in a more original form than the earliest transmitted form. On this hypothesis, the view suggested would explain the facts, or we might prefer the simpler theory that the last leaf of the autograph was lost before any copies were made. There is still another view, however, which seems to me to follow the external evidence more closely. We may hold that the earliest transmitted text truly represents the original text, and account for the incomplete form as due to the death of Mark or to some interruption of his literary labors which rendered the completion of his Gospel impossible.

The tradition which assigns our first Gospel to the apostle Matthew is early and strong, the opinion of the Church being indicated by the title, while the testimony of Papias is explicit that Matthew wrote the oracles of the Lord in the Hebrew language. In the fragment as preserved by Eusebius Papias, it is true, does not say that he received his information about Matthew from the presbyter. The indications, however, that he is describing conditions which existed in the past but no longer obtained when he wrote (*ἡρροσηυε. ἦν*) make it probable that he is repeating the tradition of an earlier time. The reference to the Hebrew or Aramaic original of Matthew has been the source of much discussion, it being difficult to determine the relation of our Greek Matthew to the Aramaic Gospel. Dr. Robinson holds that the internal phenomena of Matthew's Gospel do not confirm this tradition, and would, therefore, leave the question regarding the author of our first Gospel open. He thinks, however, that the tradition of the Church may be accounted for on the supposition that the author of our first Gospel made use of a non-Marcan Greek document, which conceivably was written in Aramaic, and if so its authorship might be assigned to the apostle Matthew (p. 18, note). Moreover, Dr. Robinson is persuaded that Matthew's Gospel must be regarded as a whole. He cannot, therefore, accept Dr. Harnack's view of "certain later additions," and consequently is forced to leave the question of its date also undecided.

The Synoptic problem is primarily a literary problem, though it has other important aspects. The literary phenomena of our first three Gospels are such that in order to give any explanation of their origin and relation some theory of dependence must be posited. Opinions have varied with the differing conceptions of the nature of this dependence. Dr. Robinson seeks the solution of the Synoptic problem by means of the two-document hypothesis. Matthew and Luke used the Gospel of Mark and a non-Marcan



Greek document, which though lost may be reconstructed from Matthew and Luke, the latter having preserved its contents and order better than the former (p. 87). One of the difficulties with this theory will be felt, I think, in finding an adequate reason for every departure in Matthew and Luke from Mark; and in case Matthew and Luke differ in their use of this common non-Marcan document, we are under the necessity of determining which has more accurately reproduced the common source or whether both have departed from it, and if so, to what extent and for what reasons. And, finally, there is the difficulty suggested by the prologue of Luke's Gospel. With true historical sense Luke prefixes to his historical treatise a brief account of his sources and method. From this we learn that he had knowledge of written sources, but the form or standard of his own work was the oral tradition of the eye-witnesses and ministers of the word. Dr. Zahn is correct, I think, in maintaining that Luke's account excludes the knowledge of any Gospel narrative written by an apostle or eye-witness, and therefore would exclude the non-Marcan document of Dr. Robinson if his view of the apostle Matthew's relation to it be thought probable. The description would not necessarily exclude knowledge of Mark (*Eileitung*, II. 361).

Dr. Robinson's treatment of the Johannine problem is straightforward, stating with conciseness and clearness the difficulties involved, and correctly indicating the point of view from which they are to be treated. After mentioning the date allowed by Dr. Harnack, "not after 110 and not before 80," Dr. Robinson says: "Most of us will be satisfied to accept the earlier date which this scholar allows us, and to retain the unbroken tradition of its apostolic authorship." The problem raised by the Gospel of John is primarily an historical one and emerges when we compare its representation of Christ's ministry and teaching with that given in the Synoptic Gospels. In regard to the length and local centre of the ministry a careful study of John and the Synoptic Gospels will show that the two narratives supplement each other. The statement on page 138 that "there is nothing in the Synoptic Gospels which directly contradicts this view" of a one-year ministry might be modified by calling attention to the lapse of time required by the changing seasons. Mark ii. 23 and parallels, when compared with Mark vi. 39 and parallels, indicate the lapse of about a year. Since it is impossible to bring the remaining events in Mark within the short time between early spring and passover, we are forced to allow more than one year for the ministry of Jesus on the evidence furnished by the Synoptic Gospels alone. The fact that John was written later than the Synoptic Gospels makes possible, while the indications within the fourth Gospel necessitate, the conclusion that John's Gospel presupposes the Synoptic Gospels. Eusebius saw this and pointed out one of the passages (John iii. 21) which most clearly imply such a relation (*H. E.*, III. 24, 11). We shall rightly understand the fourth Gospel only when we appreciate the fact that it presupposes knowledge of the Synoptic Gospels and sustains a supplementary relation to them. Dr. Robinson recognizes this and cites Dr. Westcott in support of its complementary character (p. 132). On the basis of the evidence which can be adduced in favor of this view, it might be possible to go a step further and say that the fourth Gospel presupposes knowledge of an evangelical tradition even wider than that given in the Synoptic Gospels, for the "unknown Nathanael" is introduced quite as suddenly as John the Baptist. The speeches in the fourth Gospel furnish a more serious difficulty; but in regard to them also Dr. Robinson finds that the evidence for a gradual development in the revelation by Jesus of his Messiahship to others, as traced especially in the Gospel of Mark, does not exclude the account given by John.

It is held that the conversations of Jesus would be affected by the personality of their recorder (p. 149), that Christ is no longer known "after the flesh," reminding us of Clement's designation of the Synoptic Gospels as records of the *σωματικά* of Christ's life, John composing a *πνευματικὸν εὐαγγέλιον* (Euseb., H. E., VI, 147). "The record moves not on the lines of the ordinary succession of events so much as on the pathway of ideas" (p. 154), reminding us of Prof. Schmiedel's conception of the Gospel as "ideal history."

Dr. Robinson emphasizes frequently the relation of historical criticism to the content or essence of Christian faith—in regard to the date of our Gospels (pp. 10, 22), the Synoptic problem (p. 84), the difficulties which the original source has undergone at the hands of the evangelists (p. 101), the truth of history or its meaning as distinguished from history in the lower sense of a contemporary narrative (p. 149). These distinctions doubtless have their value, but ultimately the truth of faith cannot differ from the truth of knowledge; and if historical criticism be a valid method and yield valid results, these must be taken up into our Christian faith and made a consistent part of the larger whole.

*Princeton.*

W. P. ARMSTRONG.

BIBLE STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST. Historical and Constructive.

By Rev. HENRY T. SELL, D.D. New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 16mo. Pp. 160. Price, 50 cents.

This little book covers in outline the Life of Christ as we find it recorded in our four Gospels. The author's purpose and the narrow limits within which he has crowded his material make it impossible for him to offer more than the barest results. The method also, which is, perhaps, more constructive than historical in our modern understanding of the latter word, will commend the book to intermediate Bible classes, where any attempt to face the problems raised by historical criticism would merely introduce confusion. We miss also any attempt adequately to grasp the full significance of such events as the baptism of Jesus or the temptation in their relation to His Messianic consciousness, or any attempt to trace the interaction of event and teaching in the light this throws on the progress and issues of Christ's ministry, the wider view and deeper historical insight which construe events and interpret personality under the aspect of their causal relations, and thus seek to bring the past before us in its living reality.

*Princeton.*

W. P. ARMSTRONG.

### III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DIE LUTHERISCHE KIRCHE DER WELT. Von Prof. Dr. Theol. JOHANNES NICOLAUS LENKER, Prof. der Kirchengeschichte an dem evangelisch-lutherischen Seminar, Blair, Nebraska. Band I. Europa ausser Deutschland. Sunbury, Pa., 1901. 8vo, pp. 544.

This is a most interesting book, not for Lutherans only but for all Protestants. Prof. Lenker has been at great pains in gathering the information it contains. Two journeys to Europe, the study of a large number of sources and the assistance of fourteen collaborators were necessary to give it to us. When, to this first volume, shall be added the proposed volumes on the Lutheran Church in North and South America and the church in Germany, the Lutheran communion will be in possession of a body of information

concerning the history of its extension throughout the world and the present state of its several churches of inestimable value. The publication of this volume might well provoke the Alliance of the Reformed Churches to the initiation of a similar work.

Prof. Lenker is an enthusiastic Lutheran, and of course there is no fault to be found with that. He is anxious, as he ought to be, to deepen in his own people the conviction that Lutheranism is the very best type of Protestantism, to awaken in its several churches mutual sympathy, more particularly to strengthen belief in the mission of Lutheranism to English-speaking people, and to promote beneficence in behalf of the new Lutheran churches as they are organized. The volume opens with an interesting paper on the extension of Lutheranism in Europe by means of the Reformation, in Asia and Africa by foreign missions, and in North and South America by emigration. And then follows an account of the communion in each European country except the German Empire, beginning with Denmark and closing with Italy. In each account, after a longer or shorter historical sketch, the condition of the church is presented under the titles, Parochial Conditions, Education, Charity, Home Missions, Missions to Lutherans Abroad, Foreign Missions, Missions to Jews and Religious Literature. Statistics are given in detail and appear to have been carefully chosen and fairly marshaled. A member of another communion must be narrow indeed if he can look through these chapters without thanking God for the vitality of the Lutheran Church and praying for its extension. May its increasing numbers hold fast with the fathers to "the article of a standing or a falling church," and sing with deepened faith, "A firm tower is our God"!

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

HENRY MELCHIOR MUHLENBERG, PATRIARCH OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA. By the Rev. WILLIAM K. FRICK, D.D. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 18mo, pp. iv, 200.

Dr. Frick has given us an admirable biographical sketch of one of the great missionaries and denominational organizers of America. It is complete in itself and presents far more than a mere outline of Muhlenberg's fine career; but it should introduce many of its readers to the extended *Life and Times of Muhlenberg*, by Dr. William J. Mann. Dr. Frick distributes his material under the heads, I. In training, 1711-1742; II. Planting the Church, 1742-1748; III. The care of all the Churches, 1748-1776; IV. In retirement, 1776-1787.

The Lutheran churches of the United States were fortunate indeed in enjoying at a most critical period the leadership of a man of thorough university and theological training, filled with the spirit of the pietism of Spener and especially the missionary zeal of Halle, as well as with an ardent love of his own communion; a man, too, with a constitution of great vigor, with energy and bravery not to be daunted by the toils and harshness of frontier life, with wisdom adequate to deal successfully with adventurers in his own communion, and with all the charity for other churches that one can reasonably expect to find in the missionary of a religious communion who has been sent to labor in a new and unorganized society where several communions exist.

Dr. Frick in his account of the relations between Count Zinzendorf and Mr. Muhlenberg is needlessly harsh. He has gained nothing by calling Zinzendorf names in a little book which neither justifies them nor offers to the reader the help necessary to do so, supposing them to be capable of justification. To call Zinzendorf's conduct "double dealing," to describe his tem-

porary resignation of his title, "Bishop," as "ostentatious," and to assert that "with a great pretense of humility he intermeddled, etc.," is out of place in a volume like the one under notice, and does the author no credit. He must have known that Moravian writers put a very different interpretation on Zinzendorf's conduct. If he felt bound to employ violent epithets he should have defended them by an extended discussion and abundant references to authorities. We like much better the spirit of Prof. J. Taylor Hamilton's brief treatment of the subject in his history of the Moravians in the "American Church History Series."

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

STUDENTS' HISTORY OF THE GREEK CHURCH. By the Rev. A. H. HORE, M.A. Loudon: James Potter & Co.; New York: E. & J. B. Young, 1902. 12mo, pp. xxxii, 531.

This compendium has been written by an Anglican minister, who, like many of his brethren, feels keenly the ecclesiastical isolation of Anglicanism and desires greatly the recognition of its orders by the Greek Church. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether a majority of those Anglican ministers who are urgent in this matter want more than formal recognition. Actual union and coöperation they would much rather have with the Free churches of Great Britain, if only the latter would acknowledge their alleged "historic episcopate." Moreover, the sentiment of Pan-Anglo-Saxonism is strong in England, certainly among the people; and this sentiment, made stronger by a real apprehension of Pan-Slavism, is likely to forbid anything like active commerce between the two communions, even if Greek Christianity should acknowledge Anglican "orders," of which acknowledgment there appears at present no probability.

But the Anglican "priesthood," as we have said, is conscious of its isolation and on its own theory is really in a desperate situation. For, unless it can get recognition for them from those whom it is forced to acknowledge as in the line of the "Apostolic succession," Anglicanism cannot consistently regard its own prelates as bishops. Hence far from "fearing," it longs for "the Greeks bringing presents." This longing seems to have been the impulse which drove Mr. Hore to write his "Students' History." Certainly it pervades his book like a morbid diathesis; it appears as an acute inflammation whenever the Latin Church is dealt with, as in the discussion of the *filioque*, the case of Honorius, the Vatican Council and Rome's positive rejection of the claim that English "orders" are canonically "valid," and it shows itself also in an excessive charity of judgment whenever the conduct of the Greek Church, ancient or modern, is in question.

But the book itself is a good student's history. It covers the whole ground from the Nicene period to the current life of the modern Russian Church. It refers the reader directly to the sources. It is packed full of information. Its arrangement is excellent and it is written, as such a book should be, in a clear and unpretentious style.

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

#### IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

DE ZEKERHEID DES GELOOFS. Door Prof. Dr. H. BAVINCK. 8vo, pp. 78. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1901.

In this delightful booklet Dr. Bavinck gives us not so much a scientific investigation into the nature and sources of certitude in religion as a popu-



lar discussion of the whole matter of certitude with reference to Christianity. "Inquiry into the certainty of faith," he tells us, "is of importance not merely for scientific theology but also for practical religion. It concerns not only the theologian but equally the layman; it has a place not alone in the study but in the household sanctuary as well. It is a question not more of theory and the schools than eminently also of practice and life." The particular subject of investigation which he proposes to himself in this discussion is the determination of "where and how that divine authority is to be found which has the right to demand from us recognition and obedience" (p. 50). In the interests of orderly development, however, he prefixes to the answer offered to this main inquiry some account of "what is to be understood by this certainty of faith, and how it has been sought by various schools of thought" (p. 12).

The first part of the discourse is devoted therefore to defining the nature of the certitude of faith that is under discussion. Certitude, we are told, is the complete resting of the spirit in an object of knowledge. Even the Greeks recognized various varieties of it—distinguishing between the certitude produced by sense-perception and that produced by thought, and in the latter further between the immediate certainty we possess of the first principles of science and the mediate certainty we attain by reasoning and demonstration. Alongside of these universally recognized varieties must be placed, he urges, the further variety known as the certitude of faith,—which is not the result of either sense-perception or of scientific proof, but differs from all certainty so reached in two respects: it is objectively weaker, it is subjectively stronger. Objectively weaker, because it does not rest on grounds of common reason, valid for all, to which therefore compelling appeal may be made; but is the fruit of a faith, the possession of the individual alone. Subjectively stronger, because it is rooted in the very heart of man and is intertwined with all the fibres of his being, expressing not merely an intellectual judgment but a movement of the whole soul.

In the second part a rapid but illuminating survey is given of the history of certitude of faith in the church. Here come under review Rome's renunciation of all individual assurance of salvation; the recovery of it by the Reformers, and its gradual loss again in the seventeenth century; Pietistic legalism with its renewed renunciation of personal assurance; the different one-sided efforts of Moravians and Methodists to regain it; its virtual disappearance from modern Christendom. This section is notable for the genial and yet clear-sighted judgments it expresses. *Apropos* of the effort to attain a sense of safety through an ascetic life, which is represented as one side of the Romish development, for example, Protestants are sharply warned not to content themselves with the facile condemnation that it all is the result of a false principle,—the false principle of work-righteousness. This is true enough, Dr. Bavinck remarks, but it becomes Protestants to consider that Romish work-righteousness is at least preferable to that doctrine righteousness to which Protestants are prone: work-righteousness, usually at least, advantages somebody, while doctrine-righteousness produces no fruit but loveless pride.

Again nothing could be more just than the criticism passed upon the diverse attempts of the Moravians and Methodists to restore assurance to the Christian heart. "Both movements," we read, "have exerted a strong influence on the Christian life. They have aroused believers out of their self-engrossment and recalled them from their retirement to the conflict with the world. Home and foreign missions have been vigorously taken in hand under their direction. Sunday-schools and associations of all kinds and for all sorts of purposes have been established through their initiative.

Bible and tract distributions, evangelizing and philanthropic enterprises and numerous other Christian activities have been since their rise set on foot for the extension of God's Kingdom. The whole of Christendom has been aroused from its slumber and awakened to a new and energetic life." "Nevertheless," he adds, "both movements indubitably suffer from a great one-sidedness. Neither of them reckons sufficiently with the first article of our common, undoubted Christian faith, that God the Father Almighty is the Maker of heaven and earth. The earthly spheres of art and science, of literature and politics, of domestic and social economy are underestimated in value and significance by them, and are consequently not reformed and regenerated by the Christian principle. To 'rest in the wounds of Jesus' or 'to be converted and then go forth to convert others' seems to constitute the entire content of the Christian life. Sentimentality and unhealthy emotion seem often to mark the one, excitement and zeal without knowledge frequently to characterize the other movement. The intellect is repressed in the interests of the feelings and will, and the harmony of all the faculties and powers is destroyed. The liberty of the children of God, their dominion over the world, the thankful enjoyment of every good gift that comes down from the Father of lights, the faithful discharge of the earthly vocation,—the open eye, the wide outlook, the expanded heart—these things do not come to their rights. The Christian life stands here alongside of—sometimes above, in some instances even hostilely in opposition to—human life. Christianity is here not like the leaven that transfuses the whole lump and leavens it all" (pp. 45-46).

This wide-minded conception of the mission of Christianity in the world is, as it should be, characteristic of Dr. Bavinck's teaching as of that of the whole school to which he belongs. He has given beautiful expression to it in a separate tractate on *De Algemeene Genade*, published in 1844 and reviewed in this REVIEW for January, 1897 (viii, 155); and Dr. A. Knyper has sought to work it out in all its details in a long series of articles on Common Grace printed in *De Heraut* and just now being gathered into volume form. It is reverted to more than once in the present brochure, and especially most eloquently near its close, where the Pietist is blamed for withdrawing from the world and treating all earthly employment—even the care of husband, wife or family—as only so much time and effort withdrawn from "the one thing needful"; and the Christian is exhorted to remember that all things are his, because he is Christ's and Christ is God's, and to enter into his dominion as king of the whole earth,—loving the flowers that bloom at his feet and admiring the stars that shine above his head, not despising art, which is a noble gift from God, or sneering at science, which is a bequest from the Father of lights, but believing that every creature of God is good and is not to be rejected but received with thanksgiving. We miss in this only the explicit correlation of this noble and truly Reformed conception of the Christian's relation to the world with the organic character of the redemptive work and its eschatological outlook. For it is only as we realize that God is saving the world and not merely one individual here and there out of the world, that the profound significance of the earthly life to the Christian can be properly apprehended. And the deepest distinction between the attitude to the world alike of the Pietist, Moravian and Methodist and that of the Reformed Christian turns just on the fact that the point of view of the former is individualistic and atomistic and that of the latter is organic. Missing explicit reference to the organic character of the redemptive process, in the reformation of the world after the plan of God and its gradual transmutation into His Kingdom in which His will shall be done even as in heaven, the uninstructed reader may fail to catch the ground of the signifi-

cance to the Christian of the earthly life which is so eloquently described, and may even mentally pass the unintelligent criticism which is so often pressed against the Reformed conception, that with its doctrine of predestination it leaves the earthly life without significance—a criticism which obviously is without meaning save on the extremest individualistic presuppositions.

To the third part of the essay is committed the task of explaining how Christian certitude is to be attained. Here the stress of the exposition is thrown on the assumption that it is to be reached in neither of the two ways in which it is most commonly sought,—which may be called the apologetical and the experimental ways. Men cannot reach Christian certitude, we are told, as the result of a process of reasoning,—proving first of all on rational grounds that God exists and there is such a thing as the soul and it is immortal; and then that the apostles are trustworthy witnesses of truth, that the prophecies of Scripture were really spoken and its miracles really occurred, and that Jesus really lived and worked and taught as He is represented to have done; and the like. All such reasonings leave the truth of Christianity not yet raised above all doubt and cannot be said to supply ground for an absolute certitude. Neither can it be attained, however, by the method introduced by Schleiermacher, which throws men back for certitude on what each has individually experienced. The greater part of what enters into the Christian religion has not been and cannot be “experienced” by the individual Christian: it comes to him from without, and only as so coming to him works “experiences” in him,—and somewhat similar “experiences,” including the experience of passionate conviction, are wrought by the teachings of every religion. It is very easy to say with Zinzendorf, “My heart tells me it is true; it is true for me.” But what is there that the human heart may not, under appropriate circumstances, tell us is true? And how can a scientific certitude be attained along this pathway?

How then is certitude of faith to be attained? There remains nothing to be said except that it is the fruit of faith itself. Faith, it must be remembered, is a moral act and not merely an intellectual assent. It is the response of the whole being to its appropriate object: and when the soul of man thus goes out to and finds satisfaction in an object presented to it, it carries its assurance in the very act. How the believer comes to this act, he cannot himself explain. He only knows that an object is presented to him, to which his whole being goes out in loving trust. This is not to make faith the ground on which the truth rests, or the fountain from which the knowledge of it comes, but only the organ of the soul by which truth, which is in itself objective and rests on itself, is recognized. There is always a correlation between the object and the faculty by which it is laid hold of. The eye in perceiving the sun knows that the sun exists no less than that it perceives it. So the believer in receiving the truth knows that it is the truth that he receives. There is involved in this obviously also an assurance of salvation. Here, too, it is with faith as with knowledge. It belongs to knowledge to be assured not only of its object but also of itself. When we know something, we know along with this that we know it. Real, true knowledge excludes all doubt of itself; not by a logical process but directly and immediately. “So it is also with faith. The faith that really deserves the name brings its own assurance with it. When we from the heart believe the promises of God revealed in the gospel, say, for example, the forgiveness of sins, we believe at the same time that we are ourselves personally by grace sharers in the blessing of forgiveness; the former is impossible without the latter. Certitude as to the truth of the gospel is never to be attained except along the path of personal, saving faith. And just like knowledge, faith does



not come to certitude regarding itself by logical reasoning, by making itself the object of investigation and meditating on its own nature: the 'criticism of pure reason' is seldom useful for establishing our certitude. But certitude flows to us immediately and directly out of faith itself; certitude is an essential quality of faith, it is inseparable from it and belongs to our nature." The practical rule for acquiring certitude of faith is, then, to keep our thought on the object of faith. It is this object that works through faith on our nature and produces certitude. "Let the plant of faith then only root itself in the soil of the promises of God and it will of itself bear the fruit of certitude. And the deeper and faster its roots are buried in the soil, the more strongly will it shoot up, the higher will it grow and the richer will be the fruitage."

We are not sure we have done full justice to Dr. Bavinck in this transcript of his exposition. We are sure the practical advice he gives is sound: it is the object of faith that is the main thing, not the faith itself; and it is on that object that we must keep the eyes of our heart set would we grow in strength of faith and in the joy that comes of believing. But we are not at all sure we have fully apprehended his analysis of the rise of certitude in the soul. Indeed we must confess to a certain confusion of mind as to the exact sense in which the word certitude is to be taken here and there. If we understand Dr. Bavinck, he considers that the two things most commonly connoted by the term go always together: that "certitude of the truth of the Christian religion" and "assurance of faith" imply one another, and neither is ever present without the other—both being the fruit indeed of one single act of faith. This is itself a debatable point: and in any case it will conduce to clearness if we endeavor to keep separate the two, certainly very separable, inquiries of how men can reach certainty as to the truth of the Christian religion and how they can reach assurance as to their own participation in the benefits secured by the work of Christ. For ourselves, we confess we can conceive of no act of faith of any kind which is not grounded in evidence: faith is a specific form of persuasion or conviction, and all persuasion or conviction is grounded in evidence. And it does not seem obvious on the face of it that the evidence adapted to ground the conviction that the Christian religion is true, and the evidence adapted to ground the conviction that I am myself in Christ Jesus, need be the same: so that the resulting acts of faith must necessarily occur together or even coalesce. It is quite legitimate, of course, to endeavor to point out that there is nevertheless a point in which the two do coalesce: to urge, for instance, that certitude of the truth of Christianity involves, if it does not consist in, assurance that God is in Christ reconciling the world with Himself; and that likewise assurance that I am in Christ is at bottom nothing other than the conviction that God is in Christ reconciling the world with Himself, given a personal form: so that it is only by the direct act of faith laying hold of Jesus as redeemer that we may attain either conviction of the truth of the Christian religion or the assurance of salvation. We have no wish to minimize the value of this suggestion—which, if we understand him, expresses more or less crudely Dr. Bavinck's position. But it seems to involve certain assumptions that stand in some need of explication.

For one thing, the assumption that the direct act of saving faith underlies and is the necessary prerequisite of certitude of the truth of the Christian religion appears to reverse the natural order. On the face of it, conviction of the truth of the Christian religion would appear to be the logical *prius* of self-commitment to the Founder of that religion—who is also its Heart—as the redeemer of my soul. So to hold would not necessarily be to say that a man must be a learned apologist before he can become a Christian,



and entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven can be had only through the lofty gateway of Science. There are other evidences of the truth of the Christian religion besides the philosophical and historical ones; and the appeal to faith may not be an appeal to an unjustified and therefore irrational faith, because it does not require the marshaling of all the evidence by which it may be supported before it is obeyed. We do not believe in the existence of the sun without evidence because we are not learned in astronomical science. My conviction that the handwriting that lies before me is that of my near friend is not a groundless conviction, because I am not capable of analyzing the nature of the evidence on which it is founded, and the conviction may seem to me therefore to be direct and without mediation through "reasons." Our believing response to the appeal of the gospel may similarly not be ungrounded in sufficient evidence of the truth of the Christian religion merely because the evidence on which it is grounded is not all the evidence which might be adduced and works its effect of conviction in our hearts by so direct and subtle an operation that we do not stop, perhaps cannot skill, to analyze it. Surely we believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in Him, not though it be irrational.

It is a natural result of the view we are discussing to make little of "the evidences." It is therefore characteristic of the school of thought of which Dr. Bavinck is a shining ornament to estimate the value of Apologetics somewhat lightly. This is apparent in this essay also, although Dr. Bavinck is careful in it to point out the esteem in which he holds it and the high estimate he puts upon it. The Prophets, the Apostles, Jesus Himself, he tells us, used the method of "proofs." It is wrong, therefore, in a spirit of doubt and suspicion, to abstain from them and retire behind the bulwarks of mysticism and agnosticism. "Believers are rather called to give an account of the hope that is in them even in the domain of science, and in firm trust in the justice of their cause, to stop the mouths of opponents and to repel their assaults" (p. 58). But he goes on to intimate at once that all the "proofs" that the Christian can marshal are nevertheless insufficient to place the truth of Christianity beyond doubt (pp. 56 and 57): and he elsewhere expresses his conviction of the secondary place of Apologetics sententiously, in the form that "Apologetics is the fruit, not the root of faith" (p. 24). We cannot help believing there is some slight confusion here. No one is in danger of believing that "the evidences" can produce "faith;" but neither can the presentation of Christ in the gospel produce "faith." "Faith" is the gift of God. But it does not follow that the "faith" that God gives is not grounded in "the evidences." Of course it is only the prepared heart that can fitly respond to the force of the "evidences," or "receive" the proclamation: just as it is only the eye that can see, as Dr. Bavinck explains, to which the sun can reveal itself. But this faith that the prepared heart yields,—is it yielded blindly and without reason, or is it yielded rationally and on the ground of sufficient reason? Does God the Holy Spirit work a blind and ungrounded faith in the heart? What is supplied by the Holy Spirit in working faith in the heart surely is not a ready-made faith, rooted in nothing and clinging without reason to its object; nor yet new grounds of belief in the object presented; but just a new power to the heart to respond to the grounds of faith, sufficient in themselves, already present to the mind. Our Reformed fathers did not overlook this: they always posited the presence, in the production of faith, of the "*argumentum*, propter quod credo," as well as the "*principium* seu *causa efficiens* à quâ ad credendum adducor." From this point of view, the presence to the mind of the "grounds" of faith is just as essential as the creative operation of the Giver of faith itself.

Perhaps we should say even more. The Holy Spirit does not produce faith without grounds. But the "grounds" may and do produce a faith without that specific operation of the Holy Spirit by which alone saving faith can be created in the soul. In saying this we have the fullest support from Dr. Bavinck's own exposition. He tells us that the rational arguments which are urged in favor of the truth of Christianity are of great use in silencing gainsayers. How can they so operate if they are adapted to produce no conviction in the minds of the gainsayers? He remarks again that these rational arguments can of themselves produce nothing more than "historical faith." This is true. But then "historical faith" is faith—is a conviction of mind; and it is, as Dr. Bavinck elsewhere fully allows, of no little use in the world. The truth therefore is that rational argumentation does, entirely apart from that specific operation of the Holy Ghost which produces saving faith, ground a genuine exercise of faith. This operation of the Spirit is not necessary then to produce faith, but only to give to a faith which naturally grows out of the proper grounds of faith, that peculiar quality which makes it saving faith.

Perhaps we may make this clear by an illustration drawn from the specific instance of "faith in God." Even as sinner, man cannot but believe in God: the very Devils believe—and tremble. But as sinner, man cannot have faith in God in the higher sense of humbly trusting in Him. Precisely what sin has done to man is to destroy the root of this trust by altering the relation to God in which man stands. Man as sinner is, of course, just as truly and just as entirely dependent on God as he was in his unfallen state: and because he is self-conscious he remains conscious of this, his relation of dependence on God; so long as he remains human he cannot escape the consciousness of dependence on God. But this consciousness no longer bears the same character as in the unfallen state. In the unfallen state consciousness of dependence on God took the "form" of glad and loving trust. By destroying the natural relation that exists between God and His creature and instituting a new relation—that proper to God and sinner—sin has introduced a new factor into the functioning of all human powers. The sinner instinctively and by his very nature, as he cannot help believing in God, in the intellectual sense, so cannot possibly exercise faith in God in the fiducial sense. On the contrary faith in this sense has been transformed into its opposite—faith has passed into unfaith, trust into distrust. Faith now takes the "form" of fear and despair. The reestablishment of it in the "form" of loving trust cannot be the work of the sinner himself. It can result only from a radical change in the relation of the sinner to God, brought home to the sinner by that creative act of the Holy Ghost which we call the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. Of course this restored "faith of trust" is not precisely the same thing as the "faith of trust" in unfallen man: it differs from that as a forgiven sinner differs from one who has never sinned. But this difference is not the important thing for our present purpose. That is the outstanding fact that "faith in God" is natural to man, belongs to him in all his states alike, and rests throughout them all on its proper grounds. What differs from state to state is the "form" taken by this faith—whether it is "formed" by trust or by fear. It cannot be hopeless, therefore, to produce in the sinner that form of conviction we call faith, by the presentation of the evidence on which it rests. What is hopeless is to produce by this evidence the "form" which faith takes in the regenerated sinner. That comes only by the operation of the Spirit of God. But faith without this is not therefore useless and of little worth.

It is a standing matter of surprise to us that the school which Dr. Bavinck so brilliantly represents should be tempted to make so little of Apologetics.

When we read, for instance, the really beautiful exposition which Dr. Kuyper has given us in his *Encyclopædia of Theology* of the relation of sin and regeneration to science, we cannot understand why he does not magnify instead of minifying the value of Apologetics. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in a tendency to make the contrast between the "two kinds of science"—that of nature and that of palingenesis—too absolute. There are "two kinds of men"—men under the power of sin and men under the power of the palingenesis; and the product of their intellection will naturally give us "two kinds of science": but the difference between the two is after all not properly described as a difference in *kind*—*gradus non mutant speciem*. For a critical estimate of Dr. Kuyper's view on this matter we should obviously take our start from an exact conception of the effects of sin on man. Sin clearly has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man's faculties, although (since it has affected *homo totus et omnis*) it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither reasons, nor feels, nor wills as he ought. The products of his action as a scientific thinker cannot possibly escape this influence, though they are affected in different degrees and through different channels, as Dr. Kuyper lucidly points out, in the several "sciences," in accordance with the nature of their object. Nevertheless there is question here rather of perfection than of kind of performance: it is "science" that is produced by the sinful subject even though imperfect science—falling away from the ideal, here, there and elsewhere, on account of all sorts of deflecting influences, entering it at all points of the process. The science of sinful man is thus a substantive part of the abstract science produced by the ideal subject, the general human consciousness, though a less valuable part that it would be without sin.

Regeneration, now, is not in the first instance the removal of sin; the regenerated man remains a sinner. It is only after his sanctification is completed that the contrast between him and the sinner can be thought to become absolute, and not till then could in any case the contrast between the intellection of the one and of the other become absolute. Meanwhile the regenerated man remains a sinner: no new faculties have been inserted into him by regeneration; and the old faculties common to man in all his states have been only measurably restored to their proper functioning. He is in no position therefore to produce a science different in *kind* from that produced by sinful man: the science of palingenesis is only a part of the science of sinful humanity, though no doubt its best part: and only along with it can it enter as a constituent part into that ideal science which the composite human subject is producing in its ceaseless effort to embrace in mental grasp the ideal object, that is to say, all that is. Indeed even if palingenesis had completed its work it may be doubted whether the contrast between the science produced by the two classes of men could be absolute. Even sinful men and sinless men are alike fundamentally men; and being both men, they know fundamentally alike. There is ideally but one science, the subject of which is the human spirit, and the object, all that is. Meanwhile, as things are, the human spirit attains to this science only in part and by slow accretions and through many partial and erroneous constructions. Men work side by side at the common task, and the common edifice takes gradually fuller and truer outlines. As Dr. Kuyper finely says himself (p. 151), in the conflict of perceptions and opinions those of the strongest energy and clearest thought finally prevail. Why is not the palingenesis to be conceived simply as preparing those stronger and clearer spirits, whose thought shall finally prevail? It is not a different kind of science that they are producing: it is not even the same kind but as part of a different edifice of truth. It is only the better scientific outlook, and the better scientific



product, striving in conflict with the product of fellow-workers to build itself into the one edifice of truth, which rises slowly because of sin but surely because of palingenesis.

Only in God's mind, of course, does science lie perfect—the perfect comprehension of all that is, in its organic completeness. In the mind of perfected humanity, the perfected ectypal science shall lie. In the mind of sinful humanity struggling here below, there can lie only a broken reflection of the object, a reflection which is rather a deflection. The great task of science lies in completing the edifice and correcting this deflection. Sinful man cannot accomplish it. But he makes the effort and attains his measure of success, a success that varies inversely with the rank of the sciences. The intrusion of regeneration prepares man to build better, and ever more truly as the effects of regeneration increase intensively and extensively, until the end comes when the regenerated universe becomes the well-comprehended object of the science of the regenerated race. Now it would seem a grave mistake to separate the men of the palingenesis from the race, a part of which they are, and which is itself the object of the palingenesis. And no mistake could be greater than to lead them to decline to bring their principles into conflict with those of the unregenerate in the prosecution of the common task of man. They will meet with dull opposition, with active scorn, with decisive rejection at the hands of the world: but thereby they shall win their victory. Just as the better science ever in the end secures its recognition, so palingenetic science, which is the better science, will certainly win its way to ultimate recognition. And it is in this fact that the vindication of Apologetics lies. Here too the “man of stronger and purer thought”—even though that he has it is of God alone—“will prevail in the end.” The task of the Christian is surely to continue hopefully to urge “his stronger and purer thought” in all its details on the attention of men. It is not true that he cannot soundly prove his position. It is not true that the arguments he urges are not sufficient to validate the Christian religion. It is not even true that the minds of sinful men are inaccessible to his “evidences”: though, in the sense of the proverb, “convinced against their will they remain of the same opinion still.” On the contrary, men (all of whose minds are after all of the same essential structure with his own, though less illuminated than his), will not be able to resist or gainsay his determinations. He must use and press the advantage that God has given him. He must insist and insist again that his and not the opposing results shall be built into the slowly rising fabric of truth. Thus will he serve, if not obviously his own generation, yet truly all the generations of men.

We are not, we repeat, absurdly arguing that Apologetics will of itself make a man a Christian. But neither can it be said that the proclaimed gospel itself can do that. Only the Spirit of life can communicate life to a dead soul. But we are arguing that Apologetics has its part to play in the Christianizing of the world: and that this part is not a small part: nor is it merely a subsidiary or a defensive part—as if its one end were to protect an isolated body of Christians from annoyance from the great surrounding world. It has a primary part to play and a conquering part. The individual, to be sure, does not need to become a trained apologist first, and only after and as a result of that a Christian. The individual is prone vastly to overestimate himself: it ordinarily does not require the whole “body of the evidences” to convince him. But surely he does require that kind and amount of evidence which is requisite to convince him before he can really be convinced: and faith, in all its forms, is a conviction of truth, founded as such, of course, on evidence. And this kind and amount of the evidences constitutes “Apologetics” for him and performs the functions of



Apologetics for him. When we speak of Apologetics as a science, however, we have our eye not on the individual but on the thinking world. In the face of the world, with its opposing points of view and its tremendous energy of thought and incredible fertility in attack and defense, Christianity must think through and organize its, not defense merely, but assault. It has been placed in the world to *reason* its way to the dominion of the world. And it is by reasoning its way that it has come to its kingship. By reasoning it will gather to itself all its own. And by reasoning it will put all its enemies under its feet.

Let it not be imagined that with all this we have done away with the "certainty of faith" as distinguished from "certainty of knowledge." We have only opened the way to a proper appreciation of the difference between the two. This difference is obviously the difference between faith and knowledge. And the difference between faith and knowledge is not that knowledge rests on evidence and faith does not, or that knowledge rests on sufficient evidence and faith does not, or that knowledge rests on grounds objectively or universally valid and faith does not. The difference is only that they rest on different kinds of evidence,—knowledge on "sight" and faith on "testimony." The whole question of a "certainty of faith" turns, therefore, simply on the question whether testimony is adapted to produce conviction in the human mind, and is capable of producing a conviction which is clear and firm,—a *firma certaque persuasio*. If we judge that it is, we shall have no choice but to range alongside of the various forms of "certainty of knowledge," whether resting on sense-perception, immediate intuition or rational demonstration, a "certainty of faith" also, resting on convincing testimony. This "certainty of faith" has nothing in it particularly mysterious; it is no more "incommunicable" than the "certainty of knowledge" and no more "subjective." Testimony that is "objectively" valid for the establishment of any fact, should be "subjectively" valid to establish it in the forum of any mind; and only such testimony should be valid to any mind whatever. But a conviction grounded on testimony is obviously of a different variety from a conviction grounded on "sight" and will have characteristics of its own. Chief among these is that in it the element of "trust," which is of course present in all forms of conviction (for knowledge itself rests on trust), is peculiarly prominent. In this fact only, so far as we can see, lies whatever relative justification it is possible to give to the notion that the certainty of faith is of a "lower" order than the certainty of knowledge, and bears a "more subjective" character. It does not appear, however, that either of these epithets is properly applied to it. There seems to be no reason why—if testimony is adapted to produce conviction at all—the conviction produced by testimony may not be as strong and as "objectively valid" as that produced by "sight" itself; that is, why it should not rise into "certainty." For "the certainty of faith" is obviously no more the product of faith than "the certainty of knowledge" is the product of knowledge. Strictly speaking it is just that faith itself raised to its eminent degree. No doubt, if by "certainty," "assurance," we mean the emotional accompaniments of the conviction—the rest, confidence, comfort, happiness, we find in it—it would be the product of faith; but so would the "certainty of knowledge" under such an understanding be the product of knowledge. In itself, however, it is just the conviction itself, and its validity depends only on the validity of the testimony on which it is grounded. If that testimony is really adequate to the establishment of the fact, the conviction founded on that testimony is as valid as any knowledge founded on "sight" can be.

We have wandered far from our text in Dr. Bavinck's apparent subordina-

tion of the function of the "evidences" in assuring us of the truth of the Christian religion. We should be sorry to be supposed in all this to be arraying ourselves polemically against his teaching. We are not sure that he would not give a hearty assent to all—or most—of what we have urged. The inherent interest and comparative novelty of the subject must be our excuse for taking so slight an occasion for such extended remarks. We shall hope to atone for it by extreme brevity as to the other point as to which we have signalized doubt, viz., Dr. Bavinck's apparent assumption of the invariable or normal implication of "assurance of salvation" in the direct act of faith. This is an old subject and one which has been much debated. Its solution seems ultimately to turn on our conception of the object of faith. If faith terminates on a proposition—however precious—it would seem necessary to look upon assurance as of its very essence. If it terminates rather on a person, this necessity is not apparent and the way lies open to treat assurance rather as a reflex of faith which may or may not manifest itself. All this is familiar ground.

We must not close without emphasizing the delight we take in Dr. Bavinck's writings. In them extensive learning, sound thinking, and profound religious feeling are smelted intimately together into a product of singular charm. He has given us the most valuable treatise on *Dogmatics* written during the last quarter of a century—a thoroughly wrought out treatise which we never consult without the keenest satisfaction and abundant profit. And the lectures and brochures he from time to time presents an eager public are worthy of the best traditions of Reformed thought and Reformed eloquence. Not least among them we esteem this excellent booklet on "the certitude of faith."

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE FIRST YEARS OF THE LIFE OF THE REDEEMED AFTER DEATH. A New Unfolding in Theology and in the Christian Life and Destiny Here and Hereafter. With some Connected Enquiries. By WILLIAM CLARKE ULYAT, A.M. New York: The Abbey Press, Publishers, 114 Fifth avenue. Pp. 270.

These speculations can hardly be considered seriously as "a new unfolding in theology." They are rather to be classed, as the author himself seems to intimate, with such works of the imagination as "The Gates Ajar." These chapters differ from that once popular book in that they are much more dogmatic in tone.

"Is theology a completed science? No! no!" cries the author, and makes the usual reference to Copernicus and Galileo to prove the rather easy proposition that the ecclesiastics are sometimes mistaken. The doctrine of an intermediate state is based on the fact that "men die imperfectly sanctified." This few will deny. The next proposition, however, is not so clear: "The indispensable qualification of sanctification for heaven there is no provision for attaining in an immediate complete change at the very moment of death. The redeemed are therefore halted in Paradise for this purpose." "Paradise is a great repair shop in which the righteous must tarry awhile before mounting into highest heaven." "It is a training school for something higher." "A sort of kindergarten is to be passed through." "As some on earth were made to tarry at Jericho till their beard was grown before they entered Jerusalem, so the saved on the threshold of their arrival above will be halted." These quotations give perhaps a sufficient indication of the doctrine underlying the speculations. It does not differ sufficiently from the doctrine of purgatory to warrant reopening that question.

As to the condition and employment of the redeemed after death, the author says they may have come to him "as it were in dreams and visions." This we can understand. But when he adds, "still I have found that they were not all a dream, so I have gathered confidence," and does not give us the ground of this confidence, we are of course unable to follow him and are left with his original notion of these things—that they are "visions and dreams," having the erratic and somewhat incoherent character peculiar to that class of psychological phenomena. As dreams they are, on the whole, pleasant reading.

The selections of poetry between the chapters are admirably chosen and add much to the attractiveness of the book.

There is a good portrait of the author as frontispiece, which will be enjoyed by his many friends.

*Princeton.*

SAMUEL A. MARTIN.

**THE CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW.** Three Addresses by GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, FRANCIS BROWN, Professors in Union Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

These addresses are grouped under the general head, "The Christian Point of View," and the preface notes, what the reader at once perceives, that they are closely related in theme and attitude. The addresses are of recent delivery—the first being given at the opening of the seminary term in 1900, the other two in connection with the closing exercises last May.

Dr. Knox discusses "The Problem for the Church," as suggested, apparently, by the proposed "change in the Confessional statements of the Presbyterian Church." He remarks on the "slow progress" made by the Church, and the "semi-paralysis of faith," and without hesitation locates the ailment "in the fundamental articles of the creed itself." Evidently, in his view, footnote explanations in the Confession and new chapters thereto, and "Brief Statement" for better understanding thereof, make no healing for the Church. He has no confidence in the lulling cry that "a new period of peace and progress is (now) begun"; and he declares that "discussion, and not misplaced confidence and premature peace," is the need of the hour; that to claim that we have a settled theology is a losing fight and is "the very centre of the unrest of the Church"; that half-measures are of no avail; and that to "yield it wholly (our present theology) is the only way to peace." The questions now at issue, Dr. Knox says, are not Calvinism and Arminianism, nor the Trinity or atonement, nor even the question of the authenticity and inspiration of Scripture. Such subjects "are not central," and conclusions thereon will not settle present issues. But the initial and underlying question is, What think we of God? That man's own reflection suggests a God of perfect attributes. That formal theology takes these conceptions and adds thereto those moral and spiritual apprehensions which the prophets and apostles furnish, and that then there come "the sonorous words of the Westminster divines" in their answer to the question, What is God? But this leaves him veiled and dim and far away and produces "only the feeling of wondering awe." The revelation of God made by Christ he seems to regard as not merely fuller, but as the only revelation, as if until then he had been altogether an unknown God. The Professor resolves all our knowledge of God into the moral delineation of him as given by Christ, as one who makes the sun to rise on the evil and the good and who sends rain on the just and the unjust. Let this picture of the divine character suffice for you. Make it your viewpoint and turn away



from ontology and give "the place of honor to ethics" and travel "the highway of service to our fellow-men." This will end the long conflict of the theologies. And thus, the Professor, with great naïveté, says, "The solution is simple!"

Dr. McGiffert takes up "Theological Reconstruction." He thinks this "one of the most crying needs of the day," for lack of which the progress of the gospel is impeded. He speaks almost entirely from the Ritschlian point of view, and religious knowledge seems to be only that which is subjective and experiential. The historic theologies hitherto occupying the Church have been "almost anything else than genuinely Christian," he says. And, as illustrative of what "has no rightful place in Christian theology," he tells us that "the creation of the world, the origin of man, the historicity of Adam, the fall, the deluge, Jonah, the nature and the attributes of the Absolute—with all these matters Christianity has absolutely nothing to do any more than with astronomy or geology or mathematics." Of course, on such lines of procedure there will be "more to follow" of elimination and ejection. The great principles of Christianity, long obscured, must now be brought out. And this will mean "a greater transformation than the Church has ever witnessed since the Protestant Reformation." The key to this reconstruction is found in the historic figure, Jesus Christ. The Bible as such, Old Testament and New, should be employed, not as an independent source of theology, but only as an aid to the better understanding of Christ. And, further, in making Christ the basis of theology, the constructive principle is not found in his incarnate personality, nor in "the historic events of his career—birth, death, resurrection and ascension." Neither is it in his life and work and teachings, in themselves considered. Christian theology is "the formulation of the controlling principles of the Christian life" and "with matters which do not affect life it has nothing to do." The principles which govern Christian life we are to ascertain by simply seeking the principles which governed Christ's life, and hence the formative principle in theology is the life-purpose of Jesus Christ. But, says the Professor, modern criticism has thrown some discredit on the gospel sources which reveal Christ; "of the genuineness of many of his utterances recorded in one or another of our gospels we cannot be altogether sure." This, though, is no difficulty for him. Even the mutilated gospels will still furnish a view of the life-purpose of Jesus sufficient to construct a new theology. The method, then, in Dr. McGiffert's system of reconstruction is, for the theologian first to "clear the deck" of whatever revealed facts which, in his individual judgment, do not affect Christian life and then selecting from Christ's ethical teachings whatever he chooses to regard as illustrating Christ's "life-purpose," to thus define and construct Christian theology.

Dr. Brown discourses on "The Religious Value of the Old Testament." It is "inevitable," he says, that the question should be asked, Are the Old Testament books really Christian Scriptures? Two extreme answers, he tells us, are given. One denies that they are and declares that for religious purposes we can safely neglect them. The other party affirms that they are an integral part of God's revelation of truth, of which the New Testament is a continuation. As between the two extremes Dr. Brown thinks it probable that the Old Testament, and religion generally, suffer more from the latter view than from the former. He seeks a middle ground. He would distinguish between the Old Testament's historical value and its religious value, and he presses the latter. He does not deny it has certain kinds of historical value, but he disclaims for it what he chooses to describe as the truthfulness of a "phonographic record"—as, for instance, "the literalness of the story about man and woman, and fruit tree, and serpent, and flaming sword." Of



course, finding in the chapter alone four matters of record of which he chooses thus to speak, he would have to unload his faith of many more were he to apply his sort of divining rod throughout the whole book. The Old Testament has religious value, but this "lies essentially in religious ideas and religious power." Whatever is in accord with the spirit and teaching of Christ "has religious value for us." (A suggestion this of Ritschl's *Value Judgments*.) He works throughout on the reversing hypothesis of the critics, that Israel's lapses into idolatry in the time of the prophets, were anterior to the monotheism which the Bible always represents as taught by Moses and established in the ritual of the wilderness. He finds the ethical far in the background. That God appears as caring for one people alone, as if a communal or national God, while other gods ruled elsewhere. He was "the old Hebrew God"—but our God, too, though in the evolutionary unfoldings, since the times of the Hebrews; he has become practically another God, so that "we worship the God we know and not the God Asaph or Heman knew."

It makes a painful impression to see these professors operating on such perilous border-lines, projecting "another gospel, which is not another," sowing beside all waters in their zeal and utilizing every opportunity to exploit their disturbing views—the social occasions of alumni gatherings, farewell remarks to departing graduates, seminary opening days with young men of the new class fresh from home and their mother's Bible—and, as if under the sense of an imperative mission, showing an unrelenting hostility to those conceptions of the truth which prevail in the churches and the homes of God's people.

*St. Louis, Mo.*

MEADE C. WILLIAMS.

HEDENDAAGSCHE MORAAAL door DR. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1902.

This little book contains a very interesting and instructive sketch of contemporaneous morals. It reads like a novel, for its style is pellucid and charming, simple and chaste, and the movement in the development of the theme is continuous and steady, neither too rapid nor too slow. It is indeed a little gem of great value, considered either from a literary or theological point of view. English and American readers will find in it a clear description of the history of the trend of continental moral thought since the middle of the last century. It is not written exclusively for the learned, although its scientific character is maintained throughout. The common educated reader will find the perusal of this charming book a delight. It is of an high order; only the learned apparatus has been dispensed with and the technical terms are conspicuous by their absence. Dr. Bavinck is a model of a truly popular writer. He is master of his subject and a wise steward of his treasures.

In the introduction, which is short and crisp, the author speaks of the importance of his subject on account of the ethical character of the burning questions of the day. The main divisions of his little book are: 1. The problem which presents itself to us; 2. The chief solutions which have been attempted lately and are being tried in our day; and 3. The criticism of all these solutions in the light of our Christian faith.

The second part, it is easily seen, gives us the description of contemporaneous morals. It is the historical part of the essay. It is an instructive review of pre-Kantian, Kantian and post-Kantian ethics. The voices we hear are strong and varied, as is natural when Kant, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and others speak to us. We do not wonder that the ensemble of all these opin-

ions is discordant indeed. A survey of the whole field convinces us that our contemporaries, as far as they represent the modern ideas, are adrift on the sea of skepticism. We would be in danger of losing our bearings if the author had not succeeded in his first part to place before us the problem which has to be solved. The great question which we must not lose sight of is, "Who decides what a man has to do and to leave undone? What is the authority which for all and for all times indicates and dictates the distinction between good and evil? What is good—*i.e.*, the moral in a more restricted sense—and what is the foundation whereon it rests?"

In times gone by, the author tells us, the answer to these important questions was: "The good rests in the will of God, who has revealed Himself in one way or other; He ordains what a man has to do or to leave undone; His law is the rule of our life. This was the belief of all men without exception—of heathen tribes and Mohammedans, of Jews and Christians." The signature of our time, on the contrary, is that man is the measure of all things. During the last century it was humanity and utilitarianism as embodied in the saying. The greatest good for the greatest number, which ruled supreme; but to-day it is rank individualism, which knows no other fountain of the moral good than the sovereign will of the individual.

In the third part of his essay the author first tries to show that there is something in the radical position of modern morals which is commendable as compared with the old liberal position of the middle of the last century. But, after having made this concession, he proves in a masterly way that all the different developments of morals are wrong in their foundation and that only the scriptural position, which glorifies the will of God as the fountain and foundation of morals, is the true solution of the burning questions of to-day.

The book deserves to be translated into English.

Dubuque, Iowa.

N. M. STEFFENS.

## V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

MISSIONARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE: A Discussion of Christian Missions and of some Criticisms upon them. By ROBERT E. SPEER, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902. 8vo, pp. 551.

This book is not just what its main title and the prospectus issued by its publishers might lead one to expect. *Missionary Principles and Practice* begets the anticipation of an orderly and reasoned development of principles and a scientific and comprehensive criticism of practice. The publishers say: "This book is the unique product of his (the author's) wide knowledge, his zeal and his constructive power. He may be said, in fact, to have created a science of missions." A science of missions! This great achievement has indeed come into the author's mind, but so far is he from regarding himself as having accomplished it, that he deplores the lack of such a science of missions, and points to the formulation of such a science as one of the great tasks yet waiting to be done. Speaking of certain dominant impressions which a traveler in mission lands is likely to bring back with him, Mr. Speer says (p. 44): "The third impression . . . is the absence of any body of accepted principles governing missionary operations. Here and there a great missionary has worked out some problem

and reached solid results, but in a score of other stations other missionaries, not knowing of his results or not willing to accept them, are working out the same problem for themselves. There is an immense amount of waste and loss in this. There is constant experimentation going on over questions already answered. A traveler among the missions is profoundly impressed by this. He finds that many missionaries are impressed by it also, and he comes back with the memory of many anxious inquiries as to when some body of common principles, the result of actual experience on the mission field, will be made available for new missions and missionaries. . . . All this suggests at once, obviously, the possibility and the need of a science of missions. A certain amount of experimentation was necessary. A science of missions could not be deductively reasoned out. But now, after one hundred years of actual experience, of mistake and blunder and success, the time would seem to have come for some sincere attempt to embody the approved results of the best missionary work in such statements as shall clear the ground of much present discussion and save much needless duplication of past painful experiences."

Here then is a great and necessary task. To survey the whole missionary experience of the Church; to pick out those aspects of her missionary history which are essential, passing by those that are accidental; to seize the unity that underlies the diversity; to marshal the facts in a systematic fashion, so that their meaning shall become clear; to apply the principles so developed to the solution of the great problems of missions; by this means to set the Protestant Christian world beyond the necessity of experiment with regard to some of the chief aspects and methods and problems of the missionary enterprise; to gather within the compass of a single volume the ripe fruits of mission history, set forth in a form that shall make the book a *vade mecum* for every missionary, a manual for every mission Board, a text-book for use in every theological seminary—here, we repeat, is a great and necessary task which some one ought soon to undertake. Perhaps there is no man better equipped for it than Mr. Speer. Endowed with a strong mind, well disciplined, finely cultured, widely read and with a heart in deepest sympathy with the theme; never a missionary indeed, but widely traveled in mission lands, and now for more than ten years in daily touch with the actual conduct of missionary operations in a score of fields; a master in the art of perspicuous and moving speech; come to his inheritance at the beginning of the second century of modern organized missions; now in the full strength of his powers of body and mind, why should not Mr. Speer give us this epoch-making book, which would set the Church in her work of evangelizing the world somewhat as Augustine did in her theology when he wrote his *City of God*? We say, Why should he not do it? For, the publishers to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not done it in the volume now under view. He has indeed embodied in it a chapter on "The Science of Missions," in which he has given us an outline of some of the topics which should be included in such a scientific treatment. There should be, for example, the discussion and definition (1) of the aim of missions, (2) of the means of missions, (3) of the methods of missions, (4) of the agents of missions; and in addition there should be treatment of certain supplementary questions, such as the standards of admission to mission churches, the forms of ecclesiastical organization to be given to such churches, their proper relation to the parent churches in Christian lands, the respective functions of the mission and the native Church, the matter of self-support and the whole subject of the use of money in actual mission work, comity and coöperation between different denominations at work in the same field. It is true that at least one of the subjects suggested above—education as a



missionary method—is worked out with some fulness, but when it is remembered that the whole chapter under consideration numbers only twenty-five pages, it will be seen that hardly more was possible than an amplified table of contents for such a science of missions as has been suggested. It is true also that Mr. Speer has treated some of these subjects in other chapters. There are chapters on *The Aim of Missions*, *What are Christian Missionaries Trying to Do?* *The Evangelization of the World in this Generation*. The means of missions have been admirably commented on in chapters entitled *Prayer and Missions* and *The Holy Spirit and Missions*. The agents of missions have also received attention in a sane chapter on *The Kind of Men Needed in Foreign Missions*, and the methods of missions have been touched on in a chapter on *Higher Education in Missions*, with Special Reference to Conditions in China.

There is, therefore, some excellent material for a science of missions, but no more. The form, the comprehensiveness, the unity and progress, the balance and proportion and singleness of literary aim that must characterize such a scientific treatment are wanting. For this volume has only such unity as arises from the fact that it is devoted to various aspects of one great subject. Its unity is only such as belongs to the two volumes of R. N. Cusht's *Notes on Missionary Subjects*, or to the Report of the Ecumenical Missionary Conference. In other words, it is for the most part a collection of missionary articles and addresses published or delivered by Mr. Speer at sundry times. This is frankly stated in the Preface. Many who read the book will recognize with pleasure addresses which they may have heard at the conventions of the Student Volunteer Movement in Cleveland and Toronto, at the Ecumenical Conference, and at the Twentieth Century meeting of the Presbyterian General Assembly. Many of the chapters bear the marks of the immediate occasions which gave rise to them. This is particularly true of the eight or ten that grew out of the events connected with the Boxer outbreak in China. Two chapters are rather light sketches of missionary travel; half a dozen others are portraits of native converts in Japan, Korea, China, Persia. Others still are of a somewhat ephemeral importance, *e. g.*, those devoted to Minister Wu and Li Hung Chang. Two are biblical studies, having to do with Paul's first and second journeys as illustrating certain principles of missionary procedure.

It is true that by arranging this somewhat miscellaneous collection of papers and addresses in a certain order an attempt is made to impose a kind of unity upon them. In the Table of Contents the chapters are grouped into four divisions, entitled, respectively, "Part I. General Principles Stated;" "Part II. General Principles Applied;" "Part III. Need and Results;" "Part IV. Privilege and Duty," and in his Preface the author endeavors to show that this arrangement vindicates the title of his book. "The purpose of this volume," he says, "is (1) to set forth some of the main principles of the mission movement, on which it rests in its appeal at home and its work abroad; (2) to apply these principles in some illustrative instances, especially to the conditions in China . . . which many regard as putting the missionary enterprise to a conclusive test; (3) to suggest by a few sketches of mission fields and the results of mission work in life both the need and the power of the work, and (4) to enforce the duty and privilege of the serious attempt speedily to evangelize the world, and thus enable Christianity at once to display and realize its divine mission to mankind." But surely it is not unfair to say that such an arrangement of material more or less miscellaneous in its character does not suffice to give more than an *ex post facto* unity. The unity so arising is not genetic, vital, objective; it is subjective, and while it may please the mind of the author, it



neither justifies itself to the reader nor lends any additional weight to the impression the book makes upon his mind.

But though we have not in this book "a science of missions," and though the question must be raised whether its contents really warrant the title *Missionary Principles and Practice*, we have a useful and timely and inspiring volume. It will be widely read, and wherever it is read it will advance the cause of missions. Mr. Speer speaks to a large audience. His position as Secretary of a great mission Board, his close connection with the Student Volunteer Movement and the Intercollegiate Young Men's Christian Association, the force of his personality, the eloquence of his utterance, and his previous successes as an author, will all combine to secure for this volume the attention of a large portion of the Christian public. And the larger the better, for there is not a page in it that does not ring true to a broad and sane and Scriptural conception of missions. It is written in the conscious conviction that the Bible and the facts of missionary experience in the past and the present are the only sources from which to draw true judgments as to missionary questions. It sets forth no narrow or one-sided doctrine of missionary duty or aim or motive or method. On all these points the author strikes a full and satisfying chord. If he speaks of the grounds of the missionary enterprise, he gives full recognition to the obligations that arise from the explicit command of Christ and the appeal that springs out of the moral and spiritual need of the heathen, and then goes on to show how missions root their sanction in the very nature of the Gospel and the heart of God. If he deals with the aim of missions, he does indeed have much to say about "the evangelization of the world in this generation," and he says it with a force and incisiveness that must command the admiration of even the sharpest critic of this motto; but at the same time he puts upon the expression a broad and Scriptural interpretation, while he hastens to avow his unqualified assent to the truth emphasized by Henry Venn and Rufus Anderson and Gustav Warneck, that the crowning aim must be the establishment in each heathen land of a living, self-supporting, self-governing, self-propagating church. If he sets forth missionary methods, he lays emphasis on all the great historical agencies of missionary endeavor, evangelistic, educational, literary, medical and philanthropic, while he utters a needed warning against allowing means to become ends to be sought for their own sake. If he appeals to missionary history, the figures that rise before his imagination are the great missionaries. He keeps his eyes on Paul and Barnabas, on Francis of Assisi and Francis Xavier, on Raymond Lull and Christian Schwartz, on William Carey and Adoniram Judson, on Henry Martyn and Alexander Duff and David Livingstone. If he quotes present day missionaries, he shows that the older and well-tried men are those who command his confidence, men like Griffith John, and John Ross, and John L. Nevius, and Hunter Corbett, and Bishop Thoburn, and Jacob Chamberlain, and J. C. R. Ewing, and Henry H. Jessup and John G. Paton. If he adduces opinions in support of his own, he turns by preference to the proceedings of the great missionary conferences in Shanghai and Bombay, in London and New York. The man who writes this book has intense convictions and a masterful spirit, but he is not a doctrinaire, not a radical. He has breadth of view, comprehensiveness of grasp, a keen historic sense, a quick instinct for what is of real worth, what is sane, what has the support of Scripture, what has stood the test of experience. These are great qualities of mind, and when they are combined with such unusual power and felicity of expression as Mr. Speer has at command, and engaged on a subject such as missions, the result must be a great book; and yet there is about this book something better than soundness of view, breadth of grasp, force of utter-

ance, and this is sincerity, dignity, elevation of spirit. The great subjects with which it deals are handled with seriousness and reverence such as befits them, and through all these papers and addresses the reader feels the impact of a sincere and earnest spirit who "stands ever as in his great Taskmaster's eye," who is determined to bring every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ. "The convictions that underlie these discussions," says Mr. Speer in his Preface, "are (1) that Jesus Christ is the only Saviour and Lord of human life, and that it is as certain that He is to rule the whole world as it is that the world needs to be redeemed and rightly ruled, and that He alone is able to redeem and rule it rightly; and (2) that Christ is Master not only of the life that now is, but also of that which is to come, that He is the Way, the Truth and the Life, that no man cometh unto the Father but by Him, that out of Him there is salvation neither here nor hereafter, while

"In Him is life provided  
For all mankind."

This is no academic utterance. These are not merely the logical presuppositions of this book, they are the author's deepest and most controlling personal faith; and no man can read his book without being strengthened and quickened in the same faith.

*Pittsburgh, Pa.*

CHALMERS MARTIN.

**FAITH AND LIFE.** Sermons by GEORGE TYBOUT PURVES, D.D., LL.D., Late pastor of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York. Sometime professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. With an introductory note by Benjamin B. Warfield, D.D., LL.D., professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. Pp. xxx and 380.

Here is a volume which disproves the common saying that sermons that are good to hear are not good reading. These twenty sermons were great orations, they are delightful to read.

Of course, we miss the magnetism of the great-hearted man of God who poured them forth from gracious lips. We miss the splendid rush of enthusiastic fervor which characterized his manner and kindled a kindred flame in our hearts. We do not, in all cases, have even the words he used, for his manuscript was never followed closely—was rarely before him when he spoke.

We have, however, his lucid interpretation, his breadth of view, his sweet sympathy with men, and the directness of aim with which he brought the Master's message home to the soul. It is possible also that we have a certain vividness of expression, a flavor of freshness, that would have been diminished if even the author had revised them for publication.

These twenty sermons were taken—so the editor informs us—practically at random from the hundreds of manuscript sermons left by Dr. Purves. They cover a wide range of subject matter, a great variety of themes and methods of treatment. They expound the deepest doctrines of the person of Christ; they exhort, in simple words, to the most practical of daily duties; they contain the results of profound scholarship, and nice analysis of character; and they bring grateful messages of comfort and of hope. In their wide range they reflect the author, for nothing that concerns the Christian was alien to his thought or sympathy.

As a whole, these sermons are distinguished by two qualities not often found in such perfection, and still more rarely found in such harmonious

combination. These qualities are exactness of scholarship and simplicity of expression.

The texts are interpreted with a delicate perception of their entire content that opens the Scriptures in a most satisfying way. Then the message is brought home to the soul with a clear call, like that of a pilot calling the course of a ship.

In literary style they are all alike. The sentences are almost always short and simple. The diction is that of a scholar, but not 'hat of the school—the clear, correct English which is "understood of the people." There are few illustrations, not a line of poetry in the whole twenty sermons, and comparatively few allusions to literature outside of the Sacred Scriptures. The divisions are not often formally stated, but there is a clear, logical movement in each sermon, which runs directly from text to conclusion.

There is absolutely no art for art's sake; no attempt to entertain; no adornment of the theme by ornaments laid on; but always an earnest, sometimes impassioned, pressing of the message to the soul. They may be said to be severe in their rhetorical style as Doric architecture, and, like that, dependent for their beauty on the correctness of their proportions and the harmony of their design; and, like that architecture also, in that they do not fail to please.

In their adaptation to the needs of men to-day they are singularly free from such concessions to popular demands as are supposed to bring religious instruction "up-to-date." The kind of messages we have here are undated; they are perennial, or eternal. They depend for their reception on the principle that truth is always up-to-date. The binomial theorem will never need revision. The essential elements of godliness are the same to-day as in the days of Abraham. And the great God-given hunger of the soul for truth can be relied upon to furnish the hearing ear, when any man has a clear message from God to give.

If any are alarmed or filled with dread by the cries of those who say we must reread our Bibles in the light of modern research, and must reconstruct our scheme of Christian living so as to bring it into touch with the "new learning" of our day, they will find ground for confidence in the fact that scholarship so broad, so accurate, as this finds, not only the old interpretations sound and true, but the old forms of statement adequate to body forth the deepest, highest, latest truth, and carry it to men who live in the swiftest currents of our modern life.

The fierce light that beats upon the sacred page to-day is sometimes more evidently fierce than illuminating; but we are interested to find that one who read his New Testament under the glare of all lights, old and new, read with clear vision the old truths, written large and written plain. He read it thus:

"If we present to men the Christ of the Bible, we may expect to find the natural mind ever disappointed with Him. And it will not be worth our while to try to remove the prejudice by arraying Him in tawdry robes that do not belong to Him. We shall not secure true allegiance to Him by instituting a comparison between Him and other masters. If we could show that He surpassed all others in their spheres, we should still have failed in our mission. In fact, however, as I have stated, the comparison will be disappointing. Such efforts are but little better than when the soldier cast the purple cloak upon Him and cried, 'Hail, King of the Jews!'

"Nay, we must present Him as He really is. He must ever be known as the Crucified. Just because He is that, are we sure that He is the Divine. He is not to be measured by others. He is so infinitely noble, that these measurements do not apply to Him. But, whenever by the Spirit of God



human souls are wakened to the reality of guilt and to the bondage of sin, will they see that, as despised and rejected of men, Jesus is what they need. With this all their judgments will change. The false splendor of the world's pomp will fade away. The pride of intellect will abase itself before Him as the highest truth. Even the striving after good will change into striving after God. The unutterable glory of the cross will dawn upon them. Christ will no more be one of many masters. He will be the Lamb and the Word of God."

*Princeton.*

S. A. MARTIN.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE PATH OF THE GREAT PHYSICIAN. By VALERIA FULLERTON PENROSE. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1902. 12mo, pp. 276. \$1.00.

Medical missions, especially those of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., is the subject treated under this too indefinite title. Miss Penrose, who is a devoted student and advocate of missions, has done service to the cause in gathering and presenting the material embodied in this volume. The opening chapter presents varied testimony to the efficiency of medical missions as a philanthropic and evangelizing agency, and by comparison of the medical equipment at home and abroad emphasizes heathendom's sore need of the missionary doctor. "Korea," "China," "Siam" . . . "Africa," and "Where little is done" are the titles of succeeding chapters. The line of treatment under each is in general: the prevalent diseases; the native ideas and superstitions regarding their cause, nature and remedy; the beginning of medical missions; the experiences of the medical missionary; sketches of notable physicians like Drs. Parker, Kerr and Hepburn; descriptions of the Presbyterian hospitals and dispensaries, and the beneficent fruits of medical missions. Because the author has depended upon facts to make their own appeal, the book is not only an effective plea for medical missions, but also a manual, well indexed, for those who study or teach missions. A more scientific treatment of the method and problems of medical missions than falls within the scope of the present volume is a needed work awaiting a competent hand.

CHILD CULTURE, According to the Laws of Physiological Psychology and Mental Suggestion. By NEWTON N. RIDDELL. Chicago: Child of Light Publishing Co. Pp. 130. 65 cents.

The title-page, announcing the author as "Lecturer on Heredity, Physiological Psychology, Psychic Phenomena, Inspiration, Brain Building and Soul Growth," awakens suspicions of the book. These are partly confirmed and in larger part dissipated by the perusal of the book. Its science is pretentious and does not lay deep enough hold upon the author himself much to affect his analysis of child nature, counsels to parents and teachers or methods of culture, which are for the most part excellent. The method upon which most stress is laid is Suggestion, that is, "the making of a deep abiding impression upon the inner consciousness, and thereby modifying mind and character." It is gratifying to find in a book of this sort emphasis laid upon moral training. Jesus as the true ideal, reverence for God, family worship and the spiritual birth.

THE GIST OF THE LESSON. A Concise Exposition of the International Sunday-school Lessons for the Year 1903. By R. A. TORREY. Pp. 160. 25 cents net. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company.

This little book is readily carried in one's vest pocket. The type is small,



the lines close and the margin cut close to the print. It is thus condensed to the smallest physical dimensions. The thought is equally condensed and the book contains a remarkable quantity of information, suggestion and illustration. The style of the book is popular rather than scholarly. The best feature of it are its abundant cross-references to Scripture. It is convenient and commendable.

THE GOSPEL IN THE CHRISTIAN YEAR AND IN CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.

By RANDOLPH H. MCKIM, Rector of the Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D. C. New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 12mo, pp. 343. \$1.40 net.

These sermons remind one of the Pauline epistles in their exposition of great doctrines of the faith and principles of conduct, followed by the application of these to life so that they become "practical sermons for the people." The conceptions, of the preacher as simply an interpreter of Scripture, of literary finish, of spirituality and of doctrine are, Dr. McKim shows us, consistent with interesting, helpful preaching.

FAITH, FELLOWSHIP AND FEALTY. By CLELAND B. MCAFEE. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 27. 25 cents.

Under this title we have here three short chapters on the themes: I. Becoming a Christian; II. Becoming a Church Member; III. Becoming a Church Helper. It is simple, clear, wise and judicious—just the book to put into the hands of every young man and young woman in our congregations.

Princeton.

S. A. MARTIN.

## VI.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POETRY. By Prof. MARK H. LIDDELL, A. M. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1902.

We have been awaiting with interest Prof. Liddell's promised work on the Shakespearian text, which work, it is gratifying to state, is now well under way. Meanwhile, he has offered us a contribution to the critical study of Poetry, the full title of the volume being *An Introduction to the Scientific Study of English Poetry*, most of his illustrations being taken, as he tells us, from Shakespeare. He calls it a "scientific study" as distinct from what he conceives to have been the superficial methods that have hitherto prevailed, seeming to mean by the term scientific a discussion of the "essential elements" of poetry, these elements however being presented, mainly, from the viewpoint of structure or form rather than from that of content and purpose. Hence, the title-page tells us that the treatise may be regarded as "Prolegomena to a Science of English Prosody," and in the Preface we are told that it is "a statement of prolegomena to a science of poetry." Poetry and Prosody are thus used in a sense interchangeably. Just here, Prof. Liddell has approached the subject from a new point of view and presented it by a method quite his own. It is thus that not only Book Second is seen to be, as stated, a discussion of "The Elements of English Verse Form," but fully one-half of Book First is such a discussion, though entitled "Poetry in General." Indeed, of the seventeen chapters of the volume, but three or four can properly be said to lie outside the area of a

specific study of structure. The method is thus necessarily and purposely technical, reminding us somewhat, as we read, of Lanier's *Science of English Verse* or Ten Brink's *Language and Metre of Chaucer*. A recent volume, *The Analytics of Literature*, has applied this technical method to the general department of Letters. In the book before us it is applied to Poetry only, a valid illustration of it being found in the submitted Definition of Poetry—"Poetry is literature, usually, of a high degree of Human Interest, which in addition to its Human Interest has in it an Æsthetic Interest due to the arrangement of some easily recognizable and constantly present concomitant of thought formulation into a form of æsthetic appeal, for which an appreciative Æsthetic Sentiment has been gradually developed in the minds of those who habitually think by means of the language in which the poetry is written." The author holds "that the phenomena of poetry are not of such a nature as to defy the ordinary processes of rational analysis." We are not sure but that Prof. Liddell has carried his "analysis" too far; that he has pushed his theory, good in its place, to an extreme, by interpreting the word scientific too narrowly, in the direction of prosody and poetic structure, and reducing so imaginative a product as poetry to the formulae of the chemical laboratory. The conception of poetry is, after all, not so abstruse nor is its embodiment in a definition so complex and confusing.

We could wish that the author had more fully developed his theme along the lines suggested in a few of his chapters, such as that on "General Aspects and Limitations of Poetry" or that on "Emotional Concomitants of Poetry," in fact, on lines more strictly literary and not so didactic and pedagogic and almost professional. It is such a discussion of Poetry that we are especially needing, after the manner of Shairp and Dowden and Courthope and Stedman, and not with the curriculum of the classroom too conspicuously in view.

We trust that Prof. Liddell, having thus given *An Introduction to the Study of Poetry*, may be inclined to give us a volume on Poetry itself—its nature and sources; its laws and processes; its affinities and interests, and, above all, its governing spirit and purpose in literature and the intellectual world at large.

THEODORE W. HUNT.

ROMAN AFRICA. An Outline of the History of the Roman Occupation of North Africa, based chiefly upon Inscriptions and Monumental Remains in that Country. By ALEXANDER GRAHAM, F.S.A., F.R.I.B.A. With thirty reproductions of original drawings by the author, and two maps. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co.. 1902. Svo, pp. xiii, 325.


As they were in duty bound, the French have given themselves with great diligence to the study of the history and antiquities of North Africa. But there is a lack of good text-books, to say nothing now of thorough treatises on the subject in English. The present somewhat sumptuous volume only partially supplies the want. It is rather a considerable body of historical comments based on the monumental remains than a consecutive history that it offers us; and though the author's personal experiences and observations brighten somewhat the pages the total outcome is not lively reading. As a supplementary handbook to be used in conjunction with other sources of information it is not without its value. And in any event it supplies the English reader with a welcome general account of the historical inscriptions and monuments of North Africa.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.



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